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ABSTRACT
I
ORDER AND DISORDER IN EARLY CONNECTICUT:
NEW HAVEN, 1639-1701
|

I
3
f

ROBERT W. ROETGER
University of New Hampshire, May,

1982

This dissertation assesses order and disorder in

New

Haven, Connecticut from its founding in 1639 to the intro
duction of Justices of the Peace in 1701.

It juxtaposes con

cepts of the well-ordered society as expressed in puritan
rhetoric with the reality of behavior as reflected in legal
documents to illustrate the pre-eminent role assumed by law
in ordering society.
not

What emerges is a picture of society

rigidly caught up in the policies of perfection,

but one

characterized by responsive lawmaking, equally flexible en
forcement,

and reliance upon formal legal institutions to

resolve private controversies.
The study begins with a portrait of the well-ordered
society.

It was a God-ordained social order dictated by

the religiosity of New Haven's founders and based on volun
tary covenants which defined basic social institutions.

Yet

this picture soon faded as settlers encountered the conditions
of life in New England.

Voluntarism gave way to a new order

vii

as defined through law— local bylaws and colony statutes—
that departed significantly from the Biblically based notion
of law that helped delineate order in 1639.
Challenges to order mirrored the growth of law which was
traditional and secular.

An examination of 900 violations

of local bylaws illustrates that most disorders related to the
physical adjustments of life in America.

Furthermore,

the

petty offenders who violated these ordinances were well-estab
lished members of the community who were prosecuted with a
mixture of charity and pragmatism.
violated colony statutes,

So were individuals who

thereby threatening moral order.

Analysis of 550 colony violations indicates that New Haven had
its share of social deviants who were excluded for their mis
conduct.
abusers,

But most moral offenders,
thieves,

specifically alcohol

and fornicators, were punished with in

creased leniency by magistrates who assumed a realistic per
spective on morality.
Finally,

an assessment of 350 civil suits which chal

lenged social harmony reveals that authorities utilised es
tablished law to resolve disputes equitably.

Formal litiga

tion promoted social order and was a chosen method of con
flict resolution by litigants who rejected the "peaceful
and loving" procedure of arbitration,
well-ordered society.

so symbolic of the

INTRODUCTION

The behavior of puritans has fascinated serious and notso-serious students of history for generations.

As a group,

these religious enthusiasts who settled New England have
also been frequently misunderstood,

if not misrepresented.

Yet every November they are memorialized as schoolchildren
participate in pagents where blunderbusses and dreary cos
tumes are standard props.
ways across the country.

Indian corn is displayed on door
And John and Priscilla Alden-like

figurines embellish Thanksgiving tables.

For better or for

worse, puritans have been characterized as being uncompro
misingly severe in literary works like Hawthorne's The
Scarlet Letter and in films, such as Victor Seastrom's 1926
adaptation of that classic.

Indeed, one of the greatest

attractions for tourists who visit historical sites in New
England are the stocks and pillory— testimony to an image
of puritans that pervades the popular mind.
Misimpressions have not been restricted to the general
public.

For years antiquarians and historians have inter

preted puritan society differently,

thus lending credence

to the notion that every generation writes its own history.
It is not that historians have disagreed with one another
consistently,

rather that they have had either different in

terests or training which have found expression in their

2
writings.

Beginning with the filial pietistic writers of

the mid-nineteenth century,

like George Bancroft who viewed

puritans as precursors of political and religious freedom,
historians have portrayed the saints from numerous perspec
tives.

Even in the shadow of the whigs, researchers like

Brooks and Charles Francis Adams offered different assess
ments;

for the first time, puritans were condemned for their

apparent intolerance.^
With the turn of the century came still new perspectives.
James Truslow Adams interjected elements of determinism into
the growing body of literature on puritans by suggesting that
the founders of New England communities were motivated more
by economic considerations than by religious fervor.

Adams'

thesis was challenged by Samuel Eliot Morison who, along with
others, placed greater emphasis on'what Adams rejected:
religious orientation of the Great Mirgration.

the

Indeed, the

1930s signalled a ground swell of intellectual history epit
omized by the work of Perry Miller.

More so than any scholar

of his generation, Miller argued that puritan behavior was a
by-product of their ideas.

Among other things,

this led him

to conclude that the first three generations of New Englanders
were wedded to an unbroken unified body of thought.

Clearly

there were other writers during the twenties and thirties
who blazed new paths of their own by stressing, as did the
imperial school of historians,

the network of relationships

that tied New England to the mother country.

But it was the

so-called Miller paradigm that has provoked the greatest

3
interest— and criticism— by historians in recent decades.
As noted by Edmund Morgan, Miller's monolithic view of New
England has sparked exhaustive research generated "by the
2
insights in a single paragraph."
Just as Morison and Miller departed from the perspectives
of their predecessors,

historians of the sixties and seven

ties emphasized an aspect of New England history largely ne
glected by professional scholars— society.

Younger writers

especially began moving away from the puritan's thought by
analyzing their behavior.

This entailed a fresh look at

sources— tax lists, vital statistics,

and court records—

that had been under-utilized in recent years, but which sud
denly seemed more manageable with the advent of computer
technology.

If the labors of these social historians have

been next to monumental,

so too have their contributions.

They have taken readers well beyond the "pots and pans"
social history of the late nineteenth century by providing
far-reaching insights into the lives of early New Englanders.
Pioneering studies by John Demos and Philip Greven have
illustrated how markedly family life changed over time.
Darrett Rutman and Kenneth Lockridge have documented the
erosion of utopian ideals characteristic of many communities
at the outset of settlement.

And a host of other studies

including those by James Henretta, Richard Bushman,

and

David Konig have explored various aspects of New England
society.

All have aided immeasurably ii^-b^r-eaking down

stereotypes about puritans that for years existed in lay

and academic circles.

3

With the exception of Konig's work,

however,

few have focused on law and puritan society exclu

sively.

Nor has a single topic promised to contribute as

much to our understanding of puritan behavior.
From an historiographical point of view,

"legal" studies

of seventeenth-century New England generally have followed
three avenues of inquiry.

The oldest and most traditional

is the study of law per se and the way it developed in the
new world.

The earliest of these works were written by

lawyers and thus in part explains their proclivity for ex
amining law, but not necessarily other aspects of social
control.

Noteworthy is the work of Julius

Goebel Jr.,

who argued that much of the law in early Plymouth,

Massa

chusetts was customary and therefore traceable to practices
followed in English rural communities.

4

So too was the

network of courts "transplanted" by the settlers of New
England.

Both of these notions were reinforced and expanded

upon by George Lee Haskins whose Law and Authority in Early
Massachusetts:

A Study in Tradition and Design is a classic
5
in the field of early American legal history.
Haskins'

analysis displays a deep appreciation for the way various
sources of law were interwoven within the fabric of puritan
society.

And he is to be credited with the first in-depth

exploration of written codes which were, by the last quar
ter of the seventeenth century, well entrenched features of
the colonial legal milieu.

Both these and other works

helped lay the foundation for the study of law in New

5
England.

But despite their contributions,

they had little

to say about how law was actually enforced.
This has been the avenue taken by another group of
writers whose principal interest has been crime and punish
ment.

Again, Massachusetts was the setting for these works.

The first full-length examination of crime was written by
Edwin Powers who offered readers a "documentary history."
But,
of

6

it was little more than that— a chronological catalog
laws, crimes,

and punishments which did not help to al

ter the perception that puritan lawbreakers were socially
maladjusted criminals whose behavior was punished severly.
Although his Wayward P u r i t a n s :

A Study in the Sociology of

Deviance tended to reinforce this view, Kai T. Erikson provided readers with a more complex analysis.

7

Wayward Puri

tans is the product of Erikson's training in the field of
sociology and it utilizes modern theories of deviance to
explain the behavior of puritans in Essex County, Massa
chusetts.

Erikson correctly contends that all societies

single out individuals for deviance through a variety of
means and for a number of different reasons.

However,

his

study is flawed by the assumption that Essex men and women
who appeared before county authorities were summarily
labelled as deviants.

Once so designated,

the argument

goes, lawbreakers were locked into deviant roles which pre
cluded reintegration into society.

Clearly this was true

with some, but not all, offenders.

Erikson's conclusions

appear to have been based on a marriage between the theory

6
of deviance and an overly literal interpretation of puritan
theology.

This gave rise to the notion that malfeasance was

a sign of damnation and hence a basis for assessing deviant
behavior.

More recently,

however,

a study of Middlesex

County, Massachusetts by Eli Faber suggests a different con
clusion:

most offenders were "treated with leniency after
Q

they had been punished" and few were actually excluded.
David Konig concurs,

even though his principal consider-

ation is not crime and punishment.

9

Indeed, Konig is thus-

far the lone traveller along the third avenue of legal
scholarship that twists and turns through the unfamiliar
landscape of civil litigation.

Like Erikson, Konig chose

Essex County as the setting of his analysis.

But unlike

previous writers who have speculated that legal conflict
was detrimental to social stability, Konig argues that
"litigation was a useful agent of orderly and desirable
social change."10

Law and Society is the most recent in a

series of legal studies undertaken in the past two decades
which has broadened our understanding of puritan behavior.

The present analysis of order and disorder in early
Connecticut merges all three avenues of legal scholarship
to assess the role played by law in ordering the society
of New Haven from its settlement in 1639 to the introduc
tion of Justices of the Peace in 1701.

Among other things,

it will be shown that challenges to order encountered in
the new world were transcended by imaginative lawmaking and

realistic enforcement that had little in common with the
solutions envisioned by the founders of New England.
The first of five chapters thus begins with an examina
tion of the well-ordered society as defined by leading fig
ures of the errand into the wilderness.

Included in this

group were New Haven's co-founders Theophilus E a t o n , a London
merchant,

and John Davenport,

town for 30 y e a r s .

the spiritual guide of the

To their way of thinking success in the

new world required unswerving adherence to a Biblic

iy based

concept of order that reflected their religious ideals.
They believed that it was possible to erect a "city upon a
hill" grounded upon a voluntaristic commitment to a Godordained vision of society.
ceeded.

And to a large measure they suc

New Haven's early domestic,

ecclesiastical, politi

cal, and legal institutions conformed to what has been des
cribed as the "policies of perfection."

But we also know

that the ideal, though not the commitment to order, crumbled
in the face of new world conditions.
appropriate to ask:

It therefore seems

If puritan rhetoric alone could not

maintain order, what did?
In part, the question is answered in Chapter 2 which
addresses the evolution of law and suggests that the majority
of laws formulated in New Haven bore little resemblance to
the Mosaic or Biblical law upon which the community rested.
A close look at lawmaking reveals that most laws were not
adopted to restrain sinners, but were traditional responses
to disorders adapted to fit conditions of life in New

England.

This is seen most explicitly on the local level

where the town meeting passed bylaws aimed at preserving
physical order.

These ordinances dealt with problems such

as fire prevention and livestock control considered neces
sary to sur'.rival in the wilderness.

Laws were also passed

by colony officials and then codified in an effort to pro
mote order through legal uniformity.

It was on the colony

level that the "fundamental laws” of puritans were delinea
ted.

But even here,

minority.

Moreover,

Biblically based statutes were in the
it becomes clear that within years of

settlement the God-ordained vision of the properly ordered
society was supplanted by one grounded on a combination of
traditional and homespun secular law.
This view is reinforced by the first of two chapters
devoted to disorders as seen through law enforcement.
Chapter 3 analyzes the context of petty crimes— violations
of town ordinances— which thusfar have been left unexplored
by legal scholars.

Yet patterns of prosecution are crucial

to an understanding of how order was maintained because
they illuminate the disorders that gripped the community.
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As it turns out, most of New Haven's "criminals" violated
laws unlike those anticipated by architects of the New
England Way.

The greatest contributors to disorder were

well established members of the community,

recidivists and

non-recidivists alike, whose lack of attention to bylaws
caused them to be prosecuted in great numbers.

Signifi

cantly, they were not marched off to the stocks or whipping

post.

Rather they received mild punishments and were often

treated with leniency.
So too were those who compromised the moral order by
transgressing colony statutes— the subject of Chapter 4.

To

be sure, the conduct of a handful of individuals was consid
ered so threatening that exclusion for deviance was employed
successfully as a strategy of social control.
offenders,

But most moral

contrary to impressions made by puritan rhetoric,

retained their membership in the community.

These lawbreakers

constituted New Haven's delinquent population.

They were

not, however,

part of a de

in the modern sense of the word,

linquent sub-culture that bred career deviants.

Instead,

they were the descendants of the founding fathers whose "fall
from grace" was brief and considered temporary.
punishments reflected as much.
drunks, thieves,

Increasingly,

And their

the town's

and illegal fornicators received mild sen

tences by magistrates who were empowered to, but did not,
subject them to corporal punishment.

Even God's rulers on

earth came to realize that morality could not be legislated.
The fifth and final chapter examines disorders caused
by private controversies.

Moreover,

limiting contention in

a "peaceful and loving" manner was just as important to
social harmony as controlling crime.

And while there is

ample evidence of "vexatious" civil suits between New Haven
residents,

authorities utilized law and the courts to re

solve disputes equitably.
tions of litigation,

But beyond the obvious ramifica

there were others which suggest further

10
that law played an increasingly prominent role in maintaining
order.

One,

is that litigation was "a useful agent" in pro

moting social stability, because certain lawsuits called to
attention the need to pass bylaws which in turn regulated
conduct.

Another relates to the method of conflict resolu

tion chosen by litigants.

Rather than embracing fully the

non-binding process of arbitration,

as first generation rul

ers had hoped, disputants came to rely on formal legal insti
tutions exclusively.

This is yet further evidence that the

policies of perfection failed to withstand the vicissitudes
of life in the new world.
this investigation begins.

It is with those policies that

11

INTRODUCTION
NOTES
1.

See, for example, Bancroft's History of the United
States (10 v o l s . , Boston, 1834-1874); Brooks Adams, The
Emancipation of Massachusetts (Boston, 1887); and
Charles Francis A d a m s , Antinomianism in Massachusetts
Bay (Boston, 1894).

2.

"The Historians of Early New England," in Ray Allen
Billington e d . , The Reinterpretation of Early American
History (New York, 1968) 41-63, 54.
James Truslow
Adams, The Founding of New England (Boston, 1921);
Samuel Eliot Morison, Builders of the Bay Colony (Boston,
1930); and Perry Miller, The New England M i n d : The
Seventeenth Century (New York, 1939).
Disciples of
Charles M. Andrews and other members of the imperial
school who contributed to New England studies include
Viola F. Barnes, Dominion of New E n g l a n d : A Study in
British Colonial Policy (New Haven, 1934).

3.

John Demos, A Little Commonwealth: Family Life in
Plym outh Colony (New York, 1970); Philip J. G r e v e n ,
Foui Generations: Popu la ti on , L a n d , and Family in
Colonial An d o v e r , Massachusetts (Ithaca, N.Y., 1970);
Darrett B. Rutman, Winthrop's Boston:
Portrait of a
Puritan T o w n , 1630-1649 (Chapel Hill, 1965); Kenneth A.
Lockridge, A New England Town The First Hundred Y e a r s :
D e d h a m , Massachusetts, 1636-1736 (New York, 1970);
James A. Henretta, "Economic Development and Social
Structure in Colonial Boston," William and Mary Quar
terly, 3rd Ser., XXII (1965), 75-92; Richard L. Bushman,
From Puritan to Y a n k e e : Character and the Social Order
in Connecticut, 1690-1765 (Cambridge, Mass., 1967); and
David Thomas Konig, Law and Society in Puritan Massachu
setts : Essex C o u n t y , 1629-1692 (Chapel Hill, 1979).

4.

"King's Law and Local Custom in Seventeenth Century New
England," Columbia Law Review XXXI (1931), 416-448.

5.

(New York,

6.

Crime and Punishment in Early Massachusetts, 1620-1692:
A Documentary History (Boston, 1966).

7.

(New York,

1960).

1966).
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8.

"Puritan Criminals:
The Economic, Social, and Intellec
tual Background to Crime in Seventeenth-Century Massa
chusetts," Perspectives in American H i s t o r y , XI, (Cam
bridge, Mass., 1978), 144.

9.

Law and Society, 124.

10.

Ibid., xiii.

11.

Eric H. Monkkonen has forwarded the same argument in
his, "A Disorderly People?
Urban Order in the Nineteenth
and Twentieth Centuries," Journal of American History,
LXVII (1981), 539-559.

CHAPTER I
THE WELL-ORDERED SOCIETY
Included in the intellectual baggage transported to New
England in the seventeenth century was a profound reliance
upon the concept of order.

The puritans steadfast devotion

to the righteousness of order,

frequently epitomized by

historians in the thought of John Winthrop, represented a
long standing and continued veneration of a social vision
which was decreed originally by God.

To early modern

Englishmen, whether a country gentleman, a rural peasant,
or a merchant of the emerging urban middle class, order
was conceived of as a network of hierarchical relationships
fused together for the common good.

Contemporaries were

fond of likening the many parts of society to those of the
human body to emphasize,

as Winthrop did in his ’’Model1 of

Christian Charity," that each part functioned to serve and
nourish the whole.

Even though Winthrop and other first

generation New Englanders Like John Cotton and John
Davenport believed that old England was no longer being
nourished properly,

they by no means discarded their vision

of an ideal, highly ordered society. In fact,

it may well

have been that many of the planter's traditional beliefs
were fortified by disorders in the mother country and their
trans-Atlantic voyage.^

Certainly the concept of order was

and once transplanted in New England it served as the

13
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keystone which gave society its form and texture.
meant,

among other things,

This

a devotion to order that colored

the puritan's family organization,
ments, political institutions,

ecclesiastical arrange

and fundamental laws.

The belief in the efficacy of order was by no means in
vented by the religious non-conformist leaders of the Great
Migration.

They were merely clinging to a traditional and

seemingly instinctive sense of order which had its immediate
origins in the medieval past.

It was probably this deep

commitment to "order" that enabled the saints to establish
viable communities which remained reasonably close to the
2
founder's initial ideals for nearly a century.
But what
perhaps makes the puritan's interpretation of the wellordered society so intriguing, was the apparent strength of
their commitment to an abstract definition of reality which
was in many ways inconsistent with actual human behavior.
Nevertheless,

the order which the puritan perceived to be

real, that which he revered and obeyed as best he could,
was defined and delineated in the scriptures by an un paral
leled authority— God.

He had created what one writer has

described as a "cosmic division of labor" within which each
of His creations was allocated a particular place and given
an assigned function.

3

It amounted to nothing less than a

majestic blueprint for human conduct intended to aid man in
his principal function of glorifying God.

It was this plan

that John Winthrop addressed in his famous message aboard
the Arbella in 1630.

"We are commanded this day to love the

15
Lord our God, and to love one another,” the governor wrote;
"to walk in His ways and to keep His commandments and His
ordinance,

and His laws.”

Disobediance to His plan meant

"that we shall surely perish out of the good land whither we
pass over this vast sea to p o s s e s s .”

4

Obedience to G o d ’s injunctions and to His laws was an
integral component of the puritan's conception of the wellordered commonwealth.

Their departure from England was

prompted by a sense of mission whi, h called for the creation
of a visible kingdom of God in the wilderness of the new
world where "a smooth,
family, church,

honest, civil life would prevail in
5
and state.”
The puritan's insistence upon

organizing

sustaining ordered and regulated communities

and

in keeping with the Creator's grand design can be explained
primarily by their intense religiosity.

That is what dis

tinguished them from the average Englishman also steeped in
the tradition of order.

Moreover,

the pervasive and persis

tent emphasis on order in New England towns and colonies went
beyond a tradition common to all Englishmen.

In short,

the

puritan's commitment to order was certainly grounded upon
tradition, yet in America it was reinforced to a degree
missing in England based upon the rudiments of their theol
ogy, particularly the notion of the covenant.
Members of the puritan fellowship in England and America
were all too familiar with the consequences of breaking God's
laws.

From early childhood New England puritans recalled

the lines of their primers which reminded them that "In
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Adam's Fall, We Sinned All."

Again and again they read in

their Bibles and heard from their ministers that man had for
feited his opportunity for salvation by disregarding the
terms of his original agreement or covenant with God.

But

they were also reminded that their God of love and mercy had
given man another chance at salvation.

A new covenant had

been contracted with Abraham which promised salvation for
faith alone rather than for any particular works or deeds.
The conditions of this new contractual obligation,
enant of grace,

the cov

formed the central core of puritan theology

and it was utilized in America

to

a significantly greater
0'

extent than it had been in England.
In practice this meant that New England puritans had to
be extremely vigilant and concentrate assiduously to adhere
to the terms of the covenant.

Even though a puritan might

be fairly certain that he had been elected,
salvation,

or chosen,

for

he also realized that he retained some of Fallen

Man's degenerate characteristics.

7

The disposition to sin

lurked constantly within the inner reaches of one's soul
and was capable of manifesting itself at the least instance
of spiritual weakness.

When a person did sin,

it could not

change the nature of his relationship with God because He
had predetermined which men would savor the wonders of
heaven and which would suffer the torments of hell.
ever, the act of sinning,
crime,

of,

for example,

How

committing a

could very well call into question one's convic

tions about one's status with God.

Such doubts were
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capable of illiciting psychological unrest and members of
the puritan fellowship sought to ease this stress by leading
lives worthy of truly visible saints.
The concept of sanctification in many ways 'explains why
puritans insisted upon upholding order in their Christian
Commonwealths which were,
God.

after all, based upon the laws of

In a very fundamental sense,

sanctification may be

described as good social conduct that affected both regener
ate individuals,

or members of the chosen few who had been

elected for salvation,

and unregenerates, those damned in

dividuals who constituted a majority even in seventeenthO

century New England.

Moreover,

the saints were bound to

good behavior because they believed that sanctification
followed justification.

This meant that they kept their

covenant with God through obedience to His injunctions.
Outward acts of proper conduct were not the means to grace,
but were interpreted as being an indication of the infu
sion of saving grace into the soul by God.

Sanctification

was therefore of utmost importance to the visible saint.
Disregard for God's laws as set down in the Scriptures
could indicate an unsanctified way of life.

Essentially,

then, the absence of sanctified behavior became a sign of
9

damnation!

Correct moral conduct, especially when viewed in the
context of sanctification, was an essential ingredient in
the formula of success in the Bible Commonwealths of New
England.

As suggested,

it was applicable to both regenerate
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and unregenerate members of society.

Once again,

the rea

soning behind this points to the covenant of grace.

The

stipulations of Abraham's agreement with God applied to each
of his descendants, whether covenanted or not.

Accordingly,

visible saints felt it was their obligation to engender
Godly conduct in all members of their society.

Boston's

John Cotton explained that obedience to God's injunctions
was undertaken not just for the elect,

"but in behalf of

every soul that belongs to us... our wives,
and servants,

and kindred,

and acquaintance,

and children,
and all that

are under our r e a c h , either by way of subordination, or
coordination.
saints,

Lack of proper conduct on the part of the

and their failure to restrain the corruptions of

those around them, was a strong indication that they were
destined for something other than salvation.

Psychologically

this must have had a disquieting affect on the saints,

since

it was believed that God's wrath was aimed at the entire
puritan commonwealth,
sinner.

Consequently,

not simply towards the unregenerate
the restraint of sin and the firm

correction of gross offenders was required of the saints
according to the terms of their covenant with God.
The puritan's insistence upon maintaining order in New
England communities thus emanated more from their religious
convictions than it did from a medieval tradition of order
which was shared by most early modern Englishmen.

The def

inition of order to which they adhered most rigorously orig
inated with God, an indisputable authority in their eyes.
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The commitment to order was intensified by the puritans who
migrated to the new world and who grounded their social in
stitutions upon the word of God.

Once settled in New England

they erected these institutions and enacted laws which were
designed to inculcate sanctified behavior in all the people
participating in their unique social experiment.
many New Englanders,

And for

proper order and good conduct began in

the family, which was viewed by the saints as "the germ of
all political and ecclesiastical authority.

Because families were regarded as the "nurseries of
society," well-ordered households became a fundamental goal
of New England leaders.

For nearly a century, ministerial

tracts like John Cotton's Spiritual Milk for Boston Babes
(1656) and Benjamin Wadsworth's The Well-Ordered Family
(1712) established guidelines considered necessary to satis
fy these expectations.

The public was reminded repeatedly

that the well-being of the commonwealth rested upon founda
tions laid in the family.

If familial control were allowed

to become ineffectual, if husbands and fathers neglected
their families,
their young,

if wives and mothers failed to catechise

if children disregarded the fifth commandment,

and if apprentices and servants were not introduced to via
ble trades by their masters,

leaders were convinced that

evil would spread like an uncontrollable cancer and infect
the different segments of society.

When,

for example, New

England was plagued by a host of problems in the 1670s,

20
ministers argued that lack of discipline in the family was a
principal cause.

12

Civil authorities sometimes had to make

family life their business by intervening in family disputes
and by correcting circumstances of family organization which
they perceived to be out of order.

13

Under ideal circum

stances, however, well-ordered families required little mag
isterial or ministerial intervention.

Preservation of family

harmony was the responsibility of household heads; parents
were regarded as "governors" of their "little commonwealths,"
and as such were due the respect and authority also claimed
by civil and ecclesiastical officials.

Not surprisingly,

disrespect for family authority was viewed as an offense as
grievous as contempt for political authority.

14

Moreover,

an offense against a family ruler violated God's commands,
deviated from the basic values of the community,
constituted a threat to the social order.

15

and thus

Yet if all

family members fulfilled their roles successfully and sat
isfied their obligations,

order would inevitably result.

Proper order in the family began with the relationship
between husbands and wives.

An acknowledged feature of

their union was the superiority of the husband over the
wife.

This meant,

among other things,

that the principal

responsibility for maintaining order in the family rested
on the shoulders of the husband.

Patriarchal control was

a traditional custom and one which fit neatly into the net
work of hierarchical relationships which was,
of the Creator's master plan.

again, part

Members of society were
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familiar with the plan;

they had been told that God created

man superior to all other creatures and that in the realm of
*i

human relations, men were superior to women.

One need not

look far to find a reaffirmation of this attitude in seven
teenth-century New England.
clashed with Massachusetts'

When the defiant Anne Hutchinson
leaders in the 1630s a fundamen

tal consideration in her case was that she had "gone out of
her way and calling to meddle in such things as are proper
to men."
book,

17

When the sister of Thomas Parker "published" a

her brother told he that it was beyond the custom of

her sex and it "doth rankly smell."
craze in Salem,

18

During the witchcraft

the majority of witnesses who testified

against the middle aged females accused of Satanic practices
were men.

19

Indeed,

not only was the position in which

women stood in relation to men understood in a general way,
but in the case of husbands and wives,
through a marriage covenant.

Moreover,

it was solemnized
the only natural

union between man and woman had been engineered by God for
Adam and Eve, and that relationship had been tainted by the
corrupting influences of the female partner.

However,

the

basic duties implicit in their union still applied to all
marriages.

New Haven's John Davenport argued that an ac

knowledgement of these duties was made when voluntary cov
enants were undertaken by men and women at the time of
their marriage.

20

Through these important oral agreements,

which were followed by legally prescribed "announcements,"
espoused couples were essentially making public statements

21
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of their commitment to the values of proper relationships
and well-ordered families.
The commitment to order may be conceived as the fulfill
ment of a series of related obligations governing the rela
tionship between husbands and wives.

Love was a basic in

gredient in the recipe for a successful marriage,
for the puritan experiment in general.

indeed,

Sincere affection

was the foundation of a healthy relationship,

a source of

order in family life, and in some respects the backbone of
the body constituting the entire community.

But, because

love is such an elusive emotion and at the same time very
personal,

historians face limitations in their attempts to

portray accurately the intimate details of married life in
the seventeenth century.

They can reason from their own

experiences that love and order are closely related.

And

they can make use of fragmentary evidence related to love
found in personal documents.

But for the most part they

must be satisfied with an intuitive sense that love was a
very real and important mutual obligation.
Hand in hand with the requirement of love was harmony.
Because court records contain shreds of information on how
civil authorities tried to control family disorders, his
torians

are

able to get some idea of what the duty of har

mony entailed.

The principal means of maintaining

a

har

monious family life was for heads of households to provide
safe and secure environments for their dependents.

When it

became evident to New Haven officials that Ebenezer Brown
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failed to satisfy this obligation,

he was directed by the

court to secure a suitable dwelling place for his wife.

22

The reasons for the order are clear because the Brown's un
settled state of affairs had led to "wicked carriages one
towards the other in their married relation together."
addition to providing support for their families,
were also required to live with them.

23

In

husbands

Single adults in gen

eral were viewed as a source of disruption in the community.
Those who were married and living apart simply compounded
that threat.

Thus in .1667, when New Haven magistrates

learned that Richard Nicolls,

a laborer &t the East Haven

ironworks, was married to a woman in New York, they "ordered
him to attend to his duty and return to her."

24

Harmony in

married life was also achieved when husbands and wives did
not abuse one another or force their partners to engage in
unlawful acts.

This is why the New Haven Plantation Court

promptly convicted Thomas Pinion in 1666 for promising a
friend the use of his wife's body.

Even though Mrs. Pinion

had previously faced the bench for her own misdeeds,

in this

instance she justifiably protested that her "husband had no
such power over her to make her sin."

25

Quite simple,

har

mony between spouses was best secured when circumstances
like these were avoided.
The logic of hierarchical relationships that governed
husbands and wives also applied to the relationship between
children and adults.

Because the framework of the social

order rested upon foundations laid in the family,

it was
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extremely important for parents to control their offspring.
Moreover,

in terms of regulating human conduct,

were viewed with trepedation,

children

and it was essential that both

parents and their progeny uphold the guidelines which defined
their relationship,

one in which youngsters occupied a posi-

tion inferior to that enjoyed by their elders.
the case of marital relations,

26

And as in

the observance of mutual ob

ligations was required of both parents and children.

The

principal familial duty of young puritans was to adhere to
the terms of the often quoted command:
mother."

Essentially,

"Honor thy father and

youngsters were expected to follow the

dictates of family rulers.
at the disposal of parents.

If not, then legal recourse was
It has been suggested,

however,

that few parents would have enjoyed the humiliation associated with making family discipline a public spectacle.
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For

the most part the umbrella of parental authority covered a
variety of domestic situations and applied not only to child
ren, but to young adults as well.
lapsed,

When parental control

as it was bound to on occasion,

civil officials

stepped in, as was done in the case of 21 year old Samuel
Brown who was fined 10s for participating in a drinking party
"without leave of [his] parents."

28

If parents and other family members fulfilled their roles
successfully,

order would inevitably result.

Indeed,

certain

obligations were actually specified in legal documents and
thus served as reminders of familial duties.

New Haven

Colony officials compelled parents to prevent their children
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from becoming "barborous, rude, and stubborn" by legally re
quiring frequent catechism so that youngsters would "under
stand the main grounds and principals of Christian religion
necessary to salvation."

And in an effort to direct child

ren and apprentices in some honest and lawful calling,

labor,

employment, profitable for both themselves and the colony.
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Legal obligations of this sort make perfectly sound sense
when placed in the context of the well-ordered commonwealth
as it was perceived by New England lawmakers.

If family

life was properly ordered, then magistrates would have lit
tle cause to intervene in domestic affairs.
did.

And they rarely

Although there must have been occurrences of parental

neglect in Connecticut communities,

these particular laws

never had to be enforced in New Haven.

For the most part it

seems that parents were aware of both legal and moral obli
gations required of them and of the importance of their role
in maintaining a well-ordered community.
Parents were frequently masters as well, and their af
filiation with servants was meant to be ordered in a fashion
similar to their own kinship relations.

Servants,

like all

children, occupied a position in life inferior to that of
their masters and mistresses.

As such, they were expected

to adhere to the commands of household rulers.

Obedience

was exceedingly important because ordinarily servants re
sided and interacted with families on the most intimate of
terms.

In order for their relationships to be "smooth,

honest, and civil," masters and servants had to contend
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successfully with the problems of youth and adolescence in
addition to the social and psychological adjustments associ
ated with servitude.

To help make that relationship viable,

the obligations required of both master and servant were
spelled out in written covenants or indentures.
For their part, masters were expected to provide servants
with security akin to that afforded their own children.

A

glance at one of the few extant indentures from New Haven
illustrates the point.

The agreement was recorded in 1659

on behalf of John Winston,

a local cooper, and 15 year old

John Jagger of Stamford, who was being "putt" out by his
recently widowed mother.

As master, Winston agreed to in

struct the youth in the "art of coopery, of keyne and setwork, to provide him with meat,

drink,

apparel, washing,

and lodging, meet and convenient for such a servant in all
civility."
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Beyond the terms of formal covenants, masters

were obliged to catechise younger servants and to eschew
maltreatment of any s o r t =

Masters who neglected their ob

ligations were accountable to civil authorities,
Henry Bishop who,
because,

as was

in 1653, abused his servant Samuel Andrews

among other things, "he would piss and foul his bed

and breeches."
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More charitable behavior was expected by

masters than that shown by Bishop,

and judging from extant

records it appears that most New Haven masters lived up to
their expectations.
Servants were a somewhat different story when it came
time to fulfilling obligations.

Servants and apprentices,
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like their masters, were familiar with the duties implicit
in their positions in society.

John Jagger,

for instance,

must have understood that for a period of six years he was
required to obey his master "as a good and faithful servant."
His indenture also stipulated that he avoid "unlawful g a m e s ,
taverns,

and alehouses," and at all times to do what an obe-

dient servant ought to do."
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Many servants unquestionably

observed the terms of their indentures to the satisfaction
of their masters.

Yet a simple understanding of a covenant

did not guarantee that it would be followed to the letter,
especially if you were male,
community.

15, and thrust into a strange

Some of New Haven's servants were disobedient,

given to tipling,

theft, and fornication.

Because ado

lescents were prone.to pride and sensuality by nature,

it

seems that a certain amount of misbehavior was tolerated by
charitable (and perhaps realistic) masters.
explains why,

This in part

in 1677, Abraham Dickerman pleaded success

fully with the court to have his servant's punishment re
duced from whipping to a bond for good behavior, or why,
ten years later,

the master of Abraham Johnson adopted a

similar course of action.
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In so doing masters exhibited

the same compassion for their servants as was shown to their
offspring.

In each instance the ultimate aim was the pre

servation of household harmony and order in the community.
Because family life was considered paramount to the
well-being of society,

each of its various relationships was

grounded upon Christian love and mutual obligation.

In and
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of itself, this is not particularly unique, but when coupled
with the religiosity of New Haven puritans,

family life was

afforded what seems to be an exaggerated position of impor
tance.

Patriarchal authority of the kind described by Philip

Greven in his study of Andover,

Massachusetts,
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rested upon

concepts of order and hierarchy which governed each house
hold relation from that of husbands toward wives, masters
toward servants.

Presumably,

as long as family rulers com

manded the obedience of their subordinates,
would remain unblemished.

the social order

But New England's religious and

secular leaders knew all too well that even patriarchs were
subject to temptation.

Consequently it was necessary to

provide other institutions of control to counteract sinful
urges.

Perhaps the most important of these was the church.

The contractualism that delineated familial relations
also played a primary role in ecclesiastical affairs.

The

covenant of grace, which was mentioned earlier to emphasize
the saint's strong commitment to order, became an acknowl
edged feature of the so-called "congregational way."

The

institutional church was likewise a significant part of the
puritan's concept of the well-ordered society.
all other components of the commonwealth,

had been decreed

by God in the Old, and, as some divines argued,
taments.

Indeed,

It too, like

the New Tes

for many congregational ministers,

cove

nant theology was inseperable from the voluntary covenants
undertaken by the saints for the "foundation work" of the
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institutional church.

Together the covenant of grace and

the church covenant became the basis for the ecq.lesiastical
order and discipline prevalent in many New England communi
ties .
This fusion of the two covenants
Perry Miller,

was,

according to

"the ultimate triumph of the New England mind."

For most first generation ministers the union was a logical
corollary to God's agreement with Abraham.

Since God com

manded his children to go out and form churches,

the saints,

by virtue of their covenant with Him, willingly followed His
decree by forming their own.

It may well be that the most

significant aspect associated with the formation of covenanted
church groups was that the process was voluntary.
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This

meant that individual saints agreed to follow His injunctions
religiously,

as well as conform to the decisions of the ma

jority in fellowship with them.

The church covenant as it

was practiced in New England elevated church membership to a
special level, so unique that it was condemned by prominent
non-conformist ministers in England.

It is quite possible

that their criticisms were justified on technical grounds.
Yet the fact remains that in communities like New Haven,
where the franchise was dependent upon church membership
until 1665, political power belonged to the elect.

Even

through the saint's influence erroded over time, the first
generation leadership enjoyed remarkable control over all
New Englanders.
The keystone for much of this claim to power lay firmly
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embedded in the congregational polity.

The actual form which

served as a guideline for many New England churches,

includ

ing the New Haven church, was specified point by point in
the Cambridge Platform of Church Disc ip li ne , published in
1649.
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ters who,

The Platform summarized the work of leading minis
in 1646, covened a synod in part to answer the

criticisms of English theologians.

The major disagreement

between the two groups centered on church government.

The

New England ministry equated congregational polity with vol
untary covenants and thus institutional freedom from sources
of external control,

especially in the realm of discipline.

A brief reference to some of the most conspicuous positions
of the Platform illustrates precisely the church order prac
ticed in New Haven.
Considering the religious zeal of the saints,
Davenport in particular,

and of John

it is hardly surprising that the

organization of the church pre-dated the establishment of New
Haven town government.

The church was gathered in the summer

of 1639 following 14 months of reflection and humiliation.
During this period of inward searching the settlers congre
gated into small groups "and prayed together and conferred to
their mutual edification,” so as to best judge "whom they
found fittest to nominate" for the foundation work of the
church.

Eleven men were nominated and all, including Richard

Malbon who was questioned "about taking an excessive rate for
meal," were found suitable.

Of these, seven were selected as

"pillars" of the church and entered into covenant with one

another.
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The Cambridge synod followed the founding of the First
Church by seven years, but the theory enunciated at the
gathering was already practiced in New Haven.

John Davenport,

along with other ministers who met in Cambridge, believed
that the saints "by calling must have a Visible-PoliticalUnion or else they are not yet a particular church."

Even

though they had entered into covenants with God on an indi
vidual basis, the New Haven pillars, while "squared, hewn,
and polished," were not a house until "compacted and united,"
not a church "unless orderly knit together."
time to found churches,

When it came

as in all other particulars deemed

so important to the puritans, proper procedure was decreed
by God and revealed in Scripture.

The covenant was essen

tial, because it was what made "the family of Abraham and
the children of Israel to be a church."
Visible Covenant, Agreement,

Specifically,

"the

or Consent," was required by

the saints so that they could "give up themselves unto the
Lord to the observing of the ordinances of Christ together."
Church covenants of the variety used by the saints were in
strumental in securing ecclesiastical independence.

Al

though unusually brief, the Charlestown-Boston covenant of
1630 is illustrative of these agreements:
We whose names are hereunder written,... promise
and bind ourselves, to walk in all ways according
to the'Rule of Gospel, and in all sincere Con
formity to His holy Ordinances, and in mutual
love, and respect each to other, so near as God
shall give us grace.39
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Covenants like this became the basis for the properly gath
ered church,

and, because they were voluntary,

tended to

serve as instruments of control through the pledge of the
signatories to lead sanctified lives.
More than just a signature was demanded of the saints if
they hoped to become full fledged church members.

Both the

Boston and New Haven churches required a "personal and pulic
confession, and declaring of God's manner of working upon
the soul" before one was received into church fellowship.
Professions of faith were both "lawful and expedient," and
had to be made by those "that were never in church society
before."
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Therefore, when Nathaniel Turner desired to b e

come the eighth member of the First Church, he had to make
a public profession which suited the original pillars.

A

genuine saint had to be a "tender and broken hearted Chris
tian," or "a tender hearted soul full of fears and tempta
tions but truly breathing after Christ," before gaining ad41
mission to Davenport's church.
Cotton Mather wrote of
Davenport that so strict "were the terms of his communion,
and so much,

I had well nigh said, overmuch, were the golden

snuffers of sanctuary employed by him in his exercise of
discipline," towards those seeking admission "that he did
all that was possible,

to render the renouned church of New-

Haven like the New-Je ru sa le m."
concluded, along with Mather,
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More recent scholars have

that Davenport was perhaps the

most "exacting" minister in New England.
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Davenport's own confession, which was made publically at
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the gathering of the New Haven church, was a comprehensive
statement touching upon some 20 points ranging from his per
sonal relationship with God to his role within the framework
of the institutional church.
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Although ordinary members'

professions were not as detailed, Davenport's must have
served as the standard.

During his ministry at the First

Church, New Haven's visible saints constituted a minority
of the total population.

This is partially explained by the

assiduous screening of applicants.
by space,

But it is also explained

for there was not enough to embrace the entire

community.

In 1647,

for example, when the first seating

plan was issued, the 189 available seats could not accommo
date New Haven's 219 adult males, not to mention the town's
women and children.

4o

Evidently many New Haven residents

were denied access to the church on the basis of physical
restraints alone.

For others, membership in the church was

denied because of the requirement of rigorous confessions.
A major part of New Haven's population was, therefore,

not

subject to as much influence or discipline as leaders would
have liked.

But for those who had been admitted into fellow

ship with Christ, discipline was an important and required
obligation.
Even saints were capable of error,

and on such occasions

were in danger of polluting the entire church body with their
transgressions.

Accordingly,

a viable means of ecclesiasti

cal discipline had to be implemented in order to vindicate
"the honor of Christ and his church," if and when delinquent
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saints violated the terms of their covenant.

The two forms

of disciplinary action adopted by the New Haven church and
specified in the P l a t f o r m , were admonition and excommunica
tion.

They were the most effective "Censures of the church,"

and had been "appointed by Christ for the preventing,
ing, and healing of offenses in the Church."

remov

The "offenses"

were not always specified, but must have included activities
ranging from slander to sodomy.
seriousness of an offense,

In addition to the perceived

the question of which censure was

to be brought to bear on the wayward member by the congrega
tion was determined in part on the basis of whether it was a
• 4. or public
. i . miscarriage.
. 4 6
private
Regardless of how serious the offense, brethren labored
to reform the sinner and effect a public confession and sin
cere acknowledgement of wrong doing.

A good example of the

disciplinary process at work in New Haven can be found in
the 1644 proceedings of the church against Anne Eaton,

the

wife of Theophilus Eaton, a local magistrate and governor
of the New Haven Colony.

She was charged with 17 private

errors which collectively stood in violation of the third,
fifth, sixth, and ninth commandments.

After lengthy

exam

ination the congregation wanted her to be "cast out" for her
sins, but Davenport persuaded the brethren to settle on a
public admonishment because it was not certain that she was
afflicted by "a habitual frame of sinning."

Mrs. Eaton was

accordingly admonished and told "to attend unto the several
rules... broken," and "to hold forth...

repentance according
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to God."

Much to the sorrow of the church members and their

officers Mrs. Eaton "did continue offensive" and "neither
came up to the acknowledging of the particulars for which
she was admonished,

nor held forth repentance" to the satis

faction of the congregation.
church,

When she appeared before the

"she behaved herself without any show of remorse" and

expressed herself in an ostentatious fashion.

After nine

months of waiting, during which "no fruit of reprentance ap
peared," the members felt compelled, by virtue of their cov
enant, to further censure Mrs. Eaton.

Therefore, with "much

grief of heart and many tears," the church cast her out,
whereupon "God showed a wonderful presence to the satifaction
of all that were present."
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The patience accorded Mrs. Eaton was characteristic of
the charity required of members in their relations with one
another.
uals,

Indeed, on occasion,

even excommunicated individ

like Henry Glover, were re-admitted as members of the

church in good standing.

48

Less charity was shown in in

stances of "a more heinous and criminal nature," as in the
case of William Potter who was excommunicated for bestiality in 1662 "without gradual proceeding."
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Discipline

remained an essential aspect of church government because
it punished individuals for prophaning the seals of the
covenant.

Moreover,

if disorders were permitted to go un

checked, then the church itself faced the possiblity of
dissolution,
able:

and its members something even more unimagin

the wrath of God.
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The church covenant,

the profession of faith, and the

ability of each congregation to discipline its own members,
were all important components of the properly ordered church.
These were considered basic for the success of the errand in
to the wilderness.

An elect society of visible saints was

believed to have been decreed by God and for many a first
generation religious enthusiast God's blueprint was meant to
be followed vigorously.

Few were able to envision,

in 1639,

that the institutional church which they pondered over and
wrote about so meticulously would, within a generation,
altered so dramatically.

be

Among those alterations was the

dropping of the church membership requirement for the elec
tion of civil officials who were charged with overseeing the
activities of all members of the "secular society."

The authority associated with the church was not enough
to completely preserve order in New Haven.

Even the most

energetic puritans believed that civil authorities were
necessary to uphold the social order.

Ecclesiastical and

secular authority were, therefore, to work in conjunction
with one another.

They were, moreover,

designed to exist

as "coordinate states in the same place reaching forth help
mutually each to other,
to God."
harmony,
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for the welfare of both, according

Although the two "states" were meant to work in

it was the civil rulers who,

colonization,

from the outset of

shouldered the primary burden of social con

trol in New Haven.

And as patriarchal prestige waned and
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as the church "declined" over time, the responsibilities of
civil authorities multiplied.
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Because the function per

formed by secular officials was considered so vital, the
settlers of New Ha’ven and other plantations moved cautiously
when it came time to found political institutions and to
choose men to assume positions of leadership within them.
Unlike the settlers of Massachusetts, New Haven's plant
ers lacked a charter to provide a legal basis for a civil
government.

Both John Davenport and Theophilus Eaton were

members of the Massachusetts Bay Company, however,

and they

had spent enough time in Boston to be influenced by the form
of government which had been erected in the Bay Colony.
Their Boston experiences and their familiarity with the man
uscript of John Cotton's Discourse About Civil Government
were both factors which helped shape the political institu
tions they created in New Haven.

But before they could be

given life, an agreement needed to be reached amongst the
free planters of New Haven relative to those principles of
government which they were willing to accept.
There was little doubt in the minds of New Haven leaders
like Davenport and Eaton that the principles underlying
civil government were originally decreed by God.

They were

convinced that following Adam's Fall God had created civil
governments in order to retrain the conduct of individuals
who could not be trusted on their own to adhere to the order
specified in His divine plan.

The foremost task of the

leaders was to convince New Haven's 200-plus adult males to
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accept this as the guiding light for the political institu
tions they were about to create.

Naturally the person best

qualified to persuade the planters was Davenport,

and it was

he who presided over a gathering of the settlers in 1639
which terminated with the signing of New Haven's "Fundamental
Agreement."
The agreement was important because it became the founda
tion of the government established at New Haven.

And it was

arrived at through a series of questions which were posed by
Davenport and then voted on by the entire company.

The first

of the queries was particularly suggestive of the direction
to be taken in the meeting:

"Whether the Scriptures do hold

forth a perfect rule for the direction and govenment of all
men in all duties which they are to perform to God and men
as well as in the government of families and commonwealths
as in matters of the church."
agreed to by all,
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This first principle was

"no man dissenting."

The second question

was equally significant for it requested planters to reaf
firm the "covenant solemnly made by the whole assembly...
of this plantation the first day of extraordinary humilia
tion which we had after we came together."
Haven's plantation covenant
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This was New

and it promised that "in all

public offices which concern civil order,

as choice of

magistrates and officers, making and repealing laws, di
viding allotments of inheritance and all things of like
nature we would all of us be ordered by those rules which
the Scripture holds forth to us."

The planters once again

39
unanimously accepted the terms of the covenant "by holding
up their hands."

By acknowledging that scriptural rule was

the best and that it was most suited to the ordering of gov
ernment in New Haven,

the planters moved a step closer to

accepting political institutions which would be dominated by
the elect.
The third query was again a prelude to those which would
follow.

After the planters had renewed their covenenat,

they were asked if they desired to be "admitted into church
fellowship according to Christ as soon (as) God shall fit
them thereunto."
and unanimous.

The response was once again both positive
Perhaps the planters would not have been so

accommodating had they realized that less than half their
number would eventually join the church and that even fewer
would become freemen.

Yet they nevertheless agreed to the

next question which bound them to establish a "civil order
as might best conduce to the securing of purity and peace"
for themselves and their posterity "according to God."

The

stage was set for a vote on what was perhaps the most cru
cial question and one which was surely considered to be the
foremost means of securing order in the community:

"Whether

Free Burgesses shall be chosen out of church members," and
whether only they should have the privilege of voting and
holding office?

"This was put to vote and agreed unto," but

the p l an te r’s hands had barely been lowered before "one man
stood up," and expressed displeasure with the most critical
condition of Davenport's query.

The individual, most likely
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the Reverend Mr. Samuel Eaton,
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agreed that leaders of the

commonwealth should be God fearing men and that they were
normally found within the body of the church.

He did, how

ever, warn those assembled not to surrender the power to
vote "out of their hands."

In other words, the dissenter

threatened to breach the foundation of New Haven's civil
government before it had had time to set.
This unexpected turn of events must have caused a moment
of anxiety in the seemingly unflappable D a ve np or t.
that he was being questioned was bad enough.
minister?

The fact

But by another

By a man of prestige and influence?

Fortunately,

however, Davenport received support from those participating
in the meeting.

One planter rose and stated that "nothing

was done but with their consent."

Theophilus Eaton likened

the circumstances to those in England where "the companies
of London chose the liveries by whom the public magistrates
are chosen," and where consequently "the rest are not wronged
because they expect in time to be of the livery themselves,
and to have the same power.”

Had Davenport needed to bol

ster his position further he was well equipped to do so.
More than likely he would have concurred with John Cotton
who perceived a true danger in giving political power to
non-members because they were capable of creating cults,
subverting faith, and supporting heretics.

He could have

utilized examples from Scripture like Paul's condemnation
of judges who were not saints as "destitute of righteous
ness" and utterly lacking morality,

in contrast to those
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who were saints and "consecrated to God and to his ends in
all things."
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And was it not Paul who had said that the

saints shall judge the world?

But instead of belaboring the

issue Davenport simply requested the planters to consider
what had transpired since the initial vote and asked for
another,

if they were convinced that the foundation of gov

ernment he proposed was truly in the mind of God.

The sec

ond time around once again proved positive; Davenport prob
ably breathed a sigh of relief and New Haven finally had a
"Fundamental Agreement.”
By affixing their signatures to the agreement, New Haven's
planters accepted rule by the elect as the cardinal princi
ple underlying their political institutions.

The civil or

der they erected fit neatly into the borader notion of order
which characterized other puritan institutions.

What this

meant in practical terms was that a majority of New Haven
residents "gave out of their hands" the right to participate
in the political decision making process.

And it remained

that way until 1665 when the church membership restriction
was dropped.

Political power thus lay firmly in the grasp

of the elect for nearly a generation.

Only those adult male

members of the church who had taken the freeman's charge
were granted the honor of choosing magistrates,

deputies,

and selectmen, the principal office holders of the community.
Not surprisingly,
ered no mean task.

the election of these leaders was consid
The electorate, despite its special

status, was required to be well informed about potential
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rulers.

It was for this reason that Davenport devoted time

in the 1639 meeting to discussing "what kind of person might
be trusted with matters of government."
exhortations was the Old Testament:
standing,

and experienced men,

The source of his

"Choose wise,

under

according to your tribes,

I will appoint them as your heads"

(Deut.

1:13);

and

"you may

indeed set as king over you him whom the lord your God will
chose"

(Deut.

17:15);

"moreover choose able men...

such as

fear God, men who are trustworthy and who hate a bribe,
place such men over the people as rulers"

and

(Exodus 18:21).

Thirty years later Davenport was still urging thoughtful
consideration in the choice of rulers, men who must rule in
fear of God which is "a sanctifying gift of Grace, wrought
by the Holy Spirit in the hearts of the elect."

56

Clearly

in Davenport's view, the men elevated to leadership posi
tions by New Haven's freemen had to be chosen carefully and
had to be of the highest caliber.

They were,

after all,

G o d ’s viceregents on earth and as such were due proper
deference and respect.

If any spoke out against their rule,

as was done by Thomas Blacksley in 1646, punishment would
surely follow for "neglecting the image of God in magistrates."
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Contempt for authority,

in addition to being

disrespectful and setting a poor example for others, was
viewed by the saints as a threat to the civil order they
had fabricated.
Along with the family and the church, magistrates,
guardians of New Haven's civil society, were viewed as

the
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being especially important.

More so in fact than the insti

tutions entrusted to their care.

This is not to suggest

that the principal political institutions of the community
were unimportant,

rather that their effectiveness hinged on

the quality of the individuals who were placed in positions
of authority.

This is a major reason why so much attention

was devoted to the choice and the character of magistrates
in New England, why the magistracy was considered ro be such
an important office.
suggestive.

But another line of reasoning is also

The actual organs of local government erected

in New England towns were, with some variation,
tions of English borough and shire institutions.

transplanta58

They

were part of a tradition common to all Englishmen, regener*^ u t e -and unregenerate alike.

Consequently,

there was little

need to justify the necessity of political institutions tha,t
the majority of colonists already accepted,
of their collective heritage.
in contrast, was uncommon;
indeed extolled.

that were part

Political rule by the elect,

it is what needed to be defended,

This is why it was crucial for the founda

tion of secular government to be constructed through a pro
cess that was voluntary.

This explains the care and se

quence inherent in the process which led to New Haven's
"Fundamental Agreement."

And it was consistent with the

forethought given to the creation of institutions on the
county and colony levels of government.
seated sense of order,

It was a deep

intertwined with the .religiosity of

the saints, that characterized the foundation of a civil
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government, much in the same way it defined familial obliga
tions and influenced the gathering of a covenanted church
group.

This staunch commitment to order was reflected also

in the fundamental laws of New Haven.

There can be little doubt that New H a v e n ’s earliest
laws were those that the "Scriptures held forth” as fitting
for a society of saints.

The concept of order to which they

adhered and which played a prominent role in the organiza
tion of other institutions also determined the character of
their laws.

This is consistent with the opinions of legal

historians who.subscribe to the notion that at any given time
the most powerful ingredients in law are the current values,
convictions and emotions of those responsible for making,
repealing,

and enforcing laws.
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In the case of New Haven

it is clear from the preceding discussion of the family,
the church, and the magistracy,

that these attributes man

ifested themselves in what amounts to a predictable se
quence of reasoning and events.

In each instance, the

cardinal source of both information and inspiration was
the Bible.

And, so it was with law.

Less can be said, however,

about the legal edifice

erected at New Haven in 1639 than was the case with other
institutions for the simple reason that very little was
written about law at the time.

This is not a problem with

New Haven evidence exclusively,

for the earliest records

of other New England towns are equally barren of either
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legal theory or enumerations of fundamental laws.

This ex

plains the lack of consensus in legal scholarship over mat
ters concerning the character of law during the Great Migra
tion.

A point made two decades ago by George Haskins typi

fies the problem:

"Massachusetts law in the colonial period

was a syncretization of Bibilical precedent and a complex
English heritage which included not only the common law and
the statutes," but also practices "of the church courts, of
justices of the peace,

and of the local courts of manors

and .towns from which the colonists came."
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In other words,

a virtual grab-bag of explanations has been utilized to
describe the foundations of law in the region.

A few ref

erences to Mosaic law or common law or local custom have
seemed to satisfy scholars of the early colonial period.
In response to the lack of explicit descriptions of law in
its inchoate stages of development,

current assessments have

drawn heavily from law codes which,

although complex, tended

to postdate settlement to a significant extent.

In the

case of Plymouth, where the earliest code in New England
was compiled,

the lag-time was 16 years.

chusetts, Connecticut,
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In the Massa

and New Haven colonies,

it*1was 20.

But to describe the fundamental laws of New England communi
ties on the basis of several years of accumulated experi
ence is, it seems, to minimize the importance of the set
tler's concepts about law and society before this accumu
lation actually occurred.

Moreover,

the legal foundations

that existed in New Haven and other communities at the
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outset of settlement consisted of laws that were far more
limited in scope and far more "fundamental" than those em
bodied in subsequent codes.
These limitations can be traced to a pair of sources.
The first was a complete lack of experience with new world
conditions.

The legislation which was ultimately required

to meet these novel circumstances,
into later codes.

The second,

however, was incorporated

and perhaps more important

source, was the mind set of the planters, particularly the
leaders of the puritan mission.

The process of immigration

provided unique opportunities for New England's rulers to
create a legal milieu based upon voluntary agreement and
was therefore in keeping with their larger world view.
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The basis for scriptural rude in New Haven was established
when the planters consented to Davenport's first query
which, when considering the fact that it was the foremost
principle underlying the town's laws, church,
ment,

and govern

received what appears to be extraordinary mileage.

Despite its apparent limitations,

the foundation of New

Haven's corpus juris was the Bible, just as it had been for
the other components of the New England Way; each was cast
out of the mold which had been crafted by God.

This does

not mean that the saints failed to anticipate problems
which would arise over time and for which there were no
Biblical equivalents, but rather that the Scriptures were
meant to serve as a guide for the conduct of individuals
in their relations with one another— and with God as well.
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Consequently,

it was with sincere conviction that New Haven

leaders determined "that the judicial laws of God as they
were delivered by M o s e s . .. shall be accounted of moral equi
ty, and generally bind all offenders,
the courts...

and be a rule in all

in their proceeding against offenders,

they be branched out into particulars hereafter."
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till
This

provision was extremely basic, but at the same time it was
broad enough to cover a multitude of sins, each of which
was capable of damaging the carefully constructed social
order.

Hence if a member of the community were to rise up

and take the life of his neighbor,

he could be put to death.

If a young adult should neglect his duty and steal from a
parent or master,

he was required to make restitution.

Or

if a stranger in the town disturbed the peace, he could be
taken to a stranger's court and be punished accordingly.
Moreover,

the framers of New Haven's fundamental laws

adopted those which they believed would best preserve har
mony and which,

after all, were in keeping with the formu

la for success in New England.

To suggest otherwise,

to

imply that a "syncretization" existed at the time when the
fundamental institutions were being implemented,

does not

do justice to the broad commitment to order which served
as a foundation not just for law, but for family life,
churches, and political bodies as well.

The character of New Haven's fundamental laws was but
one indication of a broad vision of order transported to
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the new world in the seventeenth century.

On the one hand,

this vision was part of a tradition shared by most English
men, one in which notions of hierarchy and the "commonwealth"
held very prominent positions.

On the other hand,

it was

strengthened substantially by a religious commitment to a
"cosmic division of labor" that colored the institutions
created by the vanguard of the errand into the wilderness.
The nucleus of the overall concept of order was one's per
sonal relationship with God; it was the covenant which bound
saints to lead sanctified lives and to set examples for
those around them in "subordination or coordination."

The

success of the puritan mission rested upon the ability of
the elect to regulate the conduct of those in fellowship
with them, and perhaps above all, of those who were not.
The surest means of achieving this goal was to fashion
the basic components of society to the specifications of the
master architect himself— God.

And because families were

considered the nurseries of society they became important
sources of proper behavior.

Moreover,

these "little com

monwealths" mirrored larger society to the extent that,
from adult male heads of households down to the inferior
servant, a network of hierarchical relationships and a
corpus of divine commands existed which delineated the true
and proper structure necessary to nourish the well-ordered
society.

Often written and oral covenants played a signif

icant role in highlighting familial obligations.

Indeed,

the saints utilized voluntary covenants in a variety of
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settings to help stress the mutual love and charity they per
ceived as permiating their society.

Perhaps the most visible

use of the covenant lay in conjunction with the gathering of
ecclesiastical institutions which were completely autonomous,
even though they were not synonymous with the membership of
the entire community.

Nevertheless, both the form of the

church and the requirements of those who wished to join, were
stipulated in Scripture.

The purity of the properly ordered

church was linked closely to its independent status and,
nested within this, the ability of each congregation to dis
cipline its own members.

It was not, however, the elect who

played havoc with the psychological insecurities of rulers.
The unregenerate "civil man" posed the most formidable chal
lenge to orthodoxy.

This is why secular government performed

such a central role in upholding the social order.
New Haven and other communities,

And in

the contractualism upon

which the church rested also formed the basis of political
institutions.

New Haven's "Fundamental Agreement" was

reached through a process of voluntarism which placed poli
tical power in the hands of the elect.

In 1639 the town's

free planters chose to impose extremely high qualifications
for citizenship and agreed to follow the laws set forth in
Scripture and enforced by a small group of God fearing m ag 
istrates.

Everyone knew that they were the laws of God,

and

they became the cornerstone of social co n trol.
All of this, of course, represented an ideal, one almost
too good to be r e a l .

But it was r e a l , at least in the minds
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of the puritans who presided over the founding institutions
in New England.
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And although the ideal would crumble in

the face of new world conditions,

it did have an impact on

subsequent generations of New Englanders.
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Additionally,

the puritan notion of order became the standard by which to
judge social change.

In the past few decades a number of

studies have been devoted to change in the areas of family
life (Greven), religious life (Miller), and community orga
nization (Lockridge).

In each instance an ideal view of

order has performed a basic task in explaining patriarchal
control, religous principles embodied in documents like the
Cambridge P l a t f o r m , and the policies of perfection inherent
in a utopian commune.

The character of fundamental law in

New Haven also reflected the ideal.
alterations must be measured.
one,

for in New Haven,

It is against this that

The wait will not be a long

the process of change began when the

law "branched out into particulars" in an effort to order
more completely a society confronted by challenges associ
ated with life in the new world.
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CHAPTER II
ORDER THROUGH LAW
On a December day in 1647 New Haven's Plantation Court
devoted an entire session to the resolution of private
controversies.
John Meiggs,

Of the several suits heard, the case between

a New Haven tanner,

and Henry Gregory, a

Stratford shoemaker, proved to have a significant impact on
the writing of law and hence the maintenance of order in the
community.

As plaintiff, Meiggs sued Gregory for damage to

"his name and estate" stemming from a breach of contract.
Meiggs charged that the 14 dozen shoes he bargained for were
poorly made, thereby damaging his reputation (he claimed
that some consumers thought that he was "worthy to be put in
prison") and to his livelihood because other sales he had
pending fell through once word spread that the shoes he was
selling were inferior.

Specifically, Meiggs claimed that

the shoes fell apart almost immediately upon use, that he
never received any with wooden heels as the contract stated,
and that some pairs were designated as size ten when in fact
they were a size smaller.

Gregory's defense was that the

leather he had received from Meiggs to make the shoes was of
extremely poor quality, thus, to his way of thinking,
ing the blame back to Meiggs.3'
The broad manifestations of the case emerged when
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shift
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witnesses appeared and it became clear to authorities that
consumers were left unprotected from fraud or poor workman
ship.

Because so many shoes were involved and because many

of them had been sold,
the most part,

For

all the testimony pointed to the same thing:

inferior shoes.
example,

it was easy to locate witnesses.

John Parmely of Guilford testified,

for

that the pair he had bought fell apart within days.

Jonathan Sargent reported that after wearing his recently
purchased shoes on three occasions one of the soles fell
off.

A Mrs. Blackman claimed that after wearing her pair

for a few days,

"the leather was like flaps of a shoulder

m u t t o n ."
It was clear from most of the testimony that the shoes
were poorly made-.
at issue.

However,

the question of blame was still

Each party was able to produce witnesses who

spoke convincingly on his behalf.

One of the plaintiff's

backed up his claim that flax rather than hemp was used to
bind the shoes, thus tending to weaken them.

By the same

token, Gregory's son Juda testified that the original
leather was poor and as such could not be worked properly.
As to some of the specific charges:

Gregory admitted that

no shoes with wooden heels were delivered, but, echoing his
son, he also argued that the sizes had originally been
marked by Meiggs and that the leather marked size ten was
so poor that it could not be stretched to specification.
As for the charge of inferior quality, witnesses for the
defense repeatedly claimed that the leather was "tainted"
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and that it could be torn easily.
Following the testimony of witnesses for the plaintiff
and the defendant,

other tanners and shoemakers were called

to examine the shoes from the perspective of the quality of
the leather used and of the workmanship itself.

According

to the "experts," both parties appeared to have been at
fault.

On the one hand, they determined that the raw leather

was in fact poor,
liable.

indeed, untanned.

For this Meiggs was

On the other hand, they also concluded that the

workmanship was sub-standard because the stitches were too
long, the flax was unwaxed,
for the thread.
the experts:

and the awl holes were too large

The decision of the court mirrored that of

both parties were to blame and in the process

the "country was much wronged."

Most of the fault was

placed on Meiggs for providing Gregory with untanned leather.
Consequently he was fined £10 and ordered to satisfy wronged
consumers.

Yet the shoemaker had also "transgressed the

rules of righteousness" and for this he was fined £5, court
charges,

and was told that he could not recover his lost

l ab or .
Although Meigg's suit had begun as a private issue
pending between two parties,

it escalated quickly to include

numerous New Haven residents as well as those of neighboring
communities.

From a legal perspective, what is significant

is the speed with which authorities responded to issues
raised in the case.

Within two months of the trial legisla

tion was passed which was intended to regulate the quality

I
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of leather used in the community and protect consumers from
"unrighteousness."

The chosen response to the problem was

the creation of the position of public sealer to inspect and
seal all leather sold to shoemakers.

And, so that the

"buyer be not deceived," cobblers were ordered to mark their
shoes "upon the lap withinside below the place where they be
tied," or face prosecution and punishment at the discretion
2
of the court.
Meiggs v. Gregory is one of the more dramatic examples
of the way laws were framed in early New Haven.

The case

called to attention a basic problem facing the community—
lack of consumer protection— and it generated a direct legal
response to a source of potential discord.

In short,

it

epitomized the "branching out" that characterized lawmaking
and legal change throughout the seventeenth century.
Because this kind of legal cause and effect relationship
had such an important bearing on the maintenance of order in
New Haven (and presumably other communities),

it is sur

prising that legal historians have not analyzed such connec
tions in greater detail.

Typically, their energies have

been channelled in the direction of colony level law codes
which,

in New England,

tended to postdate the settlement

process by at least 15 years.
codes almost exclusively,

Thus by emphasizing formal

legal scholars have virtually

ignored the evolution of law on the local level and there
fore the context of community bylaws which had a pervasive
3
impact on the lives of New Englanders.
Furthermore, they
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have also neglected to emphasize the connection between law
and its enforcement.
early America.

So too have historians of crime in

While their studies have documented the en

forcement of law, they have not generally analyzed the obvious link to the

legislative process.

This is also somewhat surprising

4

because in New Haven

and other locales both criminality and litigation were
closely related

to legislation.

In England, for example,

the Clandestine

Marriage Act of 1723 altered the legal def

inition of marriage and thus had an impact on prosecutions
for illegitimacy.

Similarly,

a sixteenth-century Act of

Parliament restricting the use of benefit of clergy is
thought to have produced a reduction in the number of thefts
involving breaking and entering.

And it has also been

argued that the re-definition of law, which sometimes causes
changes in normative boundaries, can have an instrumental
affect on the production or reduction of rates of deviance.

5

Since New Haven experienced the kind of legal interplay il
lustrated by the foregoing examples it is necessary to syn
thesize the concerns of legal scholars and historians of
crime in order to appreciate fully the context of social
control.
This is perhaps best accomplished by approaching law and
order the way the planters of New Haven did:
tinct, but interrelated levels.

on two dis

First, order was promoted

on the local level through the implementation of penaltybearing town ordinances or bylaws.

These originated within
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the context of local needs and were approved in the town
meeting by freemen.

Generally magistrates and other town

officials took the initiative in pushing for the adoption of
local ordinances, but they were doing so in response to the
concerns of local residents who felt that their daily affairs
could be better served through bylaws aimed at reducing
sources of disorder within the community.

This had been the

case with the regulations formulated in the wake of Meiggs
v. Gr egory.

On other occasions,

the initiative can be

linked more directly to local residents who openly clamored
for the adoption of certain laws.
in the late forties,

This proved to be the case

for example, when the control of live

stock had become problematic.

Regardless of who took the

initiative the actual bylaws shared common characteristics:
they tended to be "secular" responses to local problems and
were universally punishable by small fines.

Furthermore,

the enforcement of these bylaws generally took place on the
local level and as such was strikingly similar to the situ
ation that existed in English communities.

In essence then,

it was a traditional strategy for maintaining order.

6

But because New Haven was one of six towns which, after
1643, comprised the New Haven Colony,

its residents were

also bound by the laws of this larger jurisdiction.

The

laws of the colony were passed by magistrates and deputies
(representatives) of the respective towns and were eventually
incorporated into formal, written codes.

The New Haven and

Connecticut Colony codes were patchwork collections of
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procedures and laws which were designed to promote unifor
mity and order.

It was not uncommon for the codes to in

clude some of the rules and regulations which originated on
the local level.

Indeed, the sections of the New Haven

Colony code concerning shoes and shoemakers can be traced
ba,ck to Meiggs v. G r e g o r y .

However,

it was on the colony

level that one encounters the ’’Judicial Laws of Moses” and
numerous other laws ranging from gaming to drinking that
were meant to regulate the passions of the saints and civil
man alike.
Broadly conceived then, each level of lawmaking in early
New Haven attempted to promote order through law by addres
sing different sources of disorder.

Local officials were

concerned primarily with problems peculiar to their community.
Although colony officials focused on a wider range of legal
matters,

largely in the interest of uniformity,

it is never

theless important to recognize that they had the task of
legislating morality.

Because the character of law on the

local and colony levels was so different,

it is not sur

prising that patterns of criminal conduct as reflected
through enforcement also varied.

Moreover, by approaching

New Haven's legal milieu from this dual perspective it is
possible to achieve a deeper appreciation of why, when,
and how laws were enforced.

Ultimately it will promote a

better understanding of the way order was defined and
maintained in this early New England community.
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In October,

1639 when the Plantation or Town Court of

New Haven convened for the first time, the recently elected
magistrates who presided over the session did so without the
benefits of positive or established law.

In 1639 the "Judi

cial Laws of Moses" served as the only guide by which to
conduct legal affairs.

Biblical law was, of course,

consis

tent with the leader's perceptions of how best to preserve
order in a society of saints.

And it was a principal fea

ture of John Cotton's "Moses His Judicials" which was pre
sumably carried from Massachusetts to New Haven by John
Davenport.

The so-called Cotton Code was compiled by the

Boston divine in 1636 and was meant to serve as the first
legal code of Massachusetts.

Although the compilation was

rejected by Bay Colony legislators,

it is thought to have

'7
had a positive influence on the New Haven leadership.

Yet

both the Cotton Code and New Haven's reliance upon Biblical
injunctions not included in the code had obvious limita
tions, especially when placed within the context of control
ling the lives of ambitious settlers in the new world envi
ronment.

To be sure,

in certain instances Scriptural rule

suited the community's judicial system quite well.

For

example, New Haven magistrates were able to rely success
fully on the word of God when prosecuting Nepaupuck,

a

local Indian, for taking the life of an Englishman:

"He

that sheds man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed."
Accordingly,

the n a t i v e ’s head was cut off and "pitched
Q

upon a pole in the market place."

But where were the
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magistrates to turn when residents accused of cutting timber
in a disorderly manner approached the bar?

Where were they

to turn when duty called upon them to prosecute a servant
for missing a militia training exercise?

What guide could

they rely on to prosecute recalcitrant saints whose chimneys
had not been swept?

Ultimately New Haven rulers came to

depend on a combination of homespun and traditional secular
law which represented their "branching out into particulars."
When the circumstances of their environment forced New
Haven leaders to adjust to their new milieu and create laws
that were decidedly secular in nature,

they by no means in

tended to compromise the foundations of order upon which the
welfare of the community rested.
not believe that they were,

In all likelihood they did

for even the most enthusiastic

saint realized that Biblical equivalents could not be found
to govern the variety of conditions present in seventeenthcentury America.

Indeed,

a part of their English heritage

included the notion that simple regulation was a function
of good government even if it were not divinely inspired.

9

There was no way of avoiding secular regulation even if
the saints wished to because control over the daily activties of regenerate and unregenerate men, women,

and child

ren was a necessity if the community was to survive the
initial years of settlement and hope to prosper in the
future.

Very quickly secular law and its enforcement,

spiritual exegesis and admonition, became the principal
means of controlling disorder in New England towns like

not
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New Haven.

No amount of catechizing could ensure against

starvation when forests had to be cleared.

Though grievous,

sabbath breaking would be tolerated if it meant that a sec
tion of fence would be repaired and unruly livestock kept
from a tender crop.

Properly hewn and covenanted pillars

would come to mean very little if caught in the path of a
raging wilderness fire.
fencing,

And the regulation of labor, of

and of fire control equipment became,

especially

in the 1640s, major features of New Haven's branching out
and were all crucial elements of what amounted to an in
creasingly secular legal milieu.
The 1640s were, without doubt,

the most important

decade of legal growth in New Haven.

Certainly more orders

or non-penalty directives and more bylaws were passed than
during any other period of the town's history during the
seventeenth-century."^

Between 1639 and 1698 the town

adopted a total of 114 bylaws aimed at regulating the conduct
of community members.

Over half of these addressed the two

most pressing and persistent problems which faced the town
prior to 1701— livestock control and military obedience.
indicated in Figure 2.1, the vast majority of bylaws (53%)
were written in the first decade of the town's existence.
Moreover, with the exception of a trifling increase (1%)
for the decade beginning in 1689,

the percentage of total

laws passed by the local government declined steadily from
the peak of activity in the 1640s.
Of all the bylaws passed in the first ten years, a

As
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total of

30, or 50%, were placed on the

first attempt at codification in

books prior to the

1646. This initial branch

ing out reflects the need to go beyond Biblical foundations
in order to safeguard the welfare of the community.

For

example, one of the earliest dangers facing new world set
tlements like New Haven was fire.
places and ovens,

Because fires in fire

as well as on houselots, were commonplace

the possibilities of kindling an uncontrollable blaze were
numberless.

It was therefore imperative that some measures

be taken to prevent and control fire.

The first effort came

in the form of an order in 1641 specifying "that fire hooks
shall be

made for the common use of the

c h a r g e . I t

is not known with

town,at a common

certainty if there were any

major fires during this period, but in the same year that
the hooks were ordered a law was passed that stipulated
"that every house in the town shall have a ladder (in length
to suit the height of their chimney)...

to stand ready by

their houses, under penalty of 5s fine."
ably surmise, therefore,

12

One can reason

that there had been chimney or

roof fires that were damaging to individual dwellings and
perhaps threatening to the town itself.

Quite simply,

law

makers wanted houses to be equipped with ladders so that
unwanted fires could be extinguished.

Those who failed to

comply with the law were brought to court and reminded
through newly imposed penalties that they had better con
form to fire control standards.

This is exactly what hap

pened to Samuel Hotchkiss Sr. and seven other residents
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Figure 2.1
New Haven Local Laws by Decade,

1639-1698
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New Haven Re c o r d s , I & II; Town R e co rd s, I-III.
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who,

in 1643, stood in violation of the law and were conse-

quently fined 5s each "for want of ladders."

13

This small clustering of convictions is noteworthy on
two accounts.

First,

it represents roughly 20% of all the

cases prosecuted in 1643 and is indicative of local prior
ities.

Second,

it illustrates the dynamics of the rela

tionship that existed between legislation and petty offenses.
The following scenario recreates the association:

community

members express concern over dangers inherent in the con
stant use of fire; a few fires occur which are jarring
enough to warrant appropriate directives (hooks) and legis
lation (ladders);

all but a few of the residents equip them

selves with ladders; those who do not are fined and then go
on to meet the necessary fire control and prevention regu
lations.

In this particular instance the mechanisms of

social control (law and enforcement) ran smoothly enough to
suit the needs of both rulers and ruled,

and to a decided

measure functioned in such a way as to help preserve phys
ical order as well as promote peace of mind in the commu
nity.

Fire control laws comprised but a portion (3%) of

those formulated on the local level during the seventeenthcentury.

There were, however, other needs of the evolving

community that were equally if not more important in main
taining order and as such were addressed through the legis
lative process.
One of the clearest example of the relationship between
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community needs and law comes under the heading of military
affairs.

Nearly 30% of the bylaws passed during the seven

teenth century dealt with military matters,

from prohibi

tions on selling arms to Indians (£5 fine) to arriving late
for watch duty (Is fine).

Of the 31 military bylaws passed

before 1700, 24 or 77% were placed on the books prior to
1666 and New Haven's absorption into Connecticut.

And just

over half of these appeared during the first decade of set
tlement when the need for protection and military discipline
was perhaps the gr ea te st .
At various times during the course of the century the
colonists had good reason to fear attacks

from

the Dutch,

and, perhaps with greater cause, from coastal Indians.

The

most well known period of danger from the natives is King
Philip's uprising in the 1670s.

New Haven lawmakers did

respond to the dangers associated with that period of anx
iety, but by 1675 local residents had nearly 40 years of
accumulated legislation and experience which enabled them
to mobilize effectively against King Philip's threat.
1640s were a completely different story.

Indeed,

The

the ac

tual settlement of New Haven followed the conclusion of
the Pequot War by only a few years.

It is not unreasonable

to suggest that the decade following that conflict was
marked by underlying paranoia.

The trial and execution of

the "savage” Nepaupuck in 1639 was symptomatic of this per
vasive fear.

To New Havenites the image of the noble and

friendly Indian so frequently epitomized in modern
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literature by Squanto was inconsistent with many of the
realities of coexisting with a people whose behavior and
cultural heritage differed so dramatically from their own.
And, to fuel the apprehensions associated with the aftermath of the Pequot conflict,

several valid threats were

posed by Indians in the 1640s which prompted community
leaders to take action and come to grips with the perceived
menance.

14

Not surprisingly,

legislation was considered

the most responsible means of meeting the challenge.
Given the prevailing atmosphere it did not take author
ities very long to lay the foundation for military prepared
ness.

As early as 1639 the first law was passed:

"It is

ordered that everyone that bears arms shall be completely
furnished with...

a musket,

a sword, bandoleers,

a rest,

a

pound of powder, twenty bullets fitted to their musket...
under the penalty (of) 20s fine for every default."

15

Over

the course of the next five years ten more laws and a total
of 70 orders were issued in an attempt to meet the military
requirements of the community.

Among other things,

those

needs included the creation of a watch, the working out of
a training schedule,
company.

10

and the formation of an artillary

Each of these laws,

together with the sanctions

associated with them, were part of a body of secular regu
lation aimed at forcing community members to meet the minimum standards of readiness.

17

Although the barrage of or 

ders issued during this half decade carried no penalties,
they clearly lent support to the actual legislation.

For
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example,

an order of 1642 specified that under alarm condi

tions "every soldier in the town is to repair to the meet
inghouse forthwith."

In 1644 the town's "Great Gunnes" were

ordered to be put "in readiness for service."

The following

year another directive was issued that required the gun
smiths "to lay aside all other business and get those guns
repaired that are defective."

18

These orders and others

like them were important sources of support for recent leg
islation and therefore aided in the community's social con
trol endeavors during the initial years of settlement.
Throughout this period leaders had directed their energy
towards meeting a major challenge— Indians— posed by the new
world environment.

By choosing law as the best response to

crisis local rulers broadened the town's legal edifice to
embrace new aspects of order not provided by the "Judicial
Laws of Moses."
The military legislation of the 1640s left the community
with most, but not all, of the bylaws needed to check the
dangers of an Indian attack.

When new situations arose

which called for additional laws local officials once again
responded in a direct and meaningful manner.

A good example

of this is seen in the legal response to King Philip's War.
Like the crisis of the 1640s, that of 1675-1676 once again
made military preparedness a local priority.

And at the

time of the war there had not been any military legislation
in New Haven for a decade; no laws had been passed because
none were needed.

This changed dramatically when the war
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began.

Very quickly six new military regulations,

or 85% of

those passed between 1666 and 1701, were placed on the books.
Few of the new ordinances,

however, were aimed at control

ling trainband disorders, the keeping of the watch, or re
pairing defective arms, as had been the case earlier.
Either these provisions were covered adequately enough by
previous legislation or the issue of enforcement had not
become serious enough to cause revisions or amendments of
original laws.

The first priority of community leaders in

1675-76 seemed to fall in another area of preparedness:
fortifications.

That is why the town formulated new bylaws

specifying that a stockade be built and that any individual
failing to contribute to its construction (able body males
over 14) be fined 5s.

19

Much of the wood used to erect the

"fortification line" came from a vigorous effort aimed at
clearing underbrush from the area so that it would not be
come a "shelter to the enemy."
began

The process of clearing

under an order issued in the fall of 1675 which at

the time carried no penalty.

Authorities considered the

clearing project important enough to issue subsequent or
ders and warnings as a means of achieving compliance.
Within a month, however,

it had become evident that these

informal approaches to the problem were not effective.
The town therefore responded by passing a law which carried
a Is penalty for every rod not cleared.

And to make it

more meaningful several individuals were appointed to oversee the operation and report violators to the authorities.

20
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This underbrush legislation was only temporary— one of a
handful of bylaws so designated during the seventeenth
century.

However, what is significant about the military

bylaws of the 1670s is that they were passed in direct re
sponse to a crisis facing the community.

In fact most of

the 31 military regulations formulated during the century,
whether in the 1640s or 1670s, were similar in that they
represented a response to local problems and thus a branch
ing or broadening of the legal milieu beyond Bibilical
foundations.
Another area of concern that generated a similar legal
response to disorder was the control of livestock.
proved to be the case with military affairs,

As

the control of

livestock through proper fencing and other means became a
topic of utmost concern for members of the community during
the first two decades of settlement.

The first mention of

livestock control— and hint of a problem— was made at a
Town Meeting in January 1640 when it was suggested "that some
speedy course shall be taken to keep hogs out of the neck."

21

In many respects this order summarizes the central purpose
of livestock control:

permitting animals to roam in certain

areas and restraining them from entering others.

Within a

few years of this initial directive, others were made which
were aimed at controlling the animal population of New Haven
in different ways.

In 1643 the court ordered two separate

pounds to be constructed and directed the neck to be fenced
and fitted with gates.

22

In 1645 one of the earliest live
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stock control bylaws was passed;

it prohibited goats from

roaming off private property and Thomas Caffinch was fined
for failing to control his.

23

By 1646 town officials had

issued 23 orders and passed six laws all in an attempt to
restrain and otherwise control livestock.
Yet during this initial phase of legislation the author
ities were unable to bring the disorders under control;

in

fact, the entire problem had been faced in a somewhat in
formal manner.
passed,

Although orders had been made and laws

there existed no meaningful agencies of control to

carry them out.

The principal burden of livestock manage

ment before 1646 fell on the shoulders of fence viewers who
were responsible for overseeing fences in their neighbor
hoods or "quarters."

This decentralized and informal ap

proach to the problem was ineffectual,

so much so that the

town passed a law which carried a 2s penalty for viewers
who failed to carry out their "appointed" task.
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The need

for viewers originally arose in 1644 in response to a com
plaint made by Thomas Nash,

a local gunsmith,

"of damage

done in his corn to the value of nine bushels by hogs.”

25

Lack of diligence on the viewers part may also explain why
Thomas Caffinch was the only resident prosecuted for vio
lating livestock statutes prior to 1646.

More often than

not, the problem of regulation manifested itself through
civil litigation.

Quite simply,

the lack of effective en-

forecement made the problem worse and this forced residents
to drag their neighbors into court.

John Owen,

for example,
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was left with no alternative in 1642 after has corn had been
damaged by unrestrained cattle.

Two years later William

Thompson entered a complaint against Thomas Gregson,

a lead

ing member of the community, because of damage done to his
crop.

The court ruled that several individuals were at

fault for allowing their fences to "lay down," and each,

in

cluding Gregson, was ordered to pay Thompson six bushels of
corn.
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Had the viewers been doing their job correctly,

the

litigation may well have been avoided.
By 1648 the problem had become serious enough for magis
trate Theophilus Eaton to lament publically "that many are
discouraged from the labor of husbandry, because their corn,
when they had sown it, is spoiled."
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In response to what

was considered to be a serious problem,

the town devised an

effective agency of control, passed a number of new laws and
supportive orders,

and, by virtue of these changes,

a greater

number of violators were prosecuted.
The pivotal step towards resolving the problem was made
when leaders introduced to the community the position of
public pounder or pound keeper which was considered to be
the "best way" to "prevent damage done, by swine and fences.
John Cooper accepted the position,

*28

and, in addition to the

traditional duties of a pound keeper,

he was entrusted with

the responsibility of viewing fences on a weekly basis and
of notifying owners of their defects.
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The appointment was

indeed a significant step in combating the problems of live
stock control because for the first time the town had an
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effective "middleman" capable of linking private residents,
and thus violators,

to the courts.

Because the magistracy considered the position of pound
keeper to be so important,

a series of new bylaws and orders

was undertaken in the post-1648 period.

For instance,

in an

effort to aid the pounder in his duties, residents were or
dered to mark their fences so that violators could be readily identified.
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Within months of his appointment Cooper

discovered "that he finds great difficulty in viewing fences"
because of residents who left town without making some pro
vision for the maintenance of their fences.

Consequently the

court ordered that caretakers be designated by owners before
they left town for long periods or face prosecution.
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And

in 1652, after a law had been passed that enumerated penal
ties for missing posts and rails,

another was added which

carried a 12d fine for convicted fence violators who had not
paid their original penalty.
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In addition to laws focusing exclusively on fences,
others were passed which were aimed at restricting further
the movement of livestock.

Based on information provided by

the pound keeper and upon a series of complaints that
"Indian corn is spoiled,

and more like[ly] to be, if some

other course not be taken," a bylaw was passed that speci
fied that if any "swine be found in the fields or streets
unyoaked,
damage."
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the owner shall pay 12d a piece for them beside
Because the control of swine had become espe

cially troublesome by the early fifties,

authorities were
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constrained to limit the number that could be owned in di
rect proportion to the amount of land held by local residents.
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And eventually,

an order was made that "no man but

such as are admitted planters here shall keep any swine or
cattle" within the limits of New Haven without first having
obtained the "Townes consent."
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The problems associated with controlling livestock were
not completely solved by the late 1650s.

Indeed,

the town

would pass 15 more laws— as circumstances required— and go
on to issue many more orders before the turn of the century.
Yet it was during the late forties and early fifties that
the problem of control was recognized for what it was— a
threat to order— and that the position of pound keeper was
created to address the situation in a realistic and mean
ingful fashion.

And among other things,

the formulation of

new bylaws and their enforcement meant that the degree of
contention between individuals also diminished,

and so too,

the kinds of public disorders community leaders hoped to
. . 36
avoid.
Overall livestock control bylaws accounted for 41 or 35%
of those passed during the seventeenth century.

Volume

alone should be an indication that correcting disorders re
lated to livestock became a priority in New Haven.
not go unnoticed,

however,

What should

is the myriad of isolated instances

of lawmaking which, while perhaps not related to a major cri
sis, nevertheless reflect legal responses to potential
sources of disruption.

In 1641, for instance, before ferry
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service had been established for crossing the Quinnipiac
River,

disorders arose when settlers "borrowed" canoes with

out owner's permission.

Unwanted litigation resulted and the

town responded by passing a law which forced individuals
found guilty of taking a "boat or canoe without leave" to pay
a 20s fine or appropriate damages to the owner.
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When,

in

1650, the activities of a stranger named Elisha Weeden became
a source of disruption,

another ordinance was passed which

required transients to receive permission from town authori
ties to remain.

While the bylaw was aimed at regulating the

presence of "outsiders," officials were quick to note that
it was not designed to exclude "friends who in a way of love
come to visit."
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And when the need arose in 1663 to regu

late the speed at which horses could be ridden through town,
another law was passed which corrected the disorder.
Whether town ordinances were written
isolated events such as borrowing canoes
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in the wake of
or in the midst of

more prolonged periods of crisis concerned with military
preparedness,

one basic characteristic of attempts to pro

mote order through law on the local level em e r g e s :

law

making was a secular response to specific needs of the
community.

Some of the bylaws,

cutting of timber,

like those regulating the

can be traced to English

and thus were traditional.

Others,

such

manorial law

as military regu

lation, were more novel insofar as they were direct re
sponses to new world conditions.
statutes,

Most of the 114 local

78 or 69%, were passed prior to 1659 when the
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need to "branch out" was greatest.

Additional ordinances

were passed before 1701 as amendments or new legislation was
required to meet new conditions.

However, most of the law

making in the post-1659 period did not occur in clusters
which may be an indication that physically the town was bet
ter ordered in the late going that at the outset of settle
ment.

If this was the case, then it follows that most of

the enforcement of local statutes would have taken place
during the initial years when disorders were more prevalent.
Since the enforcement of bylaws generally was carried out
on the local level,

it should come as no surprise to find

that patterns of petty crime were inextricably linked to the
priorities of the community.
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The enforcement of bylaws was only one aspect of the
overall attempt to maintain order in New Haven.

As suggested

earlier, New Havenites were also bound by a set of higher,
more universal statutes which were incorporated into a se
ries of law codes found on the colony level.

Colony codes

touched on an array of legal matters, but specifically those
governing morality which were never fully addressed on the
local level.

During the century residents of the town were

exposed to four codes,

each of which was more elaborate and

realistic than its predecessor.
The initial experiment with codification came in the mid
forties and was made in direct response to a pair of recent
events.

The compilation was made in part because New Haven's
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public notary and secretary Thomas Fugill,

had been convicted

of land fraud by tampering with the records.

This was a

clear violation of public trust and it caused officials to
loose confidence in his work.
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Perhaps having a greater

bearing on the codification attempt was the formation of the
New Haven Colony in 1643 which,
proper,

in addition to New Haven

included five neighboring communities.

Quite natu

rally officials believed that a single body of laws and pro
cedures would be less confusing than six different collec
tions of rules and regulations.

Once begun, the standardiz

ation and revision process took nearly a year to complete.
The original directive was issued in 1645 when magistrates
and deputies were instructed "to view all those orders which
are cf a lasting nature,

and where they are defective,

to

mend them and then let them be read in the [general] court
[so] that the court may confirm or alter them as they see
cause."
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The work was completed by early 1646 with the

formal collection of old and new bylaws, orders, and proce
dures.
On the surface the 1646 code was little more than a
collection or compilation of previous legal efforts.

In

this sense the revision pre-figured the more elaborate
codes of 1656 (New Haven) and of 1650 and 1673 (Connecticut),
which were also compilations.

Yet to describe the 1646 re

vision and subsequent codes as simple updates is to slight
their importance to the architects of the New England Way.
On the one hand, and in a broad sense, the codes which
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appeared during the seventeenth century reflected a desire
for precise delineation of law which originated with puri
tans in England who perceived themselves as victims of
Stuart tyranny.
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On the other hand, and closer to home,

the codes were considered a means of promulgating order in
New England towns and colonies through a reaffirmation of
fundamental values and the benefits afforded by recorded,
positive law.
Not surprisingly,

the 1646 revision began with a restate

ment of the legal foundations devised to suit the needs of
the well ordered community:
they were delivered by Moses,

"The judicial laws of God, as
and expounded in other parts

of Scripture... shall be a constant direction for all proceedings here."
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Beyond this general statement, however,

the revision did not enumerate laws and punishments re
lating to moral conduct.
values,

Following this reaffirmation of

all the other laws, orders,

and policies of the first

few years "that were of a lasting nature" were incorporated
into the revision.

Significantly, many of the bylaws and

procedures used in the town of New Haven served as the
basis of the code; what was good for Davenport's and Eaton's
community was evidently good for the other five colony
towns.

This was especially true with generalized regula

tions like voting procedures and franchise requirements,
both of which were reiterated in the revision.
eral policies,

Other gen

like those governing land were rerecorded.

The methods used for determining assessments of "all rates
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and public charges" were also explained and placed on the
books.

In addition to policies,

orders that were considered

to be of special value to the communities were embraced in
the revision.

These included provisions for the "better

training up of youth in this town" and the allocation of a
salary for the town's first schoolmaster Ezekial Cheever.
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Because "of the trouble and hindrance which sundry, both of
this town and other plantations find and undergo in getting
over the East River," an order was incorporated into the
code that called for the development of a ferry system which
could alleviate the problem.

Moreover, these are but two

examples of codified orders ranging from the keeping of a
book of warrants to providing bounties for wolves and foxes.
In addition to policies and orders, the revision also
included a restatement of old bylaws and the inclusion of a
few new ones where necessary.

A total of 12 new statutes,

mostly concerning military affairs, were added during the
compilation process.

For the most part, the new military

legislation was designed to lend support to the bylaws
passed prior to 1646.

For example,

in 1640 an ordinance

stipulated that individuals who arrived late at training
exercises were to be penalized.

Yet no legal provision had

been made to keep militiamen there once they had arrived.
It was in the wake of a series of inconvenient and disrup
tive early departures that a bylaw was added to the 1646
code that penalized residents 5s if they were convicted of
leaving the exercises prematurely.

46

Similarly, because

84
there had been disputes growing out of the recording of names
of those who attended the exercises,

a new statute specified

that anyone who arrived late must notify the company clerk.
If they failed to comply, they faced possible conviction and
a 5s fine.
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And no earlier bylaws had sought to govern the

behavior of soldiers at the exercises.

This oversight was

corrected through the addition of a law which empowered mag
istrates and their deputies to punish disorderly militiamen
at their discretion.
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Essentially,

each one of the new mil

itary bylaws was designed to promote order in the communities
of the colony through effective regulation and enforcement of
military affairs.
Although the revision of 1646 attempted to bring a measure
of order through legal uniformity,
fledged code of law.

it was by no means a full

It was important because it provided

the basics needed to tie the towns of the colony together,
but it was also vastly inadequate as an overall handbook of
positive law.

Indeed so many aspects of regulating the con

duct of individuals were left untouched in the revision,
that officials eventually decided to "publish" a more com
plete code of laws.

This occurred in 1656 and was also

prompted by the fact that each of the "puritan" New England
colonies had already compiled formal codes that transcended
the peculiarities of "local communities.

Thus moved by a

desire for further uniformity and by the need to codify or
otherwise define crimes of a capital nature, the New Haven
Colony General Court requested Governor Theophilus Eaton to
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view the laws thought "most necessary to continue here," and
then have them "sent to England to be printed."
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By the

fall of 1656 500 copies of the so-called Eaton Code had ar
rived in New Haven and they were ordered to be distributed
to the colony's towns.
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Known formally as New-H av en 's Settling in New E n g l a n d ,
the code of 1656 resembled the earlier revision insofar as
it was a compilation of procedures, orders,

and laws.

But

Eaton's code departed from the collection made in 1646 in
two important ways.

First,

it was less original because

Eaton was authorized to borrow from the Massachusetts
Colony's Laws and Liberties of 1648.

Secondly, the Eaton

Code finally specified penalties for moral offenses (such
as fornication and drunkenness) which had always been un
defined and discretionary.
The code consisted of 69 different categories of laws
and procedures ranging from "actions” to "wolves” which
were collectively designed to generate a uniform body of
practices for conducting legal affairs in the colony.
these,

37 (54%) were procedural in nature.

Of

For instance,

if a New Haven housewife wished to sue her neighbor for
slander,

she could consult the portion of the code dealing

with "actions" and find information concerning legal fees
and, depending upon the value of her suit, the proper
court in which to file her cause.

By the same token,

if a

Branford farmer killed one of the colony's most dangerous
predators, he could turn to the section on "wolves" and
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discover that in return for the animal's head he was entitied to a 20s bounty.
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Standard procedures such as these

were clearly important in promoting uniformity and safe
guarding the liberties of Englishmen in the new world, but
they represent merely a portion of the code.

Another 32

(46%) of the principal headings were a combination of both
procedure and law.

Falling under these were a total of 64

laws to which specific penalties were attached.

For ex

ample, under the heading "Ecclesiastical" there were two
laws, each of which carried a different penalty:

a fixed

fine of 5s for church absence and punishment by magisterial
discretion for anyone convicted of reproaching religion.
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In order to trace and identify probable sources of the laws
in Eaton's compilation,

the various headings must be dis

sected in a manner that will isolate individual statutes.
Once this is done it becomes evident that even the rather
generalized laws of the colony were formulated in response
to specific circumstances encountered in the new world.
The one exception to this was the block of 20 laws (31%)
for which the Bible was the primary source.

Not surprising

ly, most of these were "universal" laws punishable by death.
Seventeen were capital offenses which were taken directly
from the Old Testament.

In many respects these "Judicial

laws of Moses" represent the Biblical foundations or "con
stant direction" upon which both the town and colony rested.
The well-ordered Bible Commonwealth was originally perceived
as one free of those sinful deeds committed by miscreants
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who specifically violated the commands of God.
victed murderers could be executed (Lev.
adulterers (Lev. 20:10),

24:17),

Thus,

con

as could

and rebellious children who rose

up against their parents (Deut.

21:18-21).

Yet each of the

seventeen capital laws found in the code were highly gener
alized and most were never violated and therefore enforced
with any regularity.
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The actual role they played in main

taining order in the colony's towns was limited.

More ap

plicable to New England communities were the Biblical laws
covering theft

(restitution) and fornication (marriage), but

in practice the punishment for these offenses rested on
broad magisterial discretion and thus departed literally
from Scriptural injunction.

In terms of both application and

quantity the laws of God were overshadowed by those which
were secular responses to specific problems facing the col
ony and its towns.
A little over two-thirds of the laws in Eaton's code were
either traditional or original secular pieces of legislation.
Nine (15%) can be traced directly to lawmaking that began in
the town of New Haven.

For instance, the law regulating

leather for shoes evolved out of Meiggs v. Gregory in 1648.
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Four military laws in the code date back to the rash of legislation undertaken during the 1640s in New Haven.
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And

the principal law governing the conduct of strangers can be
traced back to the circumstances surrounding Elisha Weeden
in 1650.
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Moreover, when local legislation (which Eaton

had originally had a hand in creating) was considered general
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enough to fit the needs of the colony,

it was freely incor

porated into the code.
So too were similar secular laws from Massachusetts.

An

additional 15 (24%) were borrowed directly from the Laws and
Liberties, something that was in keeping with Eaton's in
structions from the General Court.

The reliance upon the

Bay Colony for some legal advise was not altogether new in
1656.

During the late forties Eaton had written to John

Winthrop and requested information on taxation and how best
to define the obligations of transient seamen.
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Because

the ties with the Bay were especially close it seemed only
natural for Eaton "to send for one of the new book of laws...
and to add to what is already done as he shall think fit."
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Most of the borrowed laws fell under the general heading of
entertainment— something that had never received full at
tention by New Haven authorities.

These laws were quite

similar to those passed on the local level in New Haven,
insofar as they were responses to problems that Massachu
setts leaders encountered prior to 1648.

For example,

the laws against tippling which were adopted by Eaton had
been passed by the Massachusetts General Court in May of
1645; the penalty for lying was established in the same
year, and those for gaming were written shortly there
to
after.
The Bay Colony laws that were incorporated into
the Eaton Code provided an additional element of positive
legislation and strengthened those that had already been
formulated by New Haven Colony officials.
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The sources for twenty (31%) of the remaining laws in
the New Haven compilation are difficult to identify with
certainty.

For the most part they appear to have been a

collection of customs and precedents practiced in the colony
since its inception, but never specifically recorded.

This

was similar to the situation involving Biblical law, which
was practiced in New Haven prior to the code, but which re
mained nevertheless unrecorded.

It seems clear, however,

that generalized laws like that requiring colony residents
to provide strong enclosures for cattle were original to
the Eaton Code.
Indian affairs,

The same can be said of laws governing
like the sale of land,

and of new legislation

bearing on the education of children in the jurisdiction.
Still the Eaton Code was,

first and foremost,

of laws and procedures that were, by 1656,
recording and clarification.
to the Bible,
munity,
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a compilation

in need of formal

As such, Governor Eaton turned

to appropriate legislation from his own com

to the Laws and Liberties, and to the customs prac

ticed within the colony as a means of putting together 'che
colony's first formal body of laws.
The Eaton Code was but one of two major legal changes
which affected residents of the town of New Haven during
the late fifties and sixties.

The code added another layer

of rules and regulations that community members were bound
to follow.

It provided leaders with a set of uniform laws

which they could use to hold residents accountable.
same token, however,

it provided the colonists with a

By the
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clearer understanding of what was expected of them and,

im

portantly, with a guide which they could use to protect
their own rights and interests.
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Although lawmaking on the

colony level did not end with the publication of the code,
Eaton's compilation, which was more secular that Biblical
in nature,

remained the principal body of laws governing

behavior for the last decade of the colony's existence.
A second major change to occur during this period can
be traced to the dissolution of the colony in 1665.

The

formal absorption into the Connecticut Colony brought an
end to nearly a quarter century of "puritan" rule by men
like John Davenport and Theophilus Eaton.

Although the

latter's code had had an impact on the lives of all colony
residents,

it ceased to exist legally after 1665.

So too

did the discretionary Court of Magistrates on the colony
level and the Plantation Court on the local level, both of
which had heard cases without the use of juries.
legal perspective,

From a

absorption by Connecticut meant that

New Haven residents were exposed to a new body of laws
(the "Ludlow Code" of 1650) and to a new court structure.
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In practical terms the transfer of power from New
Haven to Hartford was accomplished with little difficulty.
There was some resistance in the years immediately follow
ing 1662 when leaders like John Davenport first learned of
the impending change.
seemed,

if anything,

teration.

There was,

But for the most part New Havenites
indifferent to the jurisdictional al
consequently,

also little difficulty
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involved in erecting the new court system which remained in
force for the balance of the seventeenth century.

The new

structuring provided the town with a local or monthly court
as before, with jurisdiction over misdemeanors and over
civil suits under

£20.

The principal distinction between

the new inferior or Commis si on er s’ Court and the old Plan
tation Court was the use of juries in actions amounting to
40s or more.

Also new to New Haven residents,

indeed to all

inhabitants of the colony, was a network of county courts
which heard appeals from the inferior courts,

administered

estates,

and acted on grand jury presentments in all cases
Q3
"excepting life, limb, and banishment."
The jurisdiction
for these more serious punishments rested with the new
Court of Assistants which also handled appeals from the
County Courts.
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The creation of both courts was signifi

cant because together they shared a case load which had
been previously the responsibility of a single quarterly
court in Hartford.

This fact, when coupled with the in

creased accessibility afforded by the County Courts, meant
that the entire network became more responsive and more
efficient.

Finally,

the court of last resort remained,

it had during the New Haven Colony years,

as

the General

Assembly.
In addition to a new court system, New Haven residents
were also exposed to an entirely new code of laws.

The

collection of procedures and statutes in force in 1665 was
the one compiled by magistrate Roger Ludlow some 15 years
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earlier.
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Although it was new to New Havenites,

the code

was not radically different from Eaton's either in format or
content.

Because of this, the Ludlow Code more than likely

had less of an impact- than did Eaton's when it was original
ly distributed.
Although the Ludlow Code,

along with post 1650 legisla

tion, provided legal guidelines for New Haven residents im
mediately following absorption,

this changed in 1673 when

Connecticut officials ordered a new code to be written.
revision process was put into motion in 1671,
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The

when colony

authorities requested John Allyn to "prepare a draft of laws
of this jurisdiction now in use with such amendments and ad
ditions as he shall find necessary."

The code was compiled

inside of a year, whereupon the governor and his assistants
wrote a preface and ordered the new body of laws to be
, . 67
printed.
Connecticut's new code,
towns in 1673
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"published" in the colony's

and distributed in book form a year later,

was more extensive than either the Eaton or Ludlow compila
tions.

All of the codes were similar in format,

yet the

1673 lawbook contained a substantially greater number of
headings (141) than either of its predecessors.
these were nested 87 different laws,
than found in the Eaton Code.

Within

about a third more

As far as sources of law

are concerned, both the Eaton and Connecticut Codes were
similar.

Both borrowed freely from the Laws and Liberties

of Massachusetts;

31% of Connecticut's statutes can be
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traced to that document,

compared with 24% for New Haven.

Both codes relied extensively on a combination of local law
and colony precedent— 49% for Connecticut and 40% for New
Haven.

And each code utilized the Bible as a source for

their "universal" laws.

In the case of the Eaton Code 31%,

whereas 20% of Connecticut's laws were drawn from Scripture.
That fewer of the laws in

the Connecticut compilation

are traced to the Bible is, in part,

indicative of amend

ments which reflect both changing social conditions and
values.

For instance,

in the Eaton and Ludlow codes,

tery was considered a capital offense (Lev. 20:10).

adul
By

1673, when the new code appeared, the punishment for that
crime had been reduced to whipping and stigmatization— a
subtle redefinition which was perhaps necessitated by
changing patterns of adulterous behavior.
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Indeed, the

inclusion of a number of new provisions in the code that
had no equivalents in earlier compilations suggests a re
sponse to recent social developments in the colony.

Nei

ther of the earlier codes contained bastardy laws, prob
ably because the birth of "natural" children was uncommon.
By 1673 the activities of a promiscuous second generation
had necessitated new legislation.
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The offense of "night-

walking" by young adults had become so prevalent by the
1670s that it too became a new addition to the code.

More

over, the practice of enacting new laws to counteract
changing circumstances was by no means original to- the code
of 1673;

it had taken place before and would continue to in
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the last decades of the century as Connecticut authorities
responded to social disorders through new, appropriate
legislation.
Finally,

it should be noted that while some of the laws

included in the new code regulated individual conduct in
new ways, there were others that remained unchanged.

Pun-

ishment for theft was as severe in 1701 as it was in 1639.
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The same was true with penalities for fornication— a major
moral offense.

Importantly,

in the case of both of these

crimes, magistrates continued to possess discretionary
powers in sentencing offenders.

Many of the capital laws

like bestiality and rape also retained their original form.
And, so too, did a multitude of laws which defined petty
crimes and minor procedures ranging from the gauging of
"casks and cooper" to bounties for wolves and foxes.
deed, on both the local and colony levels laws

In

of a con

stant nature together with those that were written in re
sponse to change not only defined, but more frequently re
defined notions of order in seventeenth-century Connecticut.

If there is one prominent theme of the many introduced
in this assessment of promoting order through law,
lates to legal change;

it re

it reinforces the concept that law,

unlike puritan rhetoric, was far from being cast in con
crete .

Some of the legal changes,

like the reorganization

of the court system in 1666, were made in response to ex
ternal or jurisdictional changes.

But most of the altera-
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tions that occurred came from an internal source,

from the

needs of the people and the circumstances of life peculiar
to the new world which necessitated legal adjustments on
two levels.
First,

there was change on the local level.

The con

text of lawmaking illustrated by Meiggs v. Gregory (1647)
is central to the notion of legal change and the way social
order was defined in early New Haven.

The case emphasized

the need to "branch out" beyond Biblical foundations and
pass laws which protected consumers from unscrupulous arti
sans.

Those laws enacted in the aftermath of the case

(1648) also came at a crucial juncture in the town's legal
evolution— the first decade of settlement when 60 or 53% of
the 114 bylaws were written.

Nearly all of the town ordi

nances passed during the century were similar insofar as
they were secular responses to particular problems facing
the community.

The most serious of these— livestock con

trol and military preparedness— produced 72 (62%) pieces of
new legislation.

The remaining bylaws,

although not passed

in clusters during periods of cr is i s , were nevertheless
practical responses to conditions in New Haven.

Thus wheth

er new legislation took the form of a series of livestock
control ordinances or were more isolated responses to the
presence of strangers in town, fires, or the "borrowing" of
canoes,

law seemed to function best "as a response to the

concrete needs of s o c i e t y . " ^
Second, there was notable legal change on the colony
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level.

Here too, change was a pervasive theme.

The codes

which affected New Havenites during the century were more
than updates of older statutes; they are dynamic examples
of the flexibility of colonial law.

The Revision of 1646,

for example, closed loopholes in earlier legislation in an
effort to better order the affairs of the colony.

The

Eaton Code did not merely copy the Laws and Liberties, but
included statutes and procedures original to conditions in
the New Haven Colony.

And the Connecticut Code pragmati

cally discarded antiquated laws and penalties in favor of
those which more accurately reflected the needs of Connecti
cut society in the 1670s.

One of the most striking aspects

of these compilations is the extent to which they departed
from Biblical foundations.

With the exception of universal

or capital laws delineated in the codes and traced to the
Bible, the statutes were clearly secular.

If one is willing

to accept the argument that colonial codes were the "regis
ters of social values most sensitive to the needs of society,"
then the legal guidelines of the New Haven and Connecticut
colonies were overwhelmingly secular.
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Although the bylaws of the local community and the va
riety of statutes embodied in the colony codes illustrate
the degree to which definitions of order branched out be
yond the Bible and the rhetorical concerns of the founding
fathers, they alone do not provide us with a satisfactory
understanding of which laws were most instrumental in de
fining social order in early New Haven.

More analysis of

97
the context of colonial law, specifically the enforcement
of local bylaws,

colony statutes,

and civil litigation,

is

needed to provide additional insights into those disorders
which posed the greatest challenges to the well-ordered
community.
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CHAPTER III
CHALLENGES TO PHYSICAL
ORDER:
PETTY CRIME
In February 1649,

eighteen individuals were convicted

at a session of the New Haven Plantation Court "for not
bringing their weights and measures to be tried upon the
appointed day."

The reasons for not observing the court's

instructions undoubtedly varied.

Perhaps the lawabiding but

litigious merchant John Evance was away on business.

Shop

keeper William Peck might have found the "appointed" time
of eight a.m. on a mid-November day downright inconvenient.
Or the recently widowed Jane Gregson may well have found it
emotionally difficult to gather her late husband's measures
and cart them across the street to the meetinghouse for
inspection.

Whether intended or not, the oversight cost

each of the offenders 12d.^
There was nothing unusual about a court ordered viewing
of weights and measures.
custom in New Haven.
been settled,

By the late 1640s it had become a

Indeed, well before New England had

similar accountings had come to play a tradi

tional role in English commercial life.

What is novel

about this snippet of New Haven history is that a group of
well-kenned residents had failed to comply with the court's
request.

It was unusual because the 17 men and one woman

fined in 1649 were the only inhabitants of the town known
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to have violated this practice during the seventeenth
century.

Although it was uncommon in its particulars,

the

scene and its players are nevertheless illustrative of the
more general drama of social control acted out by New Haven
residents between 1639 and 1701.
The "legislative" segment of the chronicle of order and
social control in this Connecticut community has already
been told.

Residents of New Haven promoted order by relying

upon the traditional practice of formulating bylaws designed
to meet the needs of the community.

For the most part laws

were written when crises or other problems posed discernable
threats to social stability.

The series of 35 livestock

control laws is but one example.

These and other bylaws

governed daily activities in early New Haven and when they
were violated authorities moved swiftly to enforce them.
Enforcement of local statutes is thus an important por
tion of the overall story of order and social control.

The

prosecution of residents who violated community bylaws is
as central to an appreciation of order as the writing of
the ordinances themselves.

While lawmaking sheds light on

the process of promoting and defining order, the enforce
ment of law reveals much about how it was maintained.

One

aspect of an analysis of enforcement is that it provides a
realistic view of the sorts of disorders prevalent in the
community.

These in turn help explain how order was per

ceived, perhaps more convincingly than the lofty sermons of
New Haven's celebrated divines John Davenport and James
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Pierpont.

Indeed, the famous writings of New England's

"articulate few" might, provide insights into the ideals of
the well-ordered commonwealth, but not always its realities.
Analysis of law and its enforcement is the equalizer;

2

it

contributes to the balance needed to depict accurately the
nuances of order and social control on the local level.
Patterns of "criminal" conduct reflect realities, not ideals;
the rhetoric of magistrates and ministers,

just the opposite.

Yet when both are considered simultaneously, one finds that
most of the disorders requiring control bore little resem
blance to the "corruptions" that the articulate few expected
to undermine order in the community.
This does not mean that the town was free of the disrup
tions associated with the behavior of alcohol abusers,
nicators,

for

and thieves— those who violated t h e ’codified law

of the colony and about whom the spokesmen of the New England
3

Way warned.

Yet the lion's share of the enforcement effort

seems to have been directed towards the control of petty
offenders who violated local bylaws.

It may well have been

that the true sources of disharmony in the community were
not the servant or transient who stole some lace or drank
excessively, but rather the widely known and generally
respected resident whose fence lay in disrepair or who in
advertently fell asleep during his watch duty.

This is why

it was suggested earlier that the weights and measures vio
lations enforced in 1649 were "illustrative" of social con
trol in New Haven.

The majority of the offenses known to
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have been prosecuted during the seventeenth century were
similar; they were violations of local ordinances and were
generally punishable by small fines.

Indeed,

it may well

have been that offenses like these played a more prominent
role in shaping the well-ordered community than hitherto
imagined.

4

It is therefore necessary to reconstruct as best

as possible the patterns of local enforcement recoverable
from extant records in light of questions pertinent to the
5
maintenance of order.
Which laws were violated and with
what frequency?

When were the violations?

What was the

connection between new legislation and enforcement?
the violations occurred,

Once

how were they resolved?

It is also necessary to go beyond offenses.

If the

majority of the violations in New Haven were similar to those
for which the 18 planters of 1649 were punished, what of
the offenders themselves?

How typical were they?

most petty offenders recidivists,
save John Evance?

Were

as was each of this group

How typical was the career of carpenter

and selectman William Andrews, whose three court appearances
spanned a twelve year period:

in 1648 he was accused of

missing a military training exercise and his case was dropped;
in 1649 he was convicted of the weights and measures vio
lation;

and,

in 1662 he was acquitted of missing a session

of the town meeting.
breakers,

Indeed, what was it about these law

aside from the types of bylaws they violated,

that enabled them to retain their membership in the com
munity?

What does this suggest about the maintenance of
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order?

Answers to these and other questions about petty

offenders and the different disorders they had a hand in
promoting are requisite for a clear understanding of social
control in early New Haven.
In the period from 1639 through 1698 New Haven residents
appeared before authorities on 897 known occasions for in
fractions of community bylaws or variations thereof.

Usu

ally an appearance was made before the Plantation Court,

a

local tribunal which sat without a jury, was essentially
discretionary,
Occasionally,

and which at times could be quite informal.

6

for reasons not altogether clear, petty of

fenses were heard before sessions of a superior court.
the most part, however,

violations of local laws were han

dled by local authorities;
local endeavor.

For

social control was principally a

Roughly 88% of the appearances were pro

cessed through the Plantation Court
1665) the Commissioners'

(before 1665) or (after

Court, both of which had original

jurisdiction over petty offenses.

Furthermore, most of the

known prosecutions by local authorities occurred prior to
1666, the year in which the County Courts were established.
Because New Haven was a county seat it seems as if many of
the minor transgressions of law which took place in the
town after 1666 were tried in the County Court as a matter
of convenience.

Perhaps sessions of the local courts were

postponed when the County Court s a t .
Regardless of which group of authorities local resi
dents faced, their appearances had two fundamental meanings
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and a variety of possible resolutions.

Either an individ

ual stood accused of violating a bylaw and appeared invol
untarily, or an appearance was made voluntarily to conclude
some unfinished business.

In the case of the latter, this

meant filing an appeal from an inferior court decision or
applying for remission of an earlier penalty, most likely a
fine.

In both instances the possible outcome was limited
O

to either a "yes" or a "no."

There was somewhat more

variation involved when appearances were made involuntarily.
Generally one of four things happened.

Offenders could be

haled before the court and convicted (which was usually the
case with petty offenders) or they could be acquitted.

It

was also possible to have a case dropped or even postponed
(often, as it turns out,

indefinitely).

There were other

conceivable resolutions,

such as being told to post a

recognizance, but as in the case of remissions and appeals,
9
deviations from the four just described were infrequent.
Although there were a number of possibilities associated
with making an appearance before the bench,

a little over

three-quarters of those who did so involuntarily ended up
being convicted of their minor violations.^

The majority

of these decisions were determined by local authorities
and this suggests,

in part, that the control of petty of

fenders was indeed the responsibility of the town, not the
colony.
When viewed over time, the distribution of court ap
pearances for petty offenses points towards the same
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conclusion.

They were unevenly distributed, with an over

whelming number occurring during the initial years of set
tlement and thus acclimation to new world conditions.

This

particular distribution is strikingly similar to that of
community bylaws, most of which were passed at an early
stage in the town's legal development.'*'^
Figure 3.1,

As illustrated in

fully 43% of the appearances for petty viola

tions in seventeenth-century New Haven took place before
1649.

An additional 36% were heard before the town cele

brated the twenty-first anniversary of its planting.

More

over, by the end of 1658, 713 or 80% of the total number of
known bylaw infractions had been tried by local authorities.
The peak in appearances was reached in 1644 when members of
the Plantation Court handed down 118 decisions.

And 1649

was also a busy year for local officials, who prosecuted
another 101 cases.

The 219 appearances made during these

two years alone represent a quarter of the total number
made for violations of local laws over the course of the
entire century.

As was so with the formulation of bylaws,

the 1640s were clearly a crucial decade for their enforce
ment.

Although it is difficult to determine what consti

tuted a "heavy" or "light" caseload,

certainly the number

of cases handled by town and county officials declined
steadily after the late 1640s.

Whereas enforcement efforts

in all courts uncovered 385 violations in the first decade,
similar attempts at control yielded only 17 in the last.
Although the distribution of petty offenses reflects a
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great deal of activity in the early decades,

it would be a

mistake to conclude that it all but ceased during the second
half of the century.

The reason is twofold.

While it is

correct that the vast majority of known appearances for
petty violations after.1666 were made before the County
Court,

it does not mean that local rulers relinquished their

claim to social control; they still passed bylaws and they
continued to prosecute petty offenders.

Yet the important

and regrettably unanswerable question remains:

precisely

how much law enforcement took place on the local level after
the County Courts were established?

The last known prose

cution of a petty offense by the town court was in 1670 when
Jonathan Lampson was reproved for violating a 1658 law gov
erning the "pressing" of residents for work at the town
mill.

12

Although local court proceedings disappear from

town records after 1670,
Commissioners'

it is paramount to recognize that

Courts continued to be held in the town.

Frequent references to "inferior courts" and occasional
appeals from them dot the County Court records and signify
that social control was indeed taking place on the local
level in New Haven and its surrounding communities.

13

The second reason for not concluding that local en
forcement ceased in the post-1666 period involves subtle
changes in the apparatus of control utilized by the New
Haven town government.

Even if there were complete and

accurate records of all the Commissioners'

Courts, the

story of enforcement would still be incomplete because

Figure 3.1
Percent Distribution of Petty Offenses
By Decade,

1639-1698

Q»

n ■

DECADE

Sources:

New Haven R e c o r d s , I & II; Town R ec or ds , I-III

and County Court Records,

I.
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some cases were heard by yet less formal agencies of con
trol.

For as the workload of the town meeting and Planta

tion Court increased in the 1650s, portions of their com
bined authority were delegated to other bodies, the most
important of which were the selectmen.
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This group was given a variety of tasks which the other
local institutions considered time consuming and perhaps
unpopular.

During the mid-fifties,

for example,

a great

deal of time was spent addressing problems associated with
livestock control.

Rulers responded to the disorders by

passing local ordinances,
(the public pounder),

devising a new agency of control

and prosecuting individuals who con

travened the new legislation.

Most of these violations

occurred when the lack of order seemed to be worst.
instance,

For

in a five year span from 1649 to 1654, 80% of the

total number of livestock control prosecutions took place.
And, perhaps not so coincidently, it was at the end of the
period,

in 1654, that a small but significant change af

fecting social control and modern perceptions of it occur
red:

selectmen were given "power to hear complaints con

cerning fences which are defective and make o rd e r s . .. and
levy fines for the same...

as if the court did it."

15

It

is not certain that the selectmen or townsmen, who became
a part of the system of New Haven governance in 1652 were
given this responsibility because the court was overbur
dened; the records do not explicitly indicate as much.
That, however,

is what they imply.

Indeed, the office of
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selectmen had been formulated to absorb some of the business
transacted at town meetings;

it was borrowed from neighbor

ing communities so "that these meetings which spends the
town much time may not be so often."

X6

In fact,

in 1652 the

selectmen were given certain powers to "order" matters about
fencing and swine.

The action taken in 1654 was,

it seems, a

logical corollary.
For modern observers of life in premodern New England
communities subtle changes in enforcement procedures are
problematic.

On the one hand,

it is evident that violations

of lifestock control ordinances continued after 1654 because
they are recorded irregularly in published and manuscript
records (the last case was heard in 1693 by the County
Court).

On the other hand, the records of the New Haven

selectmen, which begin in 1665, do not include mention of
violations by petty offenders.

Yet, at a town meeting held

in 1665, direct reference is made to active participation
by the selectmen in the control of livestock and the maintenance of fences.
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Moreover,

the townsmen were enforcing

livestock control laws, but unfortunately they were not re
cording the violations.

Thus, while it appears that social

control was continuing to take place on the local level,
the extent to which it was undertaken remains a mystery.
For this reason the distribution of known petty offenses
illustrated in Figure 3.1 must be assessed with caution.
Is, for example, the precipitous drop in court appearances
that began in the early fifties to be explained by changes
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in approaches to enforcement,
ority to selectmen?

X8

Or,

like the delegating of auth-

is it simply a question of real

decline in the number of bylaw violations by New Havenites?
The answer to both of these questions is the same:
a certain degree, yes.

to

Chances are quite good that avail

able records underreport the total number of court appear
ances in seventeenth-century New Haven.

If, indeed,

select

men or military officials were given a hand in controlling
certain aspects of conduct in the community,

then it is

reasonable to assume that there were more than 897 appear
ances for violations of local laws.

In other words, there

was more enforcement taking place within the confines of
the community than surviving records indicate.

If anything,

this adds credence to the notion that social control was
fundamentally a local affair.

To an extent,

however,

it is

quite probable that the downward trend suggested in Figure
3.1 is correct, that changes in the apparatus of control
which contributed to the underreporting problem were only
partially responsible for the overall decline in appear
ances after 1649.

As will be seen through analysis of the

distribution of different kinds of violations,
plunge seems bonafide.

the post-1649

But first, a more precise under

standing of the types and quantity of lav/s violated is
necessary.
Local authorities enforced a veritable potpourri of
laws during the seventeenth century.

The offenses they

handled ranged from numerous and varied military infractions

to a solitary violation of the 1663 bylaw regulating the
speed at which horses could be ridden through town.
of these violations,

Some

such as those relating to fire preven

tion, seemed to pose a more serious threat to the community •
than did others.

A great number of the petty offenses were

prosecuted within a short period of time, while others were
distributed in a more random fashion over the course of the
century.

This is an important distinction because ordi

nances which were enforced in clusters signify the gravest
disorders facing the town and say something of how they
were corrected.
One of the highest priorities given to the enforcement
of local law fell under the heading of military affiars.
As indicated in Table- 3.1, military offenses were prosecuted
most frequently.

They tended to occur in the initial years

of settlement when New Haven was susceptible to attacks
from the Indians and the Dutch.

As many as 394 (85%) of

the known military violations occurred prior to 1657.
these,

Of

157 were infractions of the 1639 law requiring mili

tiamen to be properly armed.

Faulty equipment,

it appears,

was not tolerated which is why Edward Parker was fined Is
in 1646 for carrying a ’’defective gun and touchhole," and
why Benjamin Wilmot was assessed the same penalty for a
"defective socket and bullets."
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Complete or partial ab

sence from training exercises accounted for an additional
113 violations.

Jointly, breaches of bylaws within these

two categories amounted to 270 or 58% of the military
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violations known to have been prosecuted.

It is noteworthy

that most of the militia cases were heard between 1645 and
1660, when 64% of the military bylaws were passed.

Not

only were ordinances being written at a healthy pace, but
apparently they were being enforced assiduously.
Because of the insights regarding social control afforded
by evidence associated with this rash of military violations,
it will be examined in more detail below.

So too will other

types of violations which were known to have occurred either
in great quantities or in isolated clusters.
trol laws,

Livestock con

for instance, received more than casual attention

during the first decades of the town's existence.

Most of

the violations,

91 or 93% of the total, were prosecuted

prior to 1660.

This was also the period marked by the heav

iest livestock control legislation;

indeed,

51% of these

agriculturally-oriented bylaws, mainly governing swine and
fences, were passed in the first two decades.

During this

period residents like magistrate Matthew Gilbert, who was
fined 8s for "defects" in his fence in 1650, were nearly
always convicted once their cases found their way into the
formal court system.
and Wilmot were,
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Individuals like Gilbert, Parker,

however, only three of many local resi

dents whose "criminal” activity constituted 68% of the to
tal number of appearances made for violating local regula
tions .
Although violations of military and livestock laws
were the most frequently enforced in early New Haven, by
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Table 3.1
New Haven Petty Offenses,

1639-1698

Offense Category

No.

Pet.

Military

461

51

Livestock

102

11

Trade

54

6

Court Absence

46

5

Contempt

45

5

Timber

25

3

Measures

18

2

Fire

17

2

135

15

897

100

Other
Totals

Sources:

New Haven Records I & II; Town R e co rd s,

I— I I I ; and County Court Records,

I.
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no means did they hold a monopoly on the time local offi
cials spent controlling disorders in the community.

Not

only did magistrates have to contend with inhabitants who
violated the colony's laws,

such as those prescribing gam

ing or fornication, but with a myriad of other violations
(334) of local bylaws.

Contempt of court, which repre

sented five percent of the total,

is one example.

the fact that no laws were designated as such,

Despite

individuals

were charged with contempt for transgressing one of the
t o w n 1s other ordinances.

James Stewart,

for instance,

"was

complained of for several disorderly expressions and con
tempt of the magistracy" in New Haven by refusing "to help
mend some of the town highways" when pressed by authorities.
Over the course of the century, 44 other appearances were
made for either questioning or ignoring the judgements of
local officials.

Because the magistracy was considered to

be such an important component of the well-ordered common
wealth,

at least to New Haven's "pillars,” contempt for

authority in any form was an offense which rarely went u n
punished.

When combined,, crimes like contempt of court and

the related court absence comprise a significant portion of
all known petty infractions.

Yet while they might not have

occurred with a much frequency,
fire prevention violations,

other minor offenses,

like

are perhaps more illustrative

of social control because of their timing.

Indeed,

further

analysis will demonstrate that the circumstances surround
ing the prosecution of specific offenses reveal much about

21
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the way order was maintained in this Connecticut town.
Thusfar something has been said of the kinds of offenses
that were tried in early New Haven and how,
were distributed over time.

as a group,

they

Most of the prosecutions were

handled by local authorities in the Plantation Court.
of the cases (76%) resulted in convictions.

Most

And an over

whelming majority of these appearances occurred prior to the
publication of the Eaton Code.

Among other things, this

suggests that the enforcement of law was a local matter and
that most of it took place during the important years of
acclimation to new world conditions.

This process of ad

justment figured prominently in how and when bylaws were
enforced.

As it turns out,

selectively in New Haven.

local ordinances were enforced
Evidently vigorous enforcement

took place only when a grave problem jeopardized the com
munity.

Nowhere is this seen more clearly than in the at

tempts to control military disorders during the forties and
early fifties.

Correct ordering of military affairs proved to be one
of the most challenging and time-consuming obligations
facing local officials in the 1640s.

Military preparedness

was elemental to the physical welfare of this wilderness
hamlet and its still untested inhabitants.

Within a year

of settlement two principal strategies had been adopted for
safeguarding the community.

The first was proper training

and arming of the local militia.

The second, the establishment
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of a military watch capable of alerting unsuspecting resi
dents, whether asleep in their beds or deep in prayer on
the "Lord's Day," of dangers posed by Indians or fire.
There were also a variety of tan ge nt ia l’military matters
with which local officials grappled and which,

as a result,

led to the prosecution of parties offending military disci
ple.

For the most part,

however, military business and

associated violations related either to the watch or
training.
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The first "order” governing military affairs in New
Haven also became one of the first bylaws passed in the
community.

In December 1639, everyone who possessed arms

(males between 16 and 60) was ordered to report to the
market place for an inspection by Nathaniel Turner and
Robert Seely "under the penalty of 20s fine for every de
fault or absence."

This group of New Haven males formed

the nucleus of the town's trainband which had its second
review the following spring.

By the fall of 1640 a regu

lar training schedule had been instituted and the original
penalty was reduced to a more modest Is for defective arms
and 5s for missing an exercise.
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In addition to formula

ting bylaws, a number of ancillary matters had come to the
attention of local officials before the end of the decade.
Pikes,

for example, had to be made at the town's expense

for use in training exercises.

In return for "giving out

and laying up the pikes from time to time,"
Mark Pierce from further training.

rulers

excused

Other requests for
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exemptions,

like those granted to Robert Abbott and Richard

Hull in 1643 "by reason of their bodily infirmities," also
required consideration by town fathers.
civil rulers,

And on occasion

in conjunction with military officers,

served

on a council of war to coordinate trainband activities with
those of other regions.

Efforts like these, while they may

not have been exactly routine,

illustrate the type of in

volvement local authorities had in matters pertaining to
military training.

When considering,

too, the amount of

time that was also expended prosecuting military violators,
it is little wonder that a certain amount of authority was
eventually delegated to the militia company.
Involvement by town officials in business concerning
the watch during the early decades was similar.

Moreover,

they had the initial responsibility of formalizing the
watch, which ran from an hour after sunset to thirty min
utes past sunrise.

As in the case of the trainband, this

was accomplished through legislation;

early in 1640 laws

were passed and penalties were fixed so that backsliders
like Daniel Fuller could be fined for "neglect of his
watch."
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Because the watch was unpopular, officials were

burdened with the task of granting exemptions,

requests

for which were made regularly as was true with training.
Other details relative to the watch, ranging from deter
mining the number of men required to stand duty to pro
viding wood for the watch house in cold weather, became
additional responsibilities of New Haven town officials.
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Many of these tasks appear mundane and unimportant.
should not be underrated,

They

however, because experience in

ordering military affairs proved helpful in times of crisis
and it allowed authorities in New Haven to control disorders
when they arose.
An understanding of how the mechanisms of social control
functioned is perhaps best attained by first gaining an ap
preciation of the context of events which set them in motion
As suggested in Chapter 2, New Haven experienced a series
of military crises beginning in 1643.

Unrest among the

Indians in the Connecticut-New Amsterdam region had led to
the spilling of "much Christian blood."

New Haven offi

cials were initially informed of the situation when the
Dutch requested military support for an expedition against
the Indians.

Although they refused to become actively in

volved, on the grounds that it would undermine the effec
tiveness of the newly formed New England Confederation,
New Haven authorities nevertheless began taking precautions
on a regional basis.

The election of Theophilus Eaton and

Thomas Gregson as United Colony Commissioners took place
months before it was scheduled so that if an invasion oc
curred, representatives from New Haven could attend the
Confederation meeting without first having to wait for
normal balloting.

Officials were not out of sympathy with

the Dutch, but it is clear that lawful cooperation with
Confederation members was preferable to independent action.
When the commissioners convened in September, they did
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address the crisis and their recommendations were adopted
by the General Court of the New Haven Colony the following
spring.
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Meanwhile,

the Court had been busy apprising local

residents of the dangers and they in turn took their own
precautions.

After receiving news that Stamford planters

had suffered "many injuries from the Indians," town offi
cials ordered the militia squadrons to "come to the meeting
every Sabbath completely armed" and instructed that those
who "walk the rounds shall have their matches lighted" during public worship.
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The conviction of Richard Lovell in

January of 1644 "for want of match" may well reflect the
enforcement of this order.

More disconcerting information

about the unruly natives was passed along to New Haven
residents the following spring.

They were told of an

Englishman who "had been cruelly murdered of late by the
Indians," enroute from Stamford to Fairfield.

And in June,

they heard of a Stamford goodwife who was attacked by an
Indian wielding a lathing hammer.
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This information must

have had an unsettling affect on New Havenites;

in July a

local artillary company was formed and in August another
general muster was ordered.

When this review was called,

local leaders were still uncertain about the future.

Would

they be asked by colony officials to provide men "to go
against the Indians?"
they first?

Were the heathens going to set upon

As it turned out, autumn came and went with

out any further incidents; the town's first crisis was
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over by December.
Although nothing came of this military alert,

law en

forcement officials were doing their part just in case some
thing had developed.
military bylaws.

Their fundamental task was to enforce

Only by controlling or regulating indi

viduals who shirked their responsibilities could the town
hope to become proficient in "military art."

Moreover,

while the town meeting was busy ordering musters and iron
ing out details concerning the watch, members of the Plan
tation Court were energetically prosecuting anyone who was
presented to them by militia officers.

Over the course of

the two year alert (1643-1644) more residents were tried
for military violations than in any comparable period for
the entire century.

In 1644 alone,

peared before authorities;

124 inhabitants ap

122 were convicted, while two

appeared voluntarily to request moderation of previous
penalties.
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Significantly,

there were no acquittals.

Not only does the large number of prosecutions reflect con
centrated efforts at controlling military disorders during
an alert in a general sense, but the fact that most of the
violations (86%) took place in a seven month period (Sep
tember 1643 to April 1644) suggests both the need to achieve
preparedness quickly and the pervasive unpopularity asso
ciated with participating in military exercises during the
winter.

Most of the court appearances made during this

period were for training infractions or watch disorders.
Typical were Thomas Yale's "late coming to trayne" and

126
and Matthew Hi tc h c o c k 's "willful neglect to walk the round
when officers called him."
were,
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in a time of crisis,

Both men violated bylaws which

considered to be especially im

portant to the physical welfare of the community.
Military readiness was indeed a high priority of leaders
during the first decade and a half of the town's existence.
Between 1640 and 1658, a year did not pass without someone
being punished for military laxity.

As might be expected,

the degree of enforcement differed from year to year.

Yet,

it is necessary to recognize not just the existence of a
great disparity in the number of appearances made in a given
period, but also why it existed.

The violations of 1643-

1644 reflect both assiduous enforcement during a crisis
situation as well-as the fact that the alert was the first
(and perhaps most frightening) of many sounded in the early
years of settlement.

But, by the same token, the 19 appear

ances made in 1650 occurred in the absence of a military
crisis.

And the outcome of these appearances is revealing.

Only 12 (63%) resulted in convictions— a far cry from the
100% of the early forties.

It appears as if the mechanisms

of control— issuing orders,

lawmaking, and enforcement—

were thrust into high gear when circumstances necessitated
an uncompromising ordering of conduct.

It also seems, how

ever, that once conditions changed and a given situation
became less critical,

the social control apparatus wound

down and underwent a correction of sorts.

To be sure, by

laws continued to be enforced, but apparently with less
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enthusiasm than had been the case during periods of crisis.
There is ample evidence to support the notion that
social control in early New Haven was,

as suggested in

Chapter 2, responsive to the needs of the community.
has already been illustrated,

for example,

It

how much of the

lawmaking that took place on the local level resulted from
authorities responding to particular situations.

The mili

tary ordinances of the forties, the livestock control leg
islation of the fifties,
graphic examples.

and the Meiggs case are the most

The enforcement of military bylaws during

the first alert is yet another indication.

Moreover,

the

sudden jump in the number of appearances from three in 1642,
to 124 in 1644, back down to 21 in 1645 was not accidental.
Indeed, similar increases and decreases in the number of
appearances took place when the town experienced subsequent
threats from either the Indians or the Dutch.
The period from mid-1645 to late 1646 is a case in
point.

Once it became obvious in late 1644 that the first

crisis had run its course,

authorities adopted a more le

nient posture in their treatment of offenders.

In January

several individuals who had been fined "for not bringing
their arms to public worship" had their fines remitted—
the first for military violations in the town's six year
history.

In February additional remissions were granted,

as in the case of Matthew Crowder who was able to prove
that he "was sick at the training from which he was absent."
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Over the course of the next few months a few
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isolated appearances were made for missing training or the
watch, or, in the instance of Robert Johnson,
"defective gunstock."

for having a

First and last the spring months were

not characterized by the frenzied prosecution of the pre
ceding year.

Yet,

this changed abruptly in June when it

became evident that there was a need to send "some soldiers
to strengthen Uncas against the Narragansett Indians" and a
council of war was formed.
sounded another,

Thus New Haven and her neighbors

albeit less serious,

alert.

At the August

town meeting several steps were taken to provide for the
"common safety."

Gunsmiths were urged to postpone their

normal business and "get those guns replaced that are de
fective."

Henry Peck and William Basset were asked to set

the "great gunnes" upon good strong carriages.

And all

farmers in the possession of butter and cheese were informed
that both might be needed for "public service."
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In the renewed crisis special attention was again given
to military discipline.

Residents like Anthoney Stevens

and John Thomas, presented for violating watch and training
bylaws respectively,
efforts.
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became the focus of law enforcement

Most of the violations associated with this

second alert showed up in the records in the spring of
1646 following what may well have been the first training
exercise since winter.
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Beginning in April and running

to a session of the court in early October,

some 69 mili

tiamen were presented for their disorders.

In all, more

than three times the number of appearances were made in
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1646 than in the first eight months of 1645.

And as was so

with the first alert, there were no acquittals during the
second.

People like Richard M a r d e n , found asleep on watch

duty, were presented and fined unceremoniously.

Although

some violators offered excuses for their misconduct,
tended to fall on deaf ears.

they

Throughout the century, peri

ods of military alert were characterized by the lack of
leniency displayed toward offenders.
A good example is found in the serious but short lived
alert beginning in 1649.

As was the case in other periods

of perceived danger, the authorities moved swiftly to
achieve preparedness.
in the process.

Many different people were involved

Because of the "pride and insolence" of

the Indians, more members of the community were required to
stand watch than was usually the case.

Governor Eaton had

to levy a special tax, payable in goods ranging from wheat
to pork,

in order to provide for the colony's "defense

against the Indians."

The town drummer was charged with

extraordinary responsibilities during the emergency.
Farmers were instructed to keep their weapons out of sight
"least the Indians break in and steal them."

Workmen were

"desired to mend the ladder" to the platform atop the
meetinghouse so that a sentinel could stand watch during
"days of public meeting."
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The alert was real and it

fostered a mobilization effort that embraced people from
a variety of callings.

And among those agencies of social

control which swung into action was the Plantation Court.
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Although the Court normally met once a month,

its mem

bers had an increased workload in October and November be
cause of a rise in the number of presentments for violating
military bylaws.

Of the 37 appearances made for military

infractions in 1649, well over four-fifths occurred in the
fall— after the alert had been sounded.

Everyone who ap

peared before the bench after September was convicted.

One

case, which was postponed at a November session, was con
tinued the following year when Isaac Beecher was finally
Q O

convicted of his offense.

Two other postponements (from

May) were also resolved in the fall.

"For going into the

watch-house and lying down by the fire and sleeping, when
he should have stood sentinel," Samuel Hotchkiss Sr., was
convicted,

as was John Bishop,

for a similar crime.
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All

of the military offenders, with the exception of John
Brockett whose case was postponed before the alert began
and never continued, were punished by the court for their
lack of diligence.

The normal punishments for training and

watch violations were fines.

But two watchmen were

whipped— an indication of the seriousness with which the
local authorities took the alert.
Nicholas Slooper,

James Clements and

two transients of dubious character,

de

cided that it was in their best interest to seek shelter
in Thomas Mix's barn rather than walk the rounds exposed
to the brisk autumn night air.
ditions,
Indeed,

if convicted,

Perhaps under normal con

they might have only received a fine.

it is possible that they might not even have been
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reported by the master of the watch.

Yet, during a "time

of danger" Richard Hull had little choice; they were presented, tried,

and punished.
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What was true of 1649 was true during other periods of
alert.

Quite simply, military and law enforcement offi

cials appear to have been unwilling to tolerate violations
of defense-oriented bylaws.

Although the number of appear

ances decreased with each alert— 124 in 1644, 69 in 1646,
and 37 in 1649— there was one thing that remained unchanged;
during each of the alerts, between 98% and 100% of the of
fenders were convicted.

Military emergencies turned into

periods of genuine concern for members of the town.
such,

As

leaders fulfilled their obligations to the best of

their ability through the restraint of military disorders.
They led the town meeting in issuing orders designed to
confront the "common danger" and they promoted order through
the adoption of bylaws

(68% of which were passed before

1650) which were then used to prosecute individuals who
were ill-prepared during alarms.
But what happened in years when no alerts were sounded?
What do the years of calm reveal,

if anything,

trolling disorders in early New Haven?

about con

In many respects,

evidence culled from court records pertaining to law en
forcement during times of peace,

is as helpful in under

standing control as is that found in the years of danger
when disorders were widespread.

Laws were still enforced

in years marked by normality in military affairs, but the
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resolution of many of the cases was notably different than
in periods of crisis.

Disorders still surfaced;

merely resolved differently by authorities.
things,

they were

Among other

convictions declined and acquittals increased,

thus

indicating further, that the mechanisms of social control
were flexible.
Thusfar it has been suggested that occasions of military
alert signalled prompt and efficient prosecution of offenders.
Recall,
1646.

for instance,

the period from late 1644 to early

The late winter months of 1644--1645 were characterized

by a certain amount of leniency on the part of local offi
cials.

Individuals who violated bylaws during the crisis of

1644 were granted remissions the following spring, once conditions had returned to normal.
vanished,

however,

crisis arose.
followed.

The spirit of charity

in late 1645 and early 1646 when another

And a rise in the number of convictions

When the alert had run its course,

so it seems,
leniency.
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authorities,

consciously resumed the practice of showing

And when the need to tighten the net of enforce

ment arose again,

it was done.

circumstances changed,

Yet by the same token, when

the enforcement net was loosened

accordingly.
This is seen most explicitly after the danger of 16451646.

It would be two years before another alert was

sounded and the patterns of enforcement during the inter
regnum are most interesting.

As expected,

there was an

immediate drop in the number of appearances— from 69 in
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1646 to 20 a year later.

Whereas during the alert each of

fender was convicted,

in 1647 less than half of those pre

sented were punished.

Three individuals made requests for

remission of earlier penalties.

Those made by Richard

Marden and John Walker were granted;

the one made by Samuel

Hotchkiss S r . , "for going away from training in the afternoon without leave," was denied.
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Four other cases were

postponed and two of them were never continued.

Perhaps

the most significant turn of events was the acquittal of
three violators.

Although his case was originally post

poned because he was absent from c o u r t , Roger Knapp was
eventually acquitted of the charge of "not bringing his
arms one Lord's Day."

When Knapp's case was continued, he

explained to the court that "his wife had been sick the
Lord's Day before, and she desiring now to go to meeting,
he stayed home."

Knapp was clearly guilty as charged, yet

because the court found his excuse satisfying,
was "passed b y .”
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tified servant of

So too was that committed by an uniden
Mrs. Nathaniel Turner.

his watch duty because
for two oxen that

his offense

The man neglected

his mistress asked him to help care

were injured and "in danger to die."

And

at the session of the August Plantation Court, Michael
Palmer was acquitted of charges that he failed to observe
his watch.
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Importantly,

these three were the first ac

quittals for military infractions and it is significant
that they were granted immediately after a period of danger.
The apparent leniency practiced in 1647 carried over
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into the following year— another marked by peace with the
Indians.

Indeed,

in 1648, 61% of the appearances were re

solved by acquittal, dismissal, or postponement.

Only 20

of the 51 military offenders presented were actually con
victed.

Sixteen had their cases dropped because of incom

plete evidence or procedual violations.
example,

Thomas Hogg,

for

"was warned to the court for not coming to w a t c h . ..,

but it appeared he had not sufficient warning," and the case
was dismissed.

43

Eight other residents had their cases

postponed, but only one was taken up again.

In 1648 mili

tiamen like Martin Tichnor, presented for insufficient
arms but whose case was "respited until next court," gen
erally never had their cases continued beyond the initial
session.

The one exception in that year was the case of

Joseph Guernsey whose hearing was resumed and who finally
was fined 5s "for want of arms."
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The cases of John

Thomas Sr. and six other individuals had a happier ending.
Although Thomas was late to the meeting with his arms one
day, he was acquitted ("the court judging it a work of
mercy and necessary to be done") because he had a sick
child who required his attention.

Earlier,

session of the July court John Whitehead,

at the same

a servant to

Jasper Crane, was acquitted of charges that a piece of
pine was missing from the lock of his gun.

Crane, who

argued on behalf of his servant, maintained that "it was
no other defect than hath passed these eight years," and
explained that "the gunsmith said it was sufficient."
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Later in the year, John Benham Sr. was complained of for
being "absent at two general training days."

Benham said

that on the first occasion he had to leave after the names
were called because "news came that there was many oxen in
his corn," and as a result he was excused by the court.

On

the second occasion he neglected his training because his
harvested corn "lay in danger of being eaten."

This time,

however, he was ordered to pay half of the 5s fine.
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Whether one's case was dropped, ended with an acquittal,
or was postponed and never continued,

it is clear that the

court did show "mercy" and lenience towards most of the of
fenders who appeared during the years of peace.

It is im

portant to recognize, however, that in 1649, when the town
experienced another alert, everyone who appeared before the
bench for military violations was convicted.

Quite simply,

authorities were willing to bend in times of peace, but re
mained inflexible in the face of a crisis.

Indeed, beyond

the raw data on crime there is further qualitative evidence
to support this conclusion,

such as a resumption in the

granting of military exemptions or the relaxation of the
watch in 1648— a reflection of the change in attitude regarding military affairs.
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Despite the apparent leniency of authorities in those
years free from the uncertainties associated with alerts,
it nevertheless seems evident that offenders had to earn
the acquittals they received.

Indeed, of the 38 acquittals

handed down between 1639 and 1665 all but one had to be
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earned; offenders had to offer some explanation or excuse
for their misconduct.

They essentially had to persuade of

ficials not to punish them.

That is precisely what Benjamin

Ling and eight others did in the fall of 1648 after they had
been charged with arriving late at a training exercise.
More than likely it was Ling who, on behalf of the group,
argued that "they was there before the body moved."

The

court in turn acquitted each of them "because it hath been
the usual course to count no man late until the body has
been removed."
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Had the men said nothing in their own de

fense it is probably, based on the militia captain's pre
sentment, that they would have been convicted and fined.
Most cases which ended in acquittals included similar verbal
defenses by the accused.
There is one other factor which needs to be considered
in conjunction with acquittals— timing.

Figure 3.2 illus

trates the percent distribution of military convictions,
defenses,

and acquittals.

It was not until 1647, following

an alert, that the first acquittals were handed down.
And as suggested earlier they had to be earned.
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Moreover,

as the number of explanations offered by violators increased,
so too did acquittals.

Conversely, when defenses declined,

there was a corresponding drop in acquittals.

What Figure

3.2 does not show is year by year distributions of a spe
cific nature.

It should be recalled that during periods of

crisis, almost all military offenders were convicted re
gardless of whether or not a courtroom defense was offered.
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In 1646, for example, Thomas Munson,

a militia company of

ficer, was presented for impressing three men to help him
"fetch hay" during the course of a training exercise.

Al

though he clearly violated the law, Munson attempted to
convince authorities that it was more important to bring in
his hay than it was to train.
thetic ears and he was fined.

His plea fell on unsympa49

Similarly,

during a short

lived alert in 1656 Samuel Hotchkiss Sr. tried to explain
his way out of not having adequate amounts of powder.

As

in other instances where excuses were offered during the
course of an alarm, Hotchkiss was unsuccessful in his endeavor to sway the judgement of the court.
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What is

notable is the apparent lack of difference between the
kinds of explanations offered in times of danger or in
periods of peace.

From a legal standpoint,

John Benham's

neglect of training because of his desire to tend to his
crop was no different than Thomas Munson's.
clearly violated an established bylaw.

Both men

The difference

lies in the timing of the infraction; Munson's was during
an alert and Benham's was not.

The latter, however, was

acquitted, while the former was convicted.

New Haven

authorities simply refused to allow military order and
discipline to be compromised during times of crisis, yet
were willing to back-off and act with compassion and flex
ibility when conditions warranted such action.
When viewed on an individual basis military infractions
appear innocuous at best; they are far less dramatic than

Figure 3.2
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cases of "deviant" misconduct, which is perhaps one reason
why crime on the local level had failed to capture the at
tention of historians.

Although not very sensational,

vio

lations of military bylaws in early New Haven appear to
have posed a greater threat to the maintenance of order
than hitherto imagined.

This is especially true when placed

in the context of problems encountered by authorities in
the first decade of settlement:

More than half of all pro

secutions of petty offenses in the seventeenth century were
in some manner linked to military affairs.

This reinforces

the notion that social control on the local level was a
time-consuming but evidently flexible enterprise.

When the

enforcement pattern of military bylaws in New Haven is con
sidered in conjunction with other elements in the social
control equation,

like the formulation of bylaws,

the role

accorded the regulation of military disorders looms even
larger.
Because military violations accounted for as much as
51% of all petty crime in New Haven between 1639 and 1701,
their management has served as a good example of how the
mechanisms of control functioned in the community.

The

same kind of flexibility can be discerned in the efforts
made by rulers to control livestock disorders.

Some of

the difficulties inherent in controlling livestock have
been addressed in Chapter 2.

As in the case of military

affairs, the problems local officials encountered while
attempting to control livestock w e r e 'formidable.

That 31%
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of the town's bylaws--more than any other category— were
directed expressly at this problem illustrates the deep
concern shared by authorities and their constituents alike.
Not surprisingly, when it came time to enforce these ordi
nances officials were kept extremely busy.
The preoccupation with livestock control violations was
short lived, however.
conduct,

As was the case with military mis

the overwhelming majority of known livestock in

fractions occurred in a relatively concentrated period of
time— principally during the late forties and early fifties
when, not so coincidentally, most of the livestock bylaws
were written.

Of the 102 violations (11% of all petty

crime) recorded in the century,
in the decade beginning in 1649.

93 or 91% were prosecuted
Perhaps more dramatic and

indicative of the problems of control is the fact that 79
or 77% of the violations occurred in a five year span be
tween 1649 and 1654.

In order to understand why this hap

pened an investigation of the particular setting within
which enforcement was carried out in necessary.
The typicality of "crisis management" in New Haven is
caught in the circumstances surrounding the acquittal of
John Benham.

After being charged with missing a training

exercise, Benham explained that the "many oxen in his corn"
forced him to miss the muster.

The justices of the Planta

tion Court were receptive to Benham's plea and the local
brickmaker was acquitted even though he had patently vio
lated established law.

The leniency displayed by officials
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reflected the fact that the town had recently returned to
normal conditions following a military crisis.
Benham's cornfield,
threat which was,

however,

The oxen in

is indicative of a different

in the early fifties, gripping the town:

control of livestock.

The general characteristics of this

new threat to order in the community can be gleaned from the
particulars of Benham's case:
had insufficient fencing.

either he or his neighbors

What this meant in realistic

terms was that crops were threatened.

So too was harmony,

for crop damage was the source of many civil actions.

While

it remains uncertain as to who was at fault in this instance,
it is known that Benham was convicted in 1650 "for seven
lengths of fence being down or defective" and was ordered to
^ fine.
-p51
pay a 7s
Benham was not the only resident to be presented in 1650
by pounder John Cooper and subsequently punished.
there were 41 presentments,
viction.

In all

each of which ended with a con

In two respects this renders 1650 analogous to

1644 and as such points again to the way problems were re
solved by local law enforcement officials.

First, both

years were similar insofar as each offender prosecuted for
violations of certain laws was convicted;

in 1644 it hap

pened to be residents who ignored military regulations;

in

1650 it was those who disregarded livestock control bylaws.
Second, both years were similar because they were charac
terized by the perception of a crisis.
appeared to reach levels of danger,

When local problems

as was true in both
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years, authorities moved swiftly and uncompromisingly to
restore order in the community.
Even though livestock disorders lacked the hair-raising
peril associated with an Indian attack,

the fact remains

that they were problematic and consumed the energy of offi
cials on a variety of levels ranging from fence viewer to
magistrate.
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The problem in its embryonic stage can be

traced back to 1640 when leaders noted "that some speedy
course" was needed to exclude hogs from the neck.

For the

next eight years numerous orders were issued and 13 bylaws
were written in an effort to bring a measure of order to
what must have been,

in the early years of settlement,

spatially disorganized community.

a

Orders like those in

1643 requiring the construction of two pounds and in 1647
requesting that fences be viewed after storms illustrate
the range of concerns over time.

Bylaws such as those

passed in 1648 which set penalties for damage done by cat
tle and hogs suggest that land had not been enclosed to
the satisfaction of town authorities.

53

That the disor

ders were permitted to persist for a decade or more is in
part due to human nature and the lack of enthusiasm people
shared when asked unofficially to perform a certain task.
But it also reflects the lack of a meaningful agency of
control.

The decentralized neighborhood fence-viewing

committees of the early forties were merely charged with
notifying owners of defects, who then became liable for
damages.

It was not until 1648 that damages were fixed by
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law and that John Cooper was chosen as pounder.

And it was

only then that enforcement of livestock bylaws was begun in
earnest.
It is fair to say that the problems associated with
fencing and livestock which had plagued the town during the
1640s came to a head in 1649 and 1650 when two-thirds of the
10.2 violations were prosecuted.

The climax

of the problem

is illustrated graphically in the events of March 1649 and
the spring of 1650.

At the March session of the town meet

ing magistrate Eaton reported that "he hears there is great
remisses and neglect in setting up fences according to the
order made in November last."

He went on to remark that

"some stricter order" would have to be made if residents
failed to act on Cooper's warnings.

Ultimately it was

stressed that any individual who was fined and did not pay
immediately would be subject to seizure of "part of his
estate."
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Before the year was out,

30 New Havenites were

convicted for violating recent livestock legislation.
The following year still more presentments were made.
Indeed,

in 1650 John Benham and forty of his fellow resi

dents were convicted of similar violations.

In April,

Eaton once again presided at a gathering of the town's
planters and reiterated a familiar theme:

"Fences lye

down so much about the corn fields, that some men are dis
couraged from planting,

or sowing,

speedy course must be taken...."

and therefore some
Several individuals

present at the meeting openly voiced their support for more
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meaningful control because they feared any corn planted under existing conditions "would be eaten up."
sion led to several new orders,
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The discus

one of which allocated

pounder Cooper a salary derived from fines and specified the
precise methods to follow in presenting violators to the
secretary.
And he did just that.

In May, 26 residents were fined

for failing to maintain strong fences.

56

The list of of

fenders reads like a "who's who" of the First Church of
Christ:

Deputy-Governor Stephen Goodyear was fined 3s "for

3 lengthes of fence being down," Matthew Gilbert, one of
the original "pillars" of the church and community, was
ordered to pay 2s 12d for his neglect,

and Mrs.

Isaac

Allerton, wife of the Mayflower pilgrim, was fined 12d for
her lack of diligence.

And there were many other permanent,

albeit less illustrious, members of the community who were
convicted by the court.
v. Gregory fame),

There was John Meiggs (of Meiggs

fined 5s for five defective lengths;

William Basset who, between 1644 and 1650, appeared before
the court every year for a total of ten infractions;

and

John Benham who in the same period made six appearances
before the Plantation Court.

Whether celebrated or not

each of the violators presented by Cooper was convicted.
The complete lack of favorable decisions for the accused
replicated the posture of the bench during the military
alerts of the 1640s.

Once again, when it became impera

tive to gear-up the mechanisms of social control,

to take
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"some speedy course" in the face of a crisis,

authorities

did so with little hesitation and they achieved what appears
to be a reasonable degree of success.
One indication of the successful .resolution of the live
stock problem is the sharp decline in the- number of viola
tions recorded after 1650.

It may well have been that the

energetic enforcement of livestock control bylaws served
its purpose.

Between 1650 and 1664 there were an additional

22 violations, but only half of these resulted in convic
tions.

This too bears a similarity to the way military

cases were handled in the aftermath of a crisis.
Moulthrop,

Matthew

for example, was accused of keeping more swine

than permitted by law.

His case was postponed because he

was absent from court.

It was never continued.

At the same

session of the August court John Jones was charged with the
same infraction.

Although he was subsequently convicted

(in 1655) the court was willing "to be favorable to him"
and he received a reduced fine.
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Additional cases after

1654 were postponed but never continued,

and finally,

1656, the first acquittal was handed down.

in

After having

his case postponed in November of 1655 William Davis was
acquitted the following February of charges that his fence
was defective.

As depicted in Figure 3.3, it was well

after the cathartic period from 1649 to 1651 that author
ities were willing to either let cases slip into the limbo
associated with postponements or grant acquittals.

All

available evidence relating to both livestock and military
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violations points in one direction:
forcement during crises,

rigid policies of en

followed by leniency once the most

serious problems had been overcome.

58

Over the course of the century violators within these
two categories accounted for 62% of all petty crime recorded
in New Haven.

There were other kinds of offenses which,

when viewed from the perspective of the context within which
they were committed,
tity.

were similar in theory if not in quan

The 25 timber violations,

for example,

also occurred

in clusters and reflected a current concern amongst offi
cials.

"Disorderly cutting," a charge leveled against each

of the violators,

became a problem because residents failed

to properly "clear away tops and bodies," thus cluttering
fields and pastures.

The case of William Judson is typical.

In 1654 Judson was "complained of for falling eight trees in
the ox-pasture contrary to order," and was fined 16s.
Judson pleaded ignorance of the order which authorities said
he "had no ground to do seeing it was made publically."
Judson was merely one of a group of 21 prosecuted between
1654 and 1659.59
Local officials expressed their concern about fire
through periodic enforcement of

fire prevention bylaws

which led to a similar concentration of violations.

There

were two clusters of infractions, one in 1643, the other in
1649, encompassing all but one of the fire control offenses
in the century.

Both occasions for enforcement can be tied

directly to increased concern for the physical welfare of

Figure 3.3
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the community.

The eight individuals tried and convicted

in 1643 because they did not own ladders is a manifestation
of the concern which had produced fire prevention legisla
tion a month earlier.

Then there was no action or enforce

ment until 1649, when the impending resignation of the
chimney sweep rekindled interest in adherence to fire pre
vention bylaws.

At that point eight more residents were

presented to authorities;

three were convicted,

given postponements which were never continued,
were granted acquittals,

three were
and two

including Edward Camp whose ladder

"was not in sight when the marshal" made his inspection.
Finally, the conviction of Thomas Johnson in 1654 for burn
ing rubbish on his houselot owes itself to complaints made
by neighbors who felt that open fires were dangerous as
well as illegal.
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Johnson and each of his fellow residents

were haled before the Plantation Court because of legitimate
fears about the spread of fire.
It was just a few months prior to Edward Camp's acquit
tal that Mrs. Gregson and company were convicted of the
measures violations which introduced this analysis of petty
crime in New Haven.

Unlike cases reflecting disorders re

lated to haphazard cutting or dangers associated with fire,
the enforcement of the weights and measures bylaw cannot be
linked with as much certainty to a major problem in the
community.

One suspects from its timing that the prosecu

tions in 1649 were tied to an uproar over proper measures
stemming from Meiggs v. Gregory some 13 months earlier.
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Following the conclusion of that spectacle, officials ex
pressed an increased interest in diminishing the possibility
of fraudulent practices by local merchants.

A new bylaw

covering the marking of shoes was written in 1648;

later in

the same year every cooper was ordered to "make his ware
tight and good" and in so doing create a "just gauge."

And

a bylaw of April 1649 directed "that all men that use mea
sures with strikes,

shall get strikes well made... under

the same penalty that the measures are."
tant evidence,
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Based upon ex

there is no way of knowing why Mrs. Gregson

and her neighbors failed to comply with the court ordered
viewing of their measures.

Nevertheless,

the context with

in which the convictions took place is suggestive of most
of the enforcement which occurred in early New Haven:

the

maintenance of order in the community on a priority basis.

Whether it was the prosecution of 18 people who viola
ted a weights and measures ordinance or several hundred who
failed to follow military bylaws, three basic characteris
tics stand out about how and why law enforcement functioned
on the local level.
First, most infractions of local bylaws occurred in
separate and concentrated periods of time which were re
lated to specific disorders plaguing the community.
times these periods ranged over several years,
by the military violations of the 1640s.

Some

as witnessed

In other instances,

the enforcement of particular laws was restricted to shorter
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periods as exemplified by the weights and measures viola
tions of January 1649.

These isolated periods of enforce

ment accounted for as much as 70% of the petty offenses
prosecuted in New Haven during the seventeenth century and
they can be attributed directly to particular problems
facing the community.
disappeared,

signalling

Clusters of violations appeared and
both the existence and resolution

of specific threats to the social order.
Secondly,
sense,

although unquantifiable in a statistical

it appears that there was a relationship between the

formulation of bylaws and their enforcement.

Rather fre

quently, periods of vigorous enforcement followed the
"branching out into particulars by just a few years.

A

clear example can be seen in the fire prevention legisla
tion and the prosecution of residents who lacked ladders.
Essentially, most of the community bylaws were written in
response to a specific set of circumstances.

When the

majesty of the law itself was not enough

nudge res

to

idents in the direction of conformity, uncompromising en
forcement was the solution.

It seems more by design than

coincidence that 58% of New Haven's bylaws concerned mil
itary and livestock affairs, as did 62% of the petty of
fenses prosecuted during the century.
Third, the flexibility of social control on the local
level should be recognized.

It has already been demon

strated that bylaws could be adapted to meet the needs of
the community.

Enforcement, too, was related to need.
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Roughly a quarter of all petty crimes,

like absence from

the town meeting or land use violations, were prosecuted on
a random basis.

62

Yet the overwhelming majority of infrac

tions (70%) were linked to identifiable problems.

The

mechanisms of control could, when necessary, be unflinch
ingly rigid.

This can be seen most readily in years like

1644 and 1650 when 100% of the offenders were convicted.
But by the same token,

the mechanisms were capable of

winding down and becoming rather loose once the foremost
aim

of

enforcement

achieved.

63

(resolution of the problem) had been

Military and livestock violations which ended

favorably for violators— whether guilty or not— reflect
this flexibility.

Moreover,

the disorders which surfaced

and consumed the time of local officials really bore little
resemblance to the kinds of dangers that the architects of
the New England Way warned about and endeavored to prevent.
Finally,

it should be added that petty offenders were

not criminals in the traditional sense of the word.

The

typical petty offender was what could be described as a
social insider;

he was a person who tended to share common

values and who had strong ties to the community.

Most of

the militia consisted of permanent residents and they were
the ones prosecuted for missing watch duty or a training
exercise.

Those who appeared before the bar for fence vi

olations were land owners.

And individuals who were warned

to court for fire prevention violations were residents who
owned homes which by law were required to be equipped with
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fire buckets and ladders.

Indeed,

it is fair to say that

being a permanent member of the community was nearly a pre
requisite for violating local bylaws.
John Allen,
offenders.

a saddler,

He is one of a group of 100 whose age at first

appearance as a violator,
known.

is typical of New Haven's petty

along with other attributes,

is

Allen was 31 when he was convicted by the Plantation

Court for missing a training exercise.

He was born in 1629,

the same year that Davenport and Eaton signed the famous
Cambridge Agreement,

and travelled to New England a decade

later with his older brother Roger.
Ellen Bradley,

In 1652 he married

fathered nine children,

der of his life in New Haven,

and lived the remain

dying in 1691.

Allen was one

of 63 individuals in the sample to appear before the court
only once.

Although he was admitted to the First Church in

1658, he was but one of 27 who became members.
cidivists in this group were similar to Allen;

Most nonre
they were

slightly over 30 years of age, they had what might be con
sidered middle-class professions,

and they were married.

Church members and freemen were in the minority.
icantly,
similar.

recidivists,

Signif

37 in number, were not al all dis

Members of this group averaged three appearances

before the court.
and married.

They were also in their early thirties

For example,

the first of John Holt's three

appearances came in 1675 when he was called to answer for
a trade violation committed by his wife Elizabeth.
was thirty and had been married for two years.

Holt

In 1677 he
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again appeared before authorities on a voluntary basis; he
requested a remission of his original penalty and he was
successful in getting it reduced from 20s to 10s.

Holt's

final trip to court was in 1687 when he was fined for an
other trade violation.

Like Allen, Holt spent the rest of

his life in New Haven, dying in 1733.
Residents like Allen and Holt were permanent fixtures
in the community.

They were like countless others who ap

peared before law enforcement officials because they had
violated one or more of a host of bylaws which were designed
to maintain physical order in New Haven.

They were,

like

magistrate Stephen Goodyear or selectman William Andrews,
part of a large group of well known planters who subscribed
to the principles of the Fundamental A g re em e nt .
plentiful,

Although

their offenses did not undermine the basic moral

values of the community.

This challenge came in the form

of a smaller group of deviants and delinquents.
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CHAPTER III
NOTES
1.

New Haven R e c o r d s , I, 429-430 for the violations;
for the context of the law.

313

2.

A point argued by Darrett B. Rutman, "Mirror of Puritan
Authority," in George A. Billias e d . , Law and Authority
in Colonial America (Barre, Mass., 1965), 149-167,
p as s i m .

3.

Prosecutions of colony level law and consideration of
social deviance and exclusion as a strategy of control
follow in Chapter 4.
To avoid misunderstanding, viola
tions of local laws which found their way into the col
ony codes are included in the present examination.

4.

A major reason for this is that most significant studies
of social control have focused on the colony or county
levels, and therefore have never really addressed the
issues vitally important to the individual community.
This includes Erikson, Wayward Puritans; Faber, "Puritan
Criminals;" Greenberg, Crime and Law Enforcement; Konig,
Law and So c i e t y ; and Powers, Crime and Punishment. Some
of the more recent English social history has examined
crime and disorder within the context of the local com
munity.
See, for example, J.A. Sharpe, "Crime and De
linquency in an Essex Parish, 1600-1640," in Cockburn
e d . , Crime in E n g l a n d , 90-109.

5.

Even though the present analysis concentrates on viola
tions of local laws, the 903 infractions between 1639
and 1701 were distributed in five different courts:
New
Haven Plantation Court (N=787 or 87%); New Haven County
Court (N=106 or 12%); and in the Magistrates', General,
or Special Courts of the New Haven Colony (N=1Q or
roughly 1%).

6 . Informal enough to be held in the home of magistrate
Theophilus Eaton.
And the practice was not unique to
New Haven.
In 1639, for example, John Winthrop fined
three individuals 3s each for "loytering and sleeping"
during a militia exercise.
Rutman, W i n t h r o p 's B o s t o n ,
233.
7.

Apparently, however, the local courts were more re
sponsive to individual needs and as such were more
likely to hand down acquittals than were the formal
sessions of the county courts.

8 . Individual initiative was,
mined, rather infrequent.

as best as can be deter
There were few remission
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requests, about 53 or 6% of the total appearances, and
a minuscule number of appeals (2).
The lack of appeals
is not unusual given the nature of petty offenses.
9.

The outcome of the appearances was as follows:
Resolution

No.

Pet.

642

71. 5

Acquittal

85

9.5

Postponment

84

9.5

Remission

53

6

Dropped

30

3

Convict ion

3

Other
Totals

897

.5
100

10.

Based on the population of involuntary appearances
(N=841), 76% resulted in conviction.

11.

Unfortunately, direct statistical comparison of the
two is impossible.
Residents were occasionally pun
ished for violations of laws that either do not appear
in local records, or, more likely, never existed.
In
formalities like this were bound to have occurred in
New England towns and are thus frustrating, but not
surprising, to researchers.

12.

Town Re c o r d s , II, 273.
For the bylaw see Ib id . , I,
355.
Lampson was no stranger to either the local or
county courts.
Between 1661 and 1683 he appeared be
fore the latter on five occasions; before the former,
on seven.
Jonathan seems to have followed in his
father's footsteps who appeared on 10 occasions.
Both
were well above the average three appearances made by
New Haven recidivists.

13.

An example would be the case of Joseph Baldwin who ap
pealed "the judgement of an inferior court held at New
Haven."
County Court Records, I, 213.

14.

Workload should not be confused with "caseload" of
criminal offenses.
The Plantation Court also had ju
risdiction over civil suits and in matters of probate.

15.

Town R e c o r d s , I, 216-217.

16.

Ibid., 1 0 1 .

Emphasis added.
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17.

Ibid., II, 144.

18.

David Allen has illustrated the accumulation of power
by Watertown, Mass., selectmen who, among other duties,
fined individuals for "infractions of bylaws and rates."
See, In. English Ways, 155-159, e s p . , 158.
In New Haven,
selectmen were granted authority to prosecute in areas
other than just livestock control.
Examples would in
clude fire prevention and regulation of timber cutting.
C f ., Town Re c o r d s , I, 380 and 337.
It also appears that
the militia company was given the responsibility of pun
ishing recalcitrant soldiers sometime in the 1650s.
See
suggestive references in Ibid. , I, 317; II, 200.

19.

New Haven R e c o r d s , I, 260-261.

20 .

Town Records,

21 .

New Haven R e c o r d s , I, 262-263.
For his indiscretion
Steward was ordered to pay a £5 fine and be "imprisoned
[at] the court's pleasure;" an unusually stiff sentence,
but one which is perhaps explained by the fact that he
had appeared before the bench on eight previous occa
sions for offenses ranging from theft to partial absence
from a trainband exercise.

22.

Violations of watch and training regulations, or varia
tions thereof, amounted to 361 or 78% of the total num
ber of military infractions.
"Variations" include
sleeping while on watch duty which technically is "ne
glect" of watch, but for which no specific legislation
existed, as was the case with many military offenses.

23.

New Haven R e c o r d s , I, 25, 32, and 45-46 respectively.

24.

Ibid., 76, 86, and 167.

25.

Ibid., 38 for the violation,

26.

Ibid., 133-134.

27.

Ibid. , 122 for the violation,

28.

Ibid. , 135.
Winthrop, who recorded the incident in his
chronicle, noted that "the woman recoverd, but lost her
senses."
Busheage, the Indian, was subsequently tried
and executed.
According to the governor of Massachu
setts, it took the executioner (armed with a falchion)
eight blows to strike-off the condemned man's head who,
in the process, remained "upright and stirred not all
the time."
John Winthrop, History of New England from
1630-1649, James Savage e d . , (2 vols., Boston, 1853),
II, 231-232.

I, 52.

35 for the bylaw.

119 for the order.

■(
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29.

Nine of the offenders are unidentified
because, for ex
ample, they were listed in the
records as "3 men" or
something equally as vague.
Richard Perry and Roger
Knapp, whose arms "was burnt in Delaware Bay," were the
two men whose original fines were moderated.

30.

New Haven R e c o r d s , I, 122 and 125 respectively.

31.

For the rash of remissions see Ib i d. , I, 152.
Crowder
was one of those convicted during the crisis.
See Ib id .,
123 for the violation and 153 for the remission.

3 2 * Ibid. , 167-168.
33.
34.
35.

Ibid.,

170.

For New Haven's training schedule see Ibid.,'202.
Ibid., 481-485.

36.

Ibid., 498 for the continuation and Town R ec or ds , I, 1,
for the conviction.
Isaac was Lyman Beecher's Great
Great Grandfather.

37.

For their postponements see New Haven R ec or ds , I, 456;
convictions, 487-488.

38.

Ibid., 488-489.
The watch misconduct was compounded
by lying— thought to be the "working of Satan."
Mag
isterial discretion in the punishment of gross military
misbehavior was provided for in the Revision of 1646 in
Ibid. , 205.

39.

Jules Zanger has addressed the role of remissions in
his "Crime and Punishment in Early Massachusetts,"
William and Mary Q ua rt er ly , 3rd. S e r . , XXII (1965),
471-477, although he did not analyze the context of
events and the attitudes prevalent in the Bay Colony
which promoted leniency.
For more on remissions con
sult Lee, "Discretionary Justice,” 129-130.

40.

For Marden and Walker, New Haven R e c o r d s , I, 281.
For
Hot.chkiss, 378 for the offense, 428 for the refusal.
The remission denial is perhaps explained by his pro
clivity for violating military laws, which was the
cause of seven of his eight appearances in the courts
between 1643 and 1646.

41-

Ibid., 310 and 317.
Knapp was also fined for missing
a squadron training at the same court session.

42.

Ibid., 322.
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43.

Ib id ., 378.

44.

For Tichnor see Ibid., 400.
It is perhaps noteworthy
that the one person in the group with a prior record of
severe punishment was Geurnsie, a one-time servant who
evidently left town in the fifties.
See 239 for the
original offense and punishment; 380 and 384 for the
postponement and conviction for his military infraction.

45.

I bi d., 392, 391, and 412-413 respectively for the
acquittals.

46.

I b i d ., 374, 381.
Later, when the 1649 alarm was sounded,
the watch was again increased because it was "not safe"
to continue according to the provisions of the 1648 or
der, 481.

47.

Ibid., 411.

48.

In the period from 1639 to 1665, 343 or 97% of all mil
itary convictions occurred, 133 or 96% of all military
related defenses were made, and 41 or 91% of all the
military acquittals were granted.
The breakdown for
Figure 3.2 is as follows:
Three Year Mid-Point

Convictions

Defenses

Acquittals

No.

Pet.

No. P e t .

No.

Pet. '

1640

8

2.3

0

0

0

0

1643

135

39.3

0

0

0

0

1646

84

24.4

19 14.2

3

7.3

1649

65

19

58 47.7

10

24.4

1652

31

9

30 22.6

14

34.2

1655

6

1.7

4.5

3

7.3

1658

8

2.3

14 10.6

8

19. 5

1661

1

.5

3

2.2

o
o

7.3

1664

5

1.5

o
O

2.2

0

0

41

100

Totals

343

49.

New Haven Re c o r d s , I, 230.

50.

Town Records,

I, 264.

100

6

133 100
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51.

Ibid. , 27.

52.

In Rowley, Massachusetts, during the same period, live
stock control was also problematic.
Special overseers
had to be assigned to enforce livestock and fencing by
laws.
Allen, In. English Ways, 53.

53.

For the orders see New Haven R ec o r d s , I, 82 and 305;
for the bylaws, 407.

54.

Ibid., 445-446.
In January Eaton threatened residents
with a "more severe fine” if disorders continued, 427.

55.

Town R e c o r d s , I, 18-19.

56.

Ib id . , 26-27.

57.

For the Moulthrop and Jones postponements see Ib i d.,
219; for Jones' reduced penalty, 244, and for the by
law, 101.

58.

For the Davis postponement and acquittal see I b i d ., 259
and 266 respectively.
The breakdown for Figure 3.3 is
as follows:
Three Year Mid-Point

Convictions
No.

No.

Pet.

1641

0

0

0

0

1644

1

1.2

0

0

1647

0

0

0

0

1650

64

83.4

0

0

1653

11

14.2

3

42.8

1656

1

1.2

4

57.2

1659

0

0

0

0

1662

0

0

0

0

77

100

7

100

Totals
59.

Pet.

Non-Convictions

Judson's fine was partially remitted in 1655 because of
a counting mistake by officials.
Town R e c o r d s , I, 219
and 254 for the remission.
For the orders see 154 and
223.
For the other violations, 237.
David Allen has
addressed cutting infractions from the perspective of
the value placed on different kinds of timber.
In
English W a y s , 76-77.
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60.

New Haven R e co rd s, I, 121 and 453 for the 1640 and 1649
clusters; 121 and 447 for the bylaws and expressions of
concern over chimnies.
Town Re c o r d s , I, 223-224 for
the Johnson violation.
New Haven R ec or ds , I, 157 for
the law restricting fires in house lots.

61.

«New Haven R e c o r d s , I, 357, 397, and 447-448.

62.Absence from the town
meeting could have just as easily
been linked to an enforcement priority of officials.
In 1670, for instance, a strong warning was issued be
cause "there was a great neglect in not attending the
time of these meetings."
Planters were told that they
"must expect the penalty will be required if there not
be better attendance in the future."
See Town Records,
II, 257.
63.

Similar isolated periods of enforcement are, on occasion,
alluded to elsewhere.
Joseph Smith noted that crisis
management revealed through supplemental laws could
produce sudden jumps in the enforcement of particular
crimes.
"Criminal Law," 23.
In England, "variations
in the incidence of theft followed very closely fluc
tuations in the price of food."
Cockburn, The Nature
and Incidence of Crime," in Ide m. , e d . , Crime in
E ng l a n d ," 67.
And M.G. Davies reported that English
justices enforced apprenticeship laws "only when it met
an urgent need of the local community or was in' harmony
with strong public sentiment."
See his The Enforcement
of English Apprenticeship (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), 162

CHAPTER IV
CHALLENGES TO MORAL ORDER:
DEVIANTS AND DELINQUENTS
More than likely New Haven's meetinghouse was filled to
capacity in May of 1655 as a session of the Magistrate's
Court was being called to order.

The attraction was not the

reading of the last will and testament of Anthony Tompson
"late of New Haven deceased."

Nor was it the civil suit

pending between Edward Higby and Jonas Wood.

A criminal

case involving William Ellit and Hannah Spencer for "filthy
carriages between them in William Benfield's boat" probably
generated more interest than either the probate matter or
the civil dispute.

However, what surely must have been con

sidered the "main event" on that morning in May was a case
centering on John Knight, charged with "filthiness in a
sodomittical way with Peter Vincent, his master Judson's
boy, of the age of fourteen years or somewhat more."
John Knight,
before.

a person of ill-repute had been to the bar

In 1651 he was fined 5s because his "rest was bro

ken and his gun rusty," rendering them both useless.

Ear

lier the same year he was identified as one of several
"young men" who participated in drinking parties with an
unsavory fellow named Thomas Langden.

On at least one oc

casion Knight's absence from a training exercise caused his
master, William Judson,

to be fined.
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And he had faced
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colony authorities at a prior session of the court for
"loathesome filthiness" with the children of Francis Hall,
"for which he was then near death and therefore sentenced
(beside other punishment) to wear a halter about his neck.!'
If his general demeanor had not already set him apart from
other residents of this community of saints,
the halter served that purpose.

then certainly

Knight was different from

other residents of the town anyway insofar as he was an out
sider, a servant with no known ties to the community other
than his physical presence.

Whether he was hated,

feared,

or viewed with pity is, at this juncture, only speculation.
And if John Knight had not yet been labelled as a deviant by
local residents, he was now.

Convicted,

by the court as a "lewd, profane,
rigible person...
kind."

filthy,

he was characterized
corrupting,

incor

tending to the very destruction of man

Because there seemed "to be no end to his filthiness

nor means to reclaim him, whether public punishment or pri
vate warning" the court determined that he was unfit to
"live among men" and agreed that a rope, not a halter better
suited John Knight's neck.'*'
Three years prior to the Knight case an "extraordinary"
session of the court was held to examine three youths also
charged with gross sexual misconduct.
Wakeman,

Samuel Miles, Esborne

and John Frost were charged with certain unspeci

fied homosexual acts (perhaps sodomy) as well as with some
of a more explicit nature.

These included the accusation

that they whipped each other and "handled on[e] anothers
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members."

The court records suggest that under ordinary

circumstances deviations like these would be taken up pri
vately.

Yet because this behavior "was spread abroad among

several youthes" the court felt the community would be bet
ter served if the boys were all "publically witnessed
against."

A trial was held, they were found guilty,

and

they were ordered to be whipped severely "according as their
o
age and strength will bear."
One wonders exactly how much punishment the youths
"years" would in fact bear:

Miles and Frost were twelve and

ten respectively, while Wakeman, the son of a deceased Hart
ford planter, was roughly the same age.

Not surprisingly it

was their first appearance before local authorities, but,
importantly,
careers.

it did not mark the beginning of three deviant

Young Wakeman never appeared before New Haven mag

istrates again; he fulfilled the terms of his indenture to
William Davis and removed to Stratford where he was listed
as a freeman in 1669.

The son of Richard Miles,

a well re

garded New Haven r e s id en t, remained in town where he married
and pursued his trade.

Samuel's only other appearance be

fore the court was in 1672 when he was charged with making
public speeches on the Lord's Day and ordered to post a bond
for good behavior (from which he was released six months
later).

Although the career of John Frost was somewhat more

delinquent,

he too seems to have remained a member of the

community in good standing until his death in 1700.

During

adolescence, however, he came dangerously close to being
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excluded permanently.
house to the ground.

When he was 14 he burned his master's
During his trial, which ended in con

viction and severe punishment,

Frost claimed that he had

been "knocked" and "whipped" by his master and that the fire
was his means of revenge.

Frost appeared before the bench

for the last time in 1662 when he was again accused of sex
ual misconduct,

this time with John and Mercy Paine.

spite his uneasy passage through adolescence,

De

John Frost,

like Miles and Wakeman,

seems to have been treated with
3
charity and understanding by members of the community.
These dramatic but different examples of misconduct
raise two major questions about the maintenance of order in
early New Haven.

The first concerns flexibility.

In Chap

ter 3 it was suggested that a proper ordering of the prag
matic aspects of community life was achieved through flex
ible and responsive enforcement of bylaws.
stances,

In most in

local ordinances were actually formulated in

response to particular problems facing the community.

That

enforcement on the local level should be equally responsive
is hardly surprising.

However,

does this also hold true

when addressing the more universal statutes embodied in
colony law codes?
changing,

Unlike local laws, which were ever

those governing morality tended to be more rigid;

they were "fixed" in codes at specific points in time (1650,
1656, and 1673) and for the most part were all similar.
example,

For

laws governing sodomy in each of the codes required

the same penalty:

death.4

How then was it possible,

given
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the rigidity of the law,

for Knight to receive one punish

ment while his younger counterparts received another?

It

is this kind of flexibility which must be addressed when
analyzing violations of colony law.
Clearly related to the issue of flexibility is a second
element of enforcement touched upon
sexual misbehavior:

in

the two cases of

exclusion for deviance.

Indeed, was

exclusion utilized as a means of maintaining the moral
order?

Judging from the Knight case one is tempted to con

clude that it was; he was stigmatized as an individual "un
fit to live among men" and promptly executed— an extreme
form of exclusion.

But where does this leave the three

youths who, despite their sordid crimes,
in the community?

retained membership

Although the trio must have been viewed

with displeasure by their parents and masters, as well as by
other residents,

it is highly probable,

considering their

5

age and kinship ties,
temporary.

that their "fall from grace" was

Unlike Knight,

it seems that these youths were

considered to be capable of being reclaimed.

They were de

linquent; Knight was a deviant.
In many respects,

it was New Haven's delinquents, not

its deviants, who made it difficult for leaders to maintain
moral order.

Generally,

exclusion for deviance affected

individuals with few ties to the community, of low social
standing, or those of different racial backgrounds.

It was

easier for all involved to make difficult decisions about
these "outsiders."

Where notorious conduct became a problem
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was with the off-spring of the saints.

Local residents

could not exclude their own flesh and blood, hence in the
end there was little that could be done to control the pil
fering, drinking habits, or sexual appetites of New Haven's
rising generations.

Most of the appearances made before authorities for vio
lations of colony laws were related to sex, drinking, or
theft.

In the period from 1639 to 1698 offenses within these

categories totalled 330 or 61% of the 541 known appearances
made for transgressing colony statutes.

6

Most of the trials

were heard before local rulers at sessions of the Plantation
Court.
thieves,

Officials of New Haven punished fornicators and
just as they did negligent planters whose fences

were defective.

Yet while 88% of the petty offenses were

tried on the local level, only a slim majority (52%) of the
colony offenses were.

Many more of these colony infractions

were heard at the county level (39% to 12% for petty crimes)
and still more (93% as opposed to 7%) were handled in other
sessions ranging from the Court of Assistants to "Extraor
dinary" Courts.

On the surface it may seem unusual that so

many colony violations were heard by the local tribunal.
However, until 1665 when New Haven was absorbed by Connect
icut, the Plantation Court had jurisdiction over cases in
volving punishment that did not exceed whipping or fines of
£5.

Thus, prior to 1666 nearly every kind of crime was

handled at the local level by justices who knew,

and at
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times co-habited with, offenders.

Thereafter, petty crime

became the nearly exclusive province of the Commissioners'
Courts, while more serious offenses were tried in the County
Courts.^
As was the case with petty offenders,

deviants and de-

•

linquents appeared before court sessions either on a volun
tary basis to request,

for example, remission of a previous

penalty, or involuntarily,

in which case violators were con

victed, acquitted, or had their cases dropped and postponed.
Of those who appeared involuntarily,

92% were convicted com

pared with 76% for petty offenders.

And whereas authorities

displayed frequent leniency with the latter,
was true with deviants and delinquents.

the opposite

While 85 or 9% of

the cases of petty crime ended in acquittals, only 10 or 2%
of those accused of violating colony statutes did.

And

evidently, persons charged with colony misdemeanors were
acquitted as a result of insufficient evidence rather than
because officials were acting charitably.
The distribution of colony law violations also differed
from that of petty crime.

It should be recalled that

roughly 80% of all prosecutions of the latter occurred dur
ing the first two decades of settlement.

To a large degree

this is explained by the crises of the forties and fifties,
but it also reflects the loss of mid-century inferior court
records.

Colony infractions,

much more evenly (Figure 4.1).
settlement,

in contrast, were distributed
During the first decade of

16% of all violations were recorded; during the
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last decade of the century,

some 15%.

Following a flurry

of enforcement during the 1640s, when the commitment to or
der was perhaps most pronounced and when deviants and de
linquents received their harshest punishments, prosecutions
dropped.

But they rose again,

to a century high in the de

cade between 1659 and 1668 (29%) when New Haven's second
generation was coming of age.
ecutions again declined,

In the 1670s and 1680s, pros

then began to increase in the 1690s

when another generation began to experience the trials of
adolescence.

Not only were offenders of colony law fewer in

number than petty offenders, but it appears, judging from
the general distribution,

that there was not the distinctive

clustering of enforcement that was associated with what has
been termed a "crisis management" approach in prosecuting
those who violated local ordinances.
As was the case with the distribution of petty offenses,
the question of the authenticity of the distribution of col
ony infractions must be addressed.

It is quite probable

that the distribution depicted in Figure 4.1 is an accurate
representation— certainly moreso than the one for petty
crimes.

Underrecording was a problem with petty offenses

because the records of the Commissioners'
selectmen, and other informal tribunals,
company,

Courts,

the

like the militia

are non-existent or contain little information .on

the prosecution of offenders after the mid-fifties.

By

comparison, the superior court records— General Courts,
Magistrates'

Courts, Courts of Assistants,

and County

169

Figure 4.1
Percent Distribution of Colony Offenses
By Decade,

1639-1698

80-

DECADE

Sources:

New Haven R e c o r d s , I & II; Town Re c o r d s , I-III;

and County Court Records,

I.
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Courts— are for the most part complete.

The one exception

is for the ten year period 1643 to 1653 when only partial
Q
records remain for the New Haven Colony.
A second reason
for greater accuracy in recording colony infractions is that
they were considered more serious and consequently were un
recorded on only the rearest of occasions.

Based on the

surviving records and on the nature of the offenses,

it is

reasonable to assume that the distribution of colony viola
tions is indeed representative of actual enforcement.
What remains unanswered is whether recorded violations
accurately depict deviance and delinquency in early New
Haven.

Again,

as was true with petty offenses,

there must

have been an undetermined number of colony infractions that
escaped the attention of law enforcement officials (and even
nosey neighbors).

Moreover,

there had to have been young

men who drank themselves silly unbeknownst to authorities.
There must have been adolescents whose pre-marital sexual
encounters went undetected.
of pilfering that were,
reported.

And there were surely instances

for a variety of reasons, never

Although these unreported offenses clearly ex

isted their omission from surviving records is probably not
significant enough

to

alter either the general distribution

or distributions within particular categories.
As suggested earlier,

the most frequent offenses were

those related to sex, theft, or alcohol abuse.

Together,

fornication and drunkenness accounted for 191 or 35% of the
total number of colony infractions (Table 4.1).

These two
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crimes will be assessed in more detail below.

So too will

the 76 prosecutions for theft which constituted an additional
14%.

Beyond these,

there was an assortment of other colony

law violations (274 or 50%) that also caught the eye of law
enforcement officials.

These ranged from isolated instances

of "unnatural" sexual behavior,

like bestiality,

to profaning

the sabbath "by sinful servile work or by unlawful sport,"
with six recorded cases.
Both crimes carried a maximum pen9
alty of death.
There were a few cases of arson or attempted
arson that resulted in whipping and fines for the "said
criminals" like John Watson, Hannah Little,

and Sarah

Chatterton,

each of whom was convicted by the County Court

in 1 6 9 5 . ^

For the most part, however, profound sexual of

fenses or gross crimes against property were infrequent.
Other colony infractions related to maintaining a sem
blance of order amongst local residents.

Offenses which

seemed to threaten this the most were miscarriages of the
peace (60 or 11%) and "nightwalking" (43 or 8%).
legal standpoint,

disturbing the public peace,

to violating the sixth commandment,
of activities.

From a

in addition

covered a wide range

Both the New Haven and Connecticut Colony

codes stated that whosoever disturbed the peace "by his own
tumultuous and offensive carriage, traducing, reproaching,
quarelling, challenging,

assaulting," behavior would be

subject to a wide range of penalties from a simple fine to
banishment."^

Practically any kind of conduct that the

rulers found objectionable could fall under this heading.
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Typically, misbehavior between two or more people seems to
have been the rule.

For example,

in 1678, Henry Brooks was

convicted of disturbing the peace and imprisoned at the
pleasure of the court.

A complaint made by his step-son

Peter Blakesley led to a hearing which revealed that Brooks
had been very "offensive to his neighbors" (probably by
cursing).

Following his conviction the court noted that

such behavior was "not to be endured among any sober and
Christian people."

12

Ordinarily peace-breakers received lighter sentences
than the one handed out to Brooks.

More typical of punish

ment was the 10s fine levied on John and William Collins in
1693 when they broke the peace.

13

Among other things,

this

points to the legal fact that authorities had a variety of
punishments at their disposal and were thus able to assess
each case individually.

Although both Brooks and the Collins

brothers committed the same offense, the former received the
stiffer sentence.

Other options besides fine and imprison

ment were available to justices.

When extensive quarelling

between John Morris and Eleazer Peck fell into slander and
defamation, their punishment was the drafting and signing of
a covenant which acknowledged that they had been "uncomfort
able to themselves and troublesome to their neighbors."
They had to confess that they had been a "hazard to public
peace" and agree "voluntarily" to desist.

Officials could

also order bonds of good behavior to be posted,

as was done

with the Hall brothers in 1673 after they caused a disturbance
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Table 4.1
Colony Infractions by New Haven
Residents,

1639-1698

Offense Category

No.

Pet.

Drunkenness

105

19

Fornication

86

16

Theft/Pilfering

76

14

Disturbing the Peace

60

11

Nightwalking*

43

8

171

32

541

100

Other
Totals

*Includes "unauthorized" night meetings.

Sources:

New Haven R e c o r d s , I & II; Town Re cords, I— III;

and County Court Records,

I & II.
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with Eleazer Morris.

Finally,

if the breach of peace was

not too problematic the court could act with compassion and
hand down no sentence whatsoever.

That is what happened in

June of 1690 after a 36 year old male delinquent made "humble expositions' acknowledging his evil" and was acquitted.
Although not as disruptive,

14

nightwalking also posed a

threat to order and as such was prosecuted frequently.

Spe

cifically, the threat lay in what could happen if youths
were permitted to travel about unsupervised by their parents.
Drunkenness,

theft,

and fornication were high on the list of

temptations capable of corrupting the offspring of the
saints.

That is exactly what happened when Isaac Moline

carried off John Davenport's maid, Hester Clark,

"on horse

back to a f arm... in the_night after her master's family was
in bed."

During their trial the couple was told that such

behavior was "directly contrary to the law of God and man."

15

From a legal standpoint nightwalkers were individuals who
convened "after the shutting in of the evening" in either
"streets or fields," or in houses where no authorized adult
supervision existed.

In addition to "persons young or o l d . ..

that are under parents or masters government," the law also
applied to "sojourners and boaders" capable of exercising
an evil influence over adolescents.

Although provisions

were made in earlier codes to prevent such "roaming about,”
nightwalking was only established as a separate legal cate
gory in the Connecticut Code of 1673— perhaps a reflection
of growing concern over the independence youths were
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1C

seeking in the late seventeenth century.
Nevertheless,

the offense was prosecuted regularly in

New Haven beginning in the early sixties.

In February of

1663 several youths were presented for holding "unseason
able night meetings" at the home of John and Mary Brown
"contrary to their parents and masters consent or knowl
edge."

Specifically, they were condemned for "playing at

cards, singing,

and dancing."

After offering their excuses

to authorities,

the young men were told that they committed

an offense against which "they had so often been warned in
the public ministry" and one which was "contrary to the law
here established and often published."
reminder,
5s.

17

To serve as a final

the law was read to them and they were each fined

The same reasoning lay behind the decision to uphold

an inferior court conviction of Jonathan Tuttle for "unsea
sonable travelling" on the sabbath eve "contrary to the good
example [set] for him by his parents."

18

On occasion par

ents ended up paying the fines for offenses committed by
their children.

When Samuel and Martha Munson were fined

10s each for unauthorized night meetings in 1687, they were
told that inability to pay meant sitting "in the stocks one
hour as the law directs."

Faced by the possibility of hav

ing his children publically humiliated, Mr. Munson paid the
fines.

19

Whether or not the Munson children,

19 and 17 respec

tively, received further correction at home is unknown.
Perhaps their father delivered a lecture on the evils of
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nightwalking and told them that they had to work-off their
fines.

It is also possible that nothing was done; that the

Munsons returned home and carried on as usual.

After all,

Munson’s children were only doing what other New Haven teen
agers were doing with increasing regularity.

Nightwalking

may have been considered a threat to order, but if punish
ment

is

an indication of how society viewed an offense,

en

gaging in unsupervised activity did not evoke excessively
strong feelings of displea ;ure by the community or the
courts; fines were not much larger than those laid on recalcitrant militiamen.

20

Nightwalking was,

it seems,

less

troublesome than disturbing the peace and certainly less
dangerous than theft or fornication.

And even these tradi

tionally grievous offenses were punished with less severity
over time, yet another indication of changing values.

More

over, it was only on occasions when individuals appeared to
have the potential for genuinely eroding the social order
that extreme sanctions— like exclusion for deviance— were
employed uniformly.

One does not have to look very hard to find evidence of
exclusion in New England during the colonial period.

Most

readers of history possess at least a vague familiarity with
the region's reputation for warning-out and banishing per
sons of ill-repute.

The one name that comes to mind more

than any other is Anne Hutchinson who was banished from the
Bay Colony in 1637.

But there were others who were excluded
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because they offended authorities, committed crimes, or
otherwise seemed to threaten the social order.

John and

Samuel Brown were banished from Salem for holding separate
church services which utilized the Book of Common Prayer.
There was Alexander Partridge who, after being cast out by
Massachusetts authorities, travelled to Rhode Island where
he suffered ultimate exclusion (trial and execution) by an
angry mob.

And there was, of course, John Knight who was

deemed "unfit to live among men" and executed at New Haven.
Exclusion through banishment,

excommunication,

21

and other

means, like execution and branding, was not invented by the
founders of the New England Way;

it was part of an English

tradition that was used with regularity as a means of social
control in the mother country.

It was transported to the

new world in an exaggerated form because of the religious
convictions of the saints.

Indeed,

it was apprehension over

the behavior of "civil man" that prompted New England offi
cials to formulate bylaws aimed at screening out undesir
ables before they had a chance to corrupt God-fearing members of the community.

22

Because of severe labor shortages

and other circumstances of life in America, persons of sus
picious character and even with criminal records found their
way into the covenanted communities of New England.

Once

there, continued criminal conduct or the simple suggestion
of malfeasance could lead to exclusion very quickly.
Given this familiarity,

it is surprising that more

scholars have not focused on it as a mechanism of social
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control.

The most extensive analysis is Kai Er i k s o n 's Way

ward P uritans.

Unfortunately,

Erikson miscalculated the

extent of deviance in the Bay Colony by assuming that the
Essex County Court was the "main agency for dealing with
deviant behavior" in northeastern Massachusetts,

that its

records "provide a complete coverage of all deviant activ23
ities in the county."
This has fostered the notion that
most colonial law-breakers were truly deviant.

Moreover,

if one accepts Erikson's assumption, then it also holds
true that petty offenders,

like Joseph Swett's wife who was

fined 10s for wearing a silk hood, were singled out and
labelled as deviants.

This simply was not the case.

More

recently an analysis of Middlesex County, Massachusetts
Court Records led Eli Faber to suggest that individuals
were offered several avenues of reabsorption into the com
munity after a crime had been committed.

Faber concluded

that even though offenders were punished, puritan society
"did not condemn them to exclusion and isolation for long
years to come."

24

Erikson and Faber are the only scholars

to address exclusion directly.

The sociologist takes one

position, the historian another.
plied, they

are

With certain caveats ap

probably both correct,

suggesting that

actual practice fell somewhere in between.
Despite Erikson's liberal assessment of the size of
Essex County's deviant population,

his work is eminently

suited for a discussion of what actually constituted
deviance.

As with other studies on the subject, Erikson
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utilized the generally accepted definition that deviance
refers to "conduct which the people of a group consider so
dangerous or embarrassing or irritating tha,t they bring
special santions to bear against the persons who exhibit
it."

Importantly,

he added that deviance is not a property

inherent in any particular kind of behavior;

"it is a proper

ty conferred upon that behavior by those who come into con
tact with it."

"Those" is a significant qualifier because

it suggests that every social group has its own methods for
labelling deviants.

Thus it is necessary to recognize that

deviance encompasses a broad range of possibilities,

so

broad in fact, that "there are no objective properties which
all deviant acts can be said to have in common— even within
25
the confines of a given group."'

Rape is a case in point.

Today, most people consider it to be an act of deviance com
mitted by individuals who are severely maladjusted.

Both

legal and societal responses indicate that rapists are
labelled as deviants.
case.

But this has not always been the

In fourteenth-century Venice,

for example, rape was

viewed as a minor offense against both the victim and
society.
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These kinds of exceptions to the rule help re

inforce the notion that identifying or "cataloguing" de
viants in any society is no easy task.
This is especially germane in the light of the fact
that exclusion for deviance is not always determined simply
on the basis of the given act.
the process.

Other factors enter into

The social ranking of an individual is one.
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His record as an offender is another.

And so, too,

shifting mood of the community over time.
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is the

The presence

or absence of additional variables tend to influence ones
prospects for exclusion.

For instance,

there is a strong

tendency to exclude individuals who lack close social ties
to the community.
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Yet this does not entirely preclude

exclusion of those with strong ties.

There is a greater

propensity to exclude for deviance persons who are per
ceived to reject commonly held values than there is for
those who do not.
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But this does not mean that those who

embrace those values are exempted from acquiring a deviant
status.

There is also a greater probability of exclusion

for offenders who are uncooperative with authorities than
there is for those who do cooperate.
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However,

an "un

cooperative" suspect may be trying to convince others of
his innocence and in so doing successfully avoid exclusion.
The list of propositions like these is endless.

They con

tribute to our understanding of the labelling process,

but

are not definitive criteria that can be used to pinpoint
the size of a deviant population three hundred years ago.
Seventeenth-century descriptions can help, but they
too have noteworthy limitations.

The puritans had a pen

chant for using the word "sin" to cover a wide variety of
offenses from illegal trade to fornication.
keeping with the definition of deviance,

However,

in

it would be inap

propriate to assume that all "sinners" were deviants.
Catchall terms like this must be approached with caution.
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Utilizing the law as a basis for assessing deviance can
help, but here too problems arise.

One might conclude,

for

example, that capital crimes can serve as a jumping off
point for identifying deviant offenses.

Yet in the Eaton

Code the punishment for smiting one's parents was death.
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Does this mean that rebellious children were considered
deviants?

By the same token, does it mean that Aaron Stark,

a Connecticut man whipped for bestiality before that of
fense became a capital crime was not?

He probably was,

es

pecially when considering that he had previously been
branded on the cheek with the letter "R" for sexually
abusing Mary Holt.
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Although Connecticut's laws are use

ful in establishing norms, provisions did change over time
and the strict letter of the law was not always followed.
Given these inconsistencies,

laws themselves cannot be

used as the principal basis for defining deviance.
there are comments by contemporaries,

Finally,

like the one made by

a prominent Londoner who described sodomites as deviants
who "ought to be excluded from all civil society and human
conversation," but these surface too infrequently in surviving records.
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Moreover,

regarding deviance,

as with modern propositions

contemporary evidence can help identi

fy the existence of deviations, but they offer no ironclad
rules for erecting models that can be used to single out
individual deviants.
With so many variables inherent in the process of
labelling deviants it is virtually impossible to inventory
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New Haven's deviant population.
issue at hand.

But that is really not the

What is important is to recognize that de

viance existed and that seventeenth-century New Englanders
viewed deviants as a particular class of people who were
unlikely to reform.

Moreover,

the puritan tendency to view

things in bi-polar terms— saved or damned,

ruler or ruled,

insider or outsider— strongly suggests that once a person
was excluded for deviance it was "extremely difficult for
him to resume a normal social role in the community."
Thus it is more appropriate to ask:
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is there evidence that

exclusion was used as a strategy for social control and to
what extent was it effective?
The answer to the first part of the question is yes; ex
clusion was utilized as a means of preserving the social
order.

The most thoroughly documented example is found in

the legal proceedings against George Spencer, a servant who
was executed in 1642 after being convicted of bestiality.
Importantly his trial marked the end of what may be des
cribed as a deviant career that began prior to his arrival
in New Haven.
Shortly after he landed in the new world, Spencer was
convicted by a Quarter Court held in Boston in 1637.

He

was charged with receiving stolen property from another un
distinguished servant named William Broomfield.

For his

involvement,

in keeping

Spencer was censured, whipped,

and,

with Scripture, was ordered to make twofold restitution.
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Following his encounter with Massachusetts authorities he
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removed to New Haven where,

in early 1640, he was appre

hended for conspiring to "carry away" the Cock to Virginia.
Very quickly he had acquired a reputation for being "pro
fane and disorderly in his whole conversation and an abetter
of others to sin."

On this occasion he was whipped and

banished— in and of itself evidence of exclusion.
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Al

though he was "cast out," Spencer returned to New Haven
within a year and hired on as a servant to Henry Browning.
At roughly the same time, Browning sold a pregnant sow
to John Wakenman and it was he who "acquainted the magis
trate that a sow of his" had delivered a "prodigious
monster."
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The pig was described as having "no hair on

the whole body [and] the skin was very tender... like a
childs; the head was most strange,

it had but one eye in

the middle of the f a c e . .., over the e y e . .. a thing of flesh
grew forth and hung down...
eration."

like a man's instrument of gen

Evidently the deformed creature came as no sur

prise to Goody Wakeman because the "hand of God appeared in
an impression" which prefigured the event.

Curious and

concerned citizens flocked to view the results of an
autopsy that revealed "there was an apparent difference in
all the inwards" from another pig of the same litter.

After

this public viewing "a strange impression" fell upon many
others that one "George Spencer... had been [an] actor in
unnatural and abominable filthiness with the sow."

Indeed,

so strong were these impressions that "divers upon first
sight, expressed their apprehensions without any knowledge
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what conjecture others had made."

Why?

Because Spencer

"had but one eye for use, the other has a pearl in it,
[which] is whitish and deformed, and his deformed eye being
beheld and compared together with the eye of the monster,
seemed to be as like as the eye in the glass to the eye in
the face."

Spencer,

in otherwords, was being accused of

grave sexual deviation on the basis of the pig's appearance.
An initial investigation into the event met with a de
nial by Spencer who was nevertheless incarcerated.

While

in the jailhouse he was questioned by magistrate Stephen
Goodyear, who asked him what he thought of the creature and
"whether he did not take notice of something in it like him?"
Spencer then asked whose sow it was and the magistrate,
"apprehending in the prisoner some relenting,
tion for confession,

as a prepara

remembered him of that place in Scrip

ture, he that hides his sin shall not prosper, but he that
confesses and foresakes his sins shall find mercy."

With

that the confused and scared Spencer "answered he was sorry
and confessed that he had done it."

Subsequent examinations

by Eaton and Davenport brought forth additional details.
That the temptation had "been upon his spirit two or three
days before."

That the transgression took place in Browning's

stable "about six o'clock in the evening, when the sun was
set and the daylight almost shut in."

That he was with the

sow for two hours and that the act itself lasted 30 minutes,
to which Spencer added that "it was the most terrible half
hour that he had ever had."

When asked how he could "do it
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if he had no pleasure in it," Spencer remarked that "he was
driven by the power of the Devil and the strength of his
[corr] uption to do the thing."
During his imprisonment Spencer had many conversations
with officials who endeavored to discover the reasons for
his sin.

Specifically,

they were concerned about his

"atheisticall carriage" and his failure to turn to the Lord
in the face of temptation.

Hadn't he prayed?

plied that he had not since he left England.
read the Scriptures?
upon him else not."

Spencer re
Didn't he

He answered that his "master put it
And when asked "whether he found not

some working [upon him] in the public ministry," the pris
oner admitted that it "did not abide with him."

From

these examinations it became clear that Spencer,
tion to the crime itself,

in addi

appeared to reject the values

upon which the community rested.

As was the case with John

Knight, Spencer could not be reclaimed and

was

ordered to

be "hanged upon a gallows until he be dead."
Saturday,

April 8 , 1642 was chosen as the day of execu

tion, of the final act of exclusion from society.

It must

have been a day of both excitment and fear for local resi
dents, most of whom were viewing their first hanging in
New England.

As Spencer was being drawn to the gallows in

a cart he spoke to the youths about him,

"exhorting them

all to take warning by his example how they neglect and
dispise the means to grace."

Just prior to. his execution

he again confessed the bestiality "in all its circumstances"
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and "justified the sentence to be righteous."
parting words were for William Harding,
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But his

a sawyer, whose

"pernicious counsel" had been a "means to hinder his repen
tance."

On hand to view the hanging, Harding denied the

accusation.

Among Spencer's last words was his retort that

"he was the cause of his soul's damnation."

The sow was

then run through with a sword and Spencer was hung, thus
"leaving him a terrible example of divine justice and
,,
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wrath."

Spencer and Knight were not the only individuals in the
vicinity to pay the supreme price for pronounced sexual
deviance.

In 1654 a 15 year old Milford servant, Walter

Robinson, was also executed "for committing the horrible
sin of bestiality,

with a bitch, and therein abasing the

nature of man in a most filthy way."
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Unlike Spencer's

deed, an eye witness observed Robinson commit the crime.
Edward Wilson testified that the youth "took up her hinder
legs and pulled down his breeches and took his member in
his hand and according to his purpose of unnatural copula
tion, put it in a little way into the bitch's body."

The

unwilling partner resisted so vigorously that Robinson was
prevented from penetrating "so far as he might have done."
Wilson warned Walter that he would be hanged.
then released the dog,

"pulled up his breeches,

Robinson
and ran

away, but first feeling some grumbling pain in his member,
he looked upon it,

[and] he further said that he had heard
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that such filthiness with such creatures was death.”
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Indeed it was.

Both the dog and Robinson were executed.

So too was William Potter,

a seemingly upstanding citi

zen of New Haven who was charged in 1662 with the "sin of
bestiality with sundry creatures."

The disturbing thing

about Potter was that he appeared to embrace the commitment
to order shared by most members of the community.

He was a

church member (excommunicated for his bestiality) and a man
of good estate.

Yet as the proceedings of his trial sug

gest, he had intermittently copulated with animals since
1619 when he was an 11 year old apprentice in England.
Potter reported to the court that his "temptations followed
him" to the new world.

Once in New Haven he engaged in a

series of perversions with cows, a bitch (which he then
hanged to free him of further sin),
heifer, and three sheep.
old mare."

two sows,

a yearling

He even attempted it with "his

Potter admitted that on each occasion he was

"filled with shame and confusion for the dishonor he had
done to God," and added that little could be done to re
form him.

Even after he saw "others put to death for the

same acts"

(presumably Spencer and Robinson),

remained hardened.

his heart

Eollowing his confession and testimony

by his wife and son, the law was read to Potter and he was
asked "why the court should not proceed to judge him ac
cording to the law," and he said no.

Realizing that "they

could do not otherwise," the magistrates ordered his exe42
cut ion.
Each of these individuals was excluded for what was
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considered to be a grave sexual deviation.
proceedings against Spencer, Robinson,
John Knight,

Comments in the

and for that matter,

indicate that their character or so-called de

viant disposition made their acts more believable.
Potter was different.

Unlike the others, Potter was ac

corded charity and understanding during his trial.
the phrase,

William

Indeed,

"they could do not otherwise" reveals a hint of

reluctance on the part of colony officials to exclude one of
their own.

They did so because they had to, but members of

the fellowship of saints were excluded only on the rarest of
occasions.
Most of those who were excluded were cut from a differ
ent bolt of fabric; Potter was the exception,
Execution was also

the

exception.

not the rule.

Moreover, most individ

uals excluded in New Haven were not put to death.

The very

point of exclusion was to screen-out perceived deviants be
fore they had an opportunity to undermine the social order.
The process of exclusion was meant to call attention to
conduct or personal traits deemed undesirable.

In fact

there may have been individuals of worse frame than Spencer
or Knight who never had a chance to disrupt the moral order
because they were warned out before they had a chance to
commit a crime.

That, however, may have been wishful

thinking, which is why individuals like Humphrey Norton
were apprehended, brought to trial, and excluded.
Norton was a Quaker whose reputation pre-dated his ar
rival in New Haven.

Local and colony officials knew about
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the "Quaker Invasion" of Massachusetts and on occasion had
had run-ins with Quakers within the confines of the jurisdiction.
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Controlling the sect had become difficult in

the outer reaches of the colony,
dering Southold.

especially in regions bor

It was not surprising that this sleepy

town on the eastern end of Long Island became a target for
the disciples of George Fox.

Evidently it was to this part

of the New Haven Colony tha.t Norton travelled after being
banished from the Plymouth Colony in the fall of 1657.
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Once in Southold, Norton viciously attacked the local minis
ter, John Youngs,

as well as the magistracy of the colony.

For this, he was transported to New Haven where, understand
ably, he was not received warmly.

Indeed,

Norton's account of his treatment,

it was downright inhu

mane:

if we accept

he was confined to an open prison in foul weather

where, for a three week period prior to his appearance be
fore the Plantation Court, he wore irons linked to 'a great
45
lump of w o o d . '
At his well attended trial Norton was accused of slan
der, of seducing the people "from their due attendance upon
the ministry and sound doctrines of...

religion," of

spreading heretical opinions, of villifying the magistracy,
and of disturbing the peace.
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Particularly grievous were

his attacks on the magistracy and the ministry because they
threatened to undermine the principles embodied in the Fun
damental Agreement.

Norton claimed,

for example,

that mag

istrates were "devil’s servants" who had no true power to
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punish offenders.

Although Norton's political views were

probably not taken seriously,

they tended to call into

question powers held by magistrates.
cally Youngs and Davenport,

Ministers,

got an equally bad press from

Norton in several tracts that he had composed.
he condemned infant baptism,

specifi

Basically,

a central tenant of the New

England Way, on the grounds that it lacked Scriptural
support.

In addition,

he wrote that "men may be brought to

perfection in this life,
people they cannot,...

and those ministers which tell

tell an untruth."

Another of

Norton's writings was "full of errors and reproach to Mr.
Davenport," who endeavored to address Norton's accusations
"before a great concourse of people."

When Davenport rose

to answer the Quaker's charges "the said Humphrey was so
unruly with his tongue" that the New Haven divine simply
could not be heard.
After his examination, Norton was pronounced guilty and
ordered to be "severely whipped and branded on the hand with
the letter H, for spreading his heretical opinions,...
be excluded out of this plantation."

and

Isabel Calder has pro

vided a dramatic description of the scene:
He was immediately led forth to the stocks, and in
the presence of a great crowd summoned by the beat of
a drum, stripped to the waist and given thirty-six
stripes.
Next a pan containing burning coals and an
iron was brought, and the letter 'H' for heretic was
burned into the hand of the prisoner still held fast
in the stocks, 'in malice... his right hand to hinder
him from W r i t i n g . '47
Following his ordeal in New Haven, Norton returned to
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Plymouth where, once again, he was prosecuted by authorities.
Judging from Norton's New Haven experiences it appears
that he was excluded for deviance by being publically hu
miliated, branded (or what law codes describe as "stigma
tized"), and banished.

His trial, which must have been

something of a spectacle,

had served to reinforce the

policies of perfection upon which the town and the colony
were founded.

By banishing the truculent Quaker,

authori

ties controlled what they considered to be a dangerous
situation.

It seems that Norton was punished more for his

heretical opinions than for any eccentricities (like un
ruliness during his trial) which figured in the exclusion
of Quakers in the Bay.

There, where the Quaker infestation

was much more widespread, people were labelled as deviants
for external behavior like wearing hats in the presence of
magistrates, using unconventional language,

holding private

church services, and running naked through the streets.
Persons displaying such behavior were routinely classified
as Quakers and labelled as deviants.
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But while Humphrey

Norton did not display any of these unusual characteristics,
there were others in New Haven whose "ill-report" contri
buted to their exclusion for deviance.
This was perhaps the case with a Mr. and Mrs. Hunt who
were warned out of town in 1643, even though they had not
broken any law.

In fact,

guilt by association.

their only crime may have been

Specifically,

the Hunts were asked

to leave for keeping company with William Harding,

for whom
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they baked a "past[r]y and plumb cakes."

They probably

were regarded with suspicion anyway, because they had been
"admitted to sojourn" in the plantation "upon their good
behavior."

Once they began associating with Harding (the

same man George Spencer berated from the gallows),

authori

ties may well have felt that it was time to weed them out
before they could work their corruptions on others.
though there was no public exhibition,
the case with Norton,
similar purpose:
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Al

as would later be

the exclusion of the Hunts served a

safeguarding the moral order.

The Hunts were not the only couple in New Haven who
appear to have been excluded for deviance.
forties,

In the mi d 

for example, William Fancy and his wife had some

major encounters with local officials.

.In 1643 the woman

was charged with "stealing divers things from sundry
persons."

In the course of her hearing,

authorities al

luded to previous misconduct in Connecticut where she had
been whipped twice.

Moreover,

she was labelled as a

"notorious thief and Iyer" insofar as stealing "appears to
have been her trade."

In addition to making restitution

to the victim of her crime

(who was "at prayer" when the

theft occurred) Mrs. Fancy

was ordered to be whipped

severely.

did little to reform her.

This punishment

Three

years later both she and her husband were examined for
their "lewd and unclean passages."

The case centered upon

the attempts of several men to seduce Mrs. Fancy.

Typical

was the action of Mark Meiggs (brother of litigant John)

193
who on one occasion,

being alone with the woman,

hold of her, put his hands under her coats...

"caught

and told her

he would give her" a string of wampum and 5s "if she would
teach him to get a boy."

When William Fancy was asked why

he did not report the several attempts to seduce his wife,
he claimed "that his wife having been publically punished
for thievery,

should not be believed."

In other words, he

was afraid that her prior acts and reputation would confirm
that she enticed these men to seduce her.

More than likely

this was the conclusion reached by the court:
tenced to be severely whipped,

she was sen

and "for his being as it were

a pander [e.g. pimp] to his wife," so was William Fancy.
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The Fancys were not banished as the Hunts were, but the
pair evidently left town within a few years of their trial.
They had clearly neglected che duties required of husbands
and wives and as such set a poor example for the rest of
the community.

Although we cannot be completely certain

that the Fancys were labelled as deviants,

it may well have

been that their conduct led to ridicule and even ostracism
by local residents.
Beyond those accused of gross sexual m i s c on du ct , like
Spencer or Knight, and others whose behavior was especially
troublesome,

like Norton, the Hunts, or the Fancys,

there

is little evidence of overt exclusion for deviance in early
New Haven.

In this regard Eli Faber's assessment of exclu

sion is perhaps more accurate than Erikson's.

To be sure,

some other instances of exclusion appear in court records
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as, for example, when Edward Woodcliff,

a servant, was

whipped and "sent out of the plantation."
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For the most

part deviants were members of a highly visible but reason
ably small group of undesirables.

During the course of

the seventeenth century probably fewer than 50 people (or
7% of the total offender population of 669) were excluded
for deviance.

Moreover,

individuals excluded for deviance

tended to be true outsiders who lacked strong ties with the
community.

Nearly all lacked relatives in town.

land, subscribed to the Fundamental Agreement,
or were admitted members of the church.

Few owned

could vote,

For the most part

they were unskilled laborers or servants who had low occupa
tional prestige.

We can assume that because their commit

ment to the widely held values of the community were per
ceived to be so slight and because their behavior tended to
jeopardize those values,

such individuals were excluded.

Thus the answer to the first part of the question raised
earlier is yes:

exclusion for deviance was used as a means

of promoting and preserving the moral order.

The answer to

the second half of the question is also yes:

exclusion for

deviance was effective on at least two levels.

First ex-

c.

elusion removed from the community individuals whose con
duct was "so dangerous or embarrassing or irritating" that
special sanctions were brought to bear against them.

People

like George Spencer could no longer commit acts inspired by
the Devil.

Wayward youths like John Knight could no longer

sexually abuse children.

And fanatics like Humphrey Norton
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were prevented from spreading the seeds of apostasy and
rebellion.

Moreover,

community from danger.

exclusion protected members of the
Second,

exclusion was effective be

cause it called to attention the limits of acceptable be
havior and as such provided clear examples of how not to
behave, while at the same time reinforced the fundamental
values upon which the community rested.
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New Haven was

similar to other New England towns in that it had its share
of social deviants who were condemned for their behavior
and excluded.

Yet recall that members of this "criminal"

minority were responsible for but a handful of the 541
colony violations prosecuted during the century.

The over-

shelming majority of colony offenses were committed by in
dividuals who may have been censured and frowned upon momen
tarily, but who by no means were labelled as deviants and
excluded.

In addition to peacebreakers and nightwalkers,

one finds within the ranks of this group tipplers,
and fornicators.

thieves,

It was they who constituted‘what may be

loosely described as New Haven's delinquent population.

At the May 11, 1767 session of the Connecticut General
Court special attention was devoted to the "sins" of the
rising generation.

In language that could have been lifted

from the agreements, orders,

and sermons of the 1640s, of

ficials drew a bead on adults and youths who, with increas
ing frequency,

failed to follow the path of righteousness.

They claimed that the sabbath was being profaned;

its
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"ordinances rendered unprofitable, which threatens the
rooting out of the power of Godliness and the procurring of
the wrath and judgement of God...."
further disorders,

To try and prevent

the penalty for profaning the sabbath

was increased by 5s.

Authorities were also disturbed about

the "increase of drunkenness" in the colony and accordingly
placed new restrictions on quantities of liquor retailers
could sell.

And because it was observed "that the sin of

uncleaness" was proliferating in the jurisdiction,

county

officials were urged to prosecure offenders in hopes of
stemming the tide of illegal fornication.

Finally, because

youths were "getting from under the government of parents
and masters," a new law regulating that status of "boarders
and sojourners" was implemented by the court.
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Nested

within this series of warnings, which so much resemble the
messages delivered by New England's jeremiads,

Connecticut

rulers were zeroing in on two of the colony's laws violated
most frequently by New Haven residents and apparently those
of surrounding colonies as well:

drunkenness and fornica

tion.
These offenses,

along with theft,

accounted for nearly

50% of the violations of colony statutes in New Haven between
1639 and 1698 (Table 4.1).

Alcohol abuse topped the list

with some 105 violations or 19% of the total.

Fornication

followed with 86 prosecutions (16%) and cases of theft ac
counted for an additional 76 appearances (14%).

As will be

seen shortly, these three offenses had something in common—
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they were crimes committed by young adults who also happened
to be the sons and daughters of the saints.
part,

For the most

individuals presented for excessive drinking,

for the

theft of some lace, or for premarital sex, received mild
punishments and tended to remain members of the community
in good standing.

Youths who committed these offenses

(along with breaking the peace and nightwalking) have been
referred to as being delinquent and indeed the term "delin
quency" means little more than the fact that an offender
had been negligent,
tain obligations.

that he or she had failed to meet cer
New Haven residents violated laws gov

erning morality regularly throughout the century and little
could be done to prevent so-called delinquent conduct.

Of

ficials complained bitterly of "sundry evils," but their
lamantations and warnings fell on deaf ears.

Nearly a

decade later authorities noted that the special laws passed
in 1676 "have little prevailed to the suppressing of the
growth of said evils" in the colony.
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But the hands of officials were not tied.
wanted to severely punish tipplers,
tors, they were so empowered.

thieves,

If they
and fornica

Laws bearing on the latter,

for example, were explicit enough:

convicted offenders

would be punished "either by enjoyning to marriage, or
fine, or corporal punishment, or all, or any of these,

as

the court or magistrates shall judge most agreeable to
the word of God."

The options for punishment were spelled-

out in no uncertain terms, but it was left with law
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enforcement officials to determine which of the penalties
to impose.
theft.

Penalties included fines, branding,

whipping,
teous,

The same was true regarding sentencing for
restitution,

and, for those who were "incorrigibly unrigh

and presumptuously profane," even death.

Laws

governing drunkenness and tippling were also similar inso
far as a variety of penalties existed which could be meted
out according to the discretion of the court.
Magisterial discretion was an important element in the
social control equation.

In his "Discourse on Arbitrary

Government," John Winthrop made a persuasive argument on
behalf of discretionary justice.

Moreover, Winthrop claimed

that it was unjust to punish a "youth of honest conversa
tion" the same as an "old notorious Iyer" even though the
crimes they committed were identical.

Essentially Winthrop

was emphasizing that the character of an offender had to be
taken into consideration when sentences were handed down.
Without a certain amount of flexibility and discretion,
justice would not be served.
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This kind of flexibility

in sentencing was highlighted at the outset of the present
investigation of deviants and delinquents.

Although most

of the penalties embodied in the Eaton and Connecticut
codes were fixed, officials were granted ample discretion
in cases governing morality.

As much as 27% of New Haven's

laws and 14% of Connecticut's statutes left the door open
for discretionary sentencing.

Furthermore, prior to the

publication of the Eaton Code in 1656, New Haven officials
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utilized wide discretion in all sentencing excepting cases
involving violations of bylaws with fixed penalties: It is this
kind of magisterial discretion which explains why Samuel
Hotchkiss Jr. and Elizabeth Cleverly were whipped in 1642 for
committing fornication, while 60 years later Gydian and Lydia
Andrews were fined for the same offense.
fornication in both cases was the same.
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The law governing

The difference lies

in the fact that officials simply opted for different punish
ments— an indication that notions or morality had changed
over time.
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Thus while rulers complained of "sundry evils,"

they failed to use the resources at their disposal to punish
offenders in such a way as to deter crime.

Nowhere is this

seen more clearly than in the treatment of delinquents who
violated moral statutes.
When colony officials were complaining in 1676 about the
"increase in drunkenness," alcohol related offense had already begun to decline in New Haven (Figure 4.2).
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And

that trend would continue until the turn of the century.
Actually, the period of greatest known alcohol abuse was
the first decade of settlement, when 27% of the cases were
prosecuted.

This was probably due to the unsettled state

of the community in the early 1640s when the concentration
of transients seeking land or other economic opportunities
was highest.

Once the town became better organized— land

divided, houses completed, and positive laws formulated—
the number of prosecutions dropped off dramatically.

In

deed, between 1649 and 1658 only three individuals were
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presented for intemperance.
second generation.

But prosecutions rose with the

In the two decades from 1659 to 1678

nearly 50% of all alcohol misuse cases were heard.

Only

when the offspring of the orginal saints began to settle
down and have families of their own did prosecutions begin
to decline once again.
Although drunkenness and tippling were frowned upon,
extant evidence suggest that occasional misuse of alcohol
did not cause excessive alarm.

Drinking was a part of the

settler's English heritage and the fact that New Haven's
rulers were puritans did not mean that the enjoyment of
moderate amounts of beer, wine,

and occasionally "strong

waters" was considered imprudent.

In the early years of

settlement attempts were made to find a proprietor for the
local ordinary and individuals were granted licenses to
retail liquor.

The principal concern of leaders was that

alcohol use be regulated.

That is why the published laws

of both the New Haven and Connecticut colonies specified
where drinking could take place, how much liquor could be
sold, and how much time patrons could spend in drinking
establishments.

Authorities also made special provisions

for Indians because it was believed they were "addicted"
to alcohol.

The consumption of liquor became a cause for

law enforcement only when individuals were delinquent by
disregarding the "rules of sobriety."
Most people prosecuted for drunkenness or tippling
were convicted because they drank (or were caught) outside

Figure 4.2
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the regulated confines of the tavern.

Such conduct posed a

variety of possible dangers to the well-ordered community.
It meant that the chances of idleness increased.

It served

to undermine parental authority by luring youths out into
the n i g h t .

And it threatened to disturb the peace because

very often drunkenness led to quarelling.

Henry Brooks was

probably the town drunk, but most of his 11 appearances be
fore authorities were made for disturbing the peace.

Above

all, rulers saw a danger in alcohol abuse because it deprived
people of their senses.

This is made clear from the trial

of one of the few members of the church to be presented for
the "sin of drunkenness."

In 1647 James Haywood was accused

of getting drunk on a "Dutchman's vessel."

There he drank

so much that "he had not the use of his reason,
tongue, hands, or feet."

nor of his

When asked about his offense,

Haywood confessed that he had broken the law and had "dis
honored" God.

Among other things,

authorities endeavored

to discover whether or not Haywood "had been given to
drunkenness."

Because they determined that his was "an

act only," magistrates used their discretionary powers to
go
punish him with a fine rather than by whipping.
Most residents presented for drunkenness were similar
to Haywood.

Their offenses were "acts only."

They did

not display patterns of persistent intemperance.

Of the

80 offenders who stood before the bar for alcohol abuse,
only 14 (17%) returned to court to face similar charges.
Eight of these made a second appearance and six appeared
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on three occasions.
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Thus most of New Haven's delinquent

drinkers were non-recidivists.

As a group they were white

males who were unmarried at the time of their initial ap
pearance.

Demographic data, available for slightly over a

third of the group,

indicate that the typical tippler was

between 22 and 23 years of age.

Tour of the offenders were

females ranging from 19 to 22 and they, too, tended to be
unmarried.

62

The remaining delinquents (11) included two

negroes (one of whom was Theophilus Eaton's "neager" ser
vant) and nine were Indians who,

as a group,

appeared more

for alcohol misuse than for any other offense.

Only one

of the population of 14 recidivists was a native American.
The punishment delinquent drinkers received was, on the
whole, rather mild.
recidivists alike.
posed most often.

This applied to recidivists and non
For both,

fines were the penalties im

This is largely explained by the system

of fixed sanctions that existed in the law codes.

Further

more, the fines were geared to increase with each subsequent
offense.

That is why Edward Bunce was fined 3s 4d for his

excessive drinking in 1666, while his friend, John Thomas
Jr., a second offender, was fined 6s 8d.®^

Fully 80 (83%)

of the 96 sentences handed down were fines, usually of less
than 20s.
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Four less fortunate offenders were placed in

the stocks or whipped,

and 12 received other punishments

ranging from imprisonment to an admonition.

These lawbreakers

were punished more severely because their cases merited
special attention.

Even in certain instances where fines
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were called for, authorities used discretion to punish in
dividuals for drunkenness based on the extent of their mis
behavior.

In 1644,

for example,

several residents were

convicted for holding a "drunken disorderly" ’gathering.
Two delinquents were fined 20s each for "being the authors
principally."

One, Edmund Tooly, who was John Davenport's

servant, was fined 10s "for fetching the wine."

Another

pair were fined 3s 4d each "because they were but occasionally present with the rest."
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Because so many cases

of alcohol abuse were compounded by other degrees of delin
quent behavior,
process.

discretion had to be used in the sentencing

And it remained an important feature of the social

control apparatus throughout the century.
Thus

when colony officials railed against the "sin of

drunkenness," they had within their grasp

the power to ini

tiate legal change and to punish delinquents in a manner
which would discourage others from drinking excessively.
But leaders did not use this power as forcefully as they
might have.

In retrospect,

it appears that the most rulers

did was complain loudly— and little else.

Although disap

proved of, occasional intoxication was recognized for what
it was:

a less than serious offense that was to be pun

ished by

a fine.

young, unmarried,

Most alcohol abusers in New Haven were
and prosecuted only once.

As a group the

vast majority of delinquent drinkers were sentenced to pay
fines.

Some received stiffer penalties,

but the use of

stocking and whipping was rare and declined over time.
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This is partly explained by what must have been a softening
of the official opinion relat ive to per iodic alcohol m i s u s e .
But it was not an indication that justices let their guard
down.

They were ever wary of liquor consumption by Indians,

of unsupervised "husking parties," and of the activities of
Henry Brooks.

Serious alcohol abuse was visualized as being

capable of thoroughly corrupting and depriving individuals
of their reason.

In New Haven this never became a serious

problem which is why drunks and tipplers were punished as
mildly as petty criminals.
The situation with theft was somewhat different.

If

there was a single non-capital crime which predisposed God
fearing New Englanders to consider an individual deviant,
was theft.

it

Indeed, some of New Haven's deviants had robbed

at some point in their infamous careers; Mrs. Fancy, William
Broomfield,

and George Spencer are examples.

Children read

in their primers that "a dog will bite a thief at night."
And the legal provisions for punishing convicted thieves in
cluded branding with the letter "B" for their first offense-an indication that thieves could easily be cast into deviant
roles.

Moreover, while cases of theft were prosecuted less

frequently than drunkenness,

thieves were punished more

severely than drunks or tipplers.
Over the course of the century theft was an offense which
was subject to a steady,

if not slight, decline.

As sug

gested in Figure 4.3, the crime was distributed rather
evenly; it was not enforced with great variation which
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proved to be the case with petty crime, alcohol abuse, or
even fornication.
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The highest percentage of thefts oc

curred in the first and third decades of settlement and ac
counted for 42% of the cases prosecuted.

There were never

years or extended periods of time when the community was
plagued by stealing.

In fact,

the most thefts recorded for

a single year were six in 1665 and 1682.
Although thieves frequently received harsh punishments,
most were not career criminals (like Mrs. Fancy) who were
excluded for their unrighteousness.

Between 1639 and 1698,

59 individuals were responsible for 76 thefts.
from the theft of

These ranged

£5 17s in 1639 by Roger Duhurst and James

Stewart, two servants who were whipped for taking the money
out of their master's "chest on the Lord's Day in the meet
ing time," to a case of pilfering watermelons in 1682 by
four yourths,

each of whom was fined and reminded by author-

ities that "the law gives liberty for capital punishment."
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Most offenders were similar to this group of six because
they stole on only one occasion;

^6 (45%) never committed

another crime, 21 (35%) violated other local or colony
statutes during their residence in New Haven but stole
only once, and 12 (20%) appeared for theft more than once.
Of these, ten appeared twice and two made four separate
appearances.
Nearly all of New Haven's thieves were convicted (96%)
and the punishments they received was determined by the
discretion of the court— as the cases of pilfering suggest.
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Figure 4.3
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Each crime was assessed on an individual basis,

thereby

giving magistrates the option of meting out punishment fit
ted to the offense.

In practice this meant that there was

little distinction between the sanctions employed against
recidivists and non-recidivists.

One might expect that the

former were punished more severely, but that was not always
the case, even though the law directed recidivists to re
ceive stiffer sentences.

Indeed,

as a group non-recidivists

received a higher percentage of whippings

(10. or 45%) and

fewer fines (5 or 20%).

the larger of the

For recidivists,

two groups, the figures were 16 or 35% for both whipping and
fines.
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It should be noted,

of alcohol abuse,

however,

that,

as in the case

discretion was used liberally because many

cases of theft were compounded by other crimes,

such as

lying or stealing on the sabbath.
The typical thief was,
male, young,

like the drunk or tippler,

and unmarried.

town's thieves were males,

Forty-eight

also

(81%) of the

and based on very limited demo

graphic data (5 cases) the average thief was in his mid
twenties.

Nineteen of the group were servants (ages

unknown).

This suggests,

was younger still.

however,

that the typical thief

Eighteen of the offenders were married

at the time of their first violation, while 21 are defi
nitely known to have been unmarried.

It is probable that

the remaining 20 thieves and pilferers, which included
five Indians and four Negroes, were also unmarried.

The

11 females (19%) in the group tended to mirror the male
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population.

They were young (three whose ages are known

were 17, 22 and 48) and unmarried.

Five of the 11 were

servants and there were no Indian or Negro females thieves.
New Haven's thieves therefore shared much in common
with the town's alcohol abusers.

Both groups of offenders

typically consisted of a population of single white males
under twenty-five years of age.
share of female offenders,

Both groups had their

19% and 5% respectively,

and

both had roughly equal percentages of racial minorities
(15% and 13%).

Most of these lawbreakers were similar to

the extent that they appeared before authorities on but
one occasion.

As a group, they were not career criminals

who merited exclusion for deviance.

And whether recidi

vists or not, most of the sentencing which took.place was
done at the discretion of the court.

Thieves were the more

severely punished of the two, but that simply reflects the
belief that theft was a more serious offense.

Nevertheless,

none of New Haven's thieves were actually branded for their
initial offense as the law directed.

The stiff penalties

were written into the codes so magistrates could punish
"incorrigible" thieves accordingly.
with other crimes as well.

And the same was true

As it turns out,

sanctions such as branding, banishment,

and execution were

reserved for those considered truly deviant.
delinquents were fined, whipped,

New Haven's

and stocked precisely be

cause it was felt they could be "reclaimed."
few, like Mrs.

extreme

Perhaps a

Fancy, would later be excluded for deviance,
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but most retained their membership in the community.
The same flexibility and discretion that marked the
sentencing of youthful tipplers and thieves also was used
to control the growth of "uncleanness" in New Haven.
In the shadowy years of pre-code law in Massachusetts,
Thomas Shepard wrote to John Winthrop and asked the governor
to make a law "for the punishing of that sin w h i c h . .. will
soon poison these societies."
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Shepard was referring to

the "sin of fornication" and his concern would be echoed by
Connecticut

officials a quarter of a century later.

1676, society was not

poisoned. True, King Philip's

Yet

in

War

was

interpreted as having been a sign of God's displeasure with
His chosen people.

Church membership and religiosity in

general had

declined. And most of the architects of the

England Way

had died.Society had

it was far from poisoned.

New

changed, but, to repeat,

Towns continued to be founded

and older settlements continued to expand.

People seemed

quite comfortable with their ever broadening economic
horizons.
tutions.

And families still remained viable social insti
Although fornication was clearly on the increase

in the waning years of the seventeenth century, Shepard's
gloomy prophecy was inaccurate.
Indeed,

in 1642 and 1676, two years known for remon

strances against pre-marital sexual intercourse, prosecu
tions in New Haven were infrequent.

In fact, the first

and fourth decades combined accounted for but 10 or 12% of
the 79 appearances made for fornication between 1639 and
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1698 (Figure 4.4).

These decades represented,

in the

scheme of a rather unequal distribution of fornication
cases, periods of calm before two storms.

Following the

initial ten years of settlement, when 6 or 7%, of the cases
were heard, there was a steady increase in prosecutions
which appears to have been tied to the sexual exploits
the rising second generation.

of

In the decade from 1658 to

1668 when the settler's first born were entering their
twenties,

nearly a quarter (24%) of all the prosecutions

for illegal copulation were made.

Then, almost as suddenly

as they rose, prosecutions dropped to a scant four (5%) in
the decade ending in 1678 and seven (9%) in the next ten
years.

Then, even more precipitously than they rose in the

1660s, prosecutions climbed to a staggering degree in the
1690s when 36 or 45% of the cases heard for the entire cen
tury were prosecuted.
coming of age.

Quite simply,

another generation was
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Although this increase in fornication by the third gen
eration may have shocked some of Connecticut's conservative
divines and lawmakers, there were undoubtedly many parents
and masters who took the misconduct in stride.

In fact,

many had experienced similar behavior when they were coming
of age in the 1650s and 1660s; the third generation did not
invent pre-marital sex.
the two generations,

If there was one difference between

it lay with increased incidences of

pre-marital pregnancy with the third.

Second generation

young adults whose sexual misconduct led to pregnancy were
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punished by the courts and then "enjoined to marriage."
With the third generation, most cases were discovered
through the birth of a child who was conceived some months
prior to marriage.

Moreover,

voluntary marriage of couples

who intended to marry from the outset had become commonplace.
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Most scholars now believe that increased promis

cuity was difficult to regulate and as such came to be gen
erally accepted.

Indeed,

as David Flaherty has noted,

late

seventeenth-century delinquents came to be viewed "with a
mixture of tolerance,

amusement,

and titillation."
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The best test of this tolerance lies not in the occa
sional lamentations of ministers and colony officials, but
in the sentences that convicted fornicators received.
tween 1639 and 1698,

Be

71 individuals were responsible for

79 appearances before authorities.

Slightly over half of

the group (38) were non-recidivists.

Thirty-three had

violated other local or colony statutes in addition to
committing fornication.

But only six of these recidivists

had prior records of sexual mis co nd uc t .

Perhaps some of

these, like Thomas Badger who had been severely punished
before his fornication trial for "defiling himself by
divers unclean passages with one of his master's children
not above six years of age," were excluded for deviance
at the time of their second offense.
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However,

none of

the six appeared for sexual misbehavior more than twice;
there were no overt career sexual offenders in New Haven.
As such, there was little distinction between punishments
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recidivists and non-recidivists received.

As in the case

of alcohol abuse and t h e f t , magistrates assessed each case
individually and made use of discretion when sentencing
offenders.

By law, this meant that authotities could, with

the exception of death, punish delinquents as they saw fit.
Overall,
tions.
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whippings,

96% of the appearances resulted in convic-

Of the 70 punishments meted out, 23 (33%) were
43 (61%) were fines, and four (6%) included
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other forms of p u n is hm en t, such as child s up po rt .

A pair

of cases typifies the trend in sanctions over the course of
the century.

In 1652 Robert and Susan Meaker were presented

for a "high breach of the law of God,

in committing fornica

tion, defiling one another before marriage."
convicted and ordered to be whipped.
in 1674, Robert Augur,

The pair was

Twenty-two years later, .

the nephew of a local physician,

and

his wife Mary, the 23 year old daughter of magistrate Matthew
Gilbert, were convicted by their own confession of fornica
tion prior to marriage.
was ordered to pay a

For their misconduct,

£5 fine.
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the couple

Significantly,

the provi

sion for punishment was the same in each of the cases.
What had changed was the attitude of officials regarding
the seriousness of the offense.
about unrighteousness;
unceremoniously.

the Augurs were tried and convicted

And so it was with most second and third

generation offenders.
the whippings occurred.
in 1692 when Cush,

Gone by 1674 was rhetoric

Indeed, prior to 1669, 21 or 91% of
Only on rare occasions,

such as

a Negro servant of Richard Rosewell who
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was whipped at the "place of execution" for fornicating
with a white woman (who went unpunished), was corporal punishment used.
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Conversely,

only six or 14% of the fines

were handed out prior to 1669.

Furthermore,

those that

were levied in the early years of settlement tended to in
volve special circumstances.
was fined

For example, Rebecca Turner

£10 in 1649 for fornicating with Thomas Meaks.

She escaped a whipping only because a mid-wife testified
that she had "sore breasts and a forward child."
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Over

time, punishments like those inflicted upon the Meakers
declined, while those received by couples like the Augurs
rose.
In part, this is explained by changing values.

But it

is also explained by the fact that most fornicators in the
last half of the century were descendants of the original
"pillars" of New Haven.

Few servants or members of other

minorities were presented.
cuted.

Cush was the only Negro prose

And although Margret Trowbridge and Mary Butler were

both fined 40s in 1691 for fornicating,

their mutual partner

Robin, a "wicked Indian" who ran away, went unpunished.
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Robin was the only Indian accused of fornication; both he
and Cush were atypical offenders.

Most were young, white

sons and daughters of permanent residents.

Forty-one of

the 71 fornicators were males whose average age at their
trial (N=13) was 25.

Their 30 female counterparts tended

to be three years younger (N=ll).

In other words,

they

were, like delinquent drinkers and t h e i v e s , well known
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fixtures in the community who generally appeared before
authorities on one occasion for morals violations.

They

also tended to be in their mid-twenties, white, and un
married at the time their crime was committed.

And the

punishments these delinquents received were mild.

Impor

tantly, these were determined at the discretion of the
court.

If delinquency had been a true problem,

would have been punished severely.
late in the century especially,

offenders

But they were not.

By

the severity and rhetorical

expostulations associated with trials in the early years
had vanished.

Officials had come to accept with reluctance

the realization that morality could not be legislated and
the increased use of mild sentencing bears testimony to the
change in attitude.

Chronicling changing attitudes about morality is a dif
ficult task at best.

What is considered moral to one

group or even subgroup at a given point in time varies con
siderably.

The ideals and values of the Davenport house

hold serves as an example.

John Davenport,

the author of

the Fundamental Agreement and numerous sermons intended to
guide the youth of New Haven along the path of righteous
ness, had a concept of morality and obligation that un
doubtedly differed from that of his maid servant Hester
Clark, who considered it acceptable to ride off into the
night with Isaac Moline to savor fruits of the flesh.

It

also differed from that of his servant Edmund Tooly, who
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participated in a "drunken gathering" for which he was
fined.

Davenport’s servants were,

like other young adults,

passing through a stage of life that was understood to inelude a variety of temptations associated with coming of
age.

That different notions of morality could exist within

the confines of a single household serves as a reminder
that great variation must have existed in a large community
over the course of a century.

Moreover,

if Davenport could

not influence those under his roof enough to prevent them
from engaging in delinquent conduct, how could authorities
of the town or colony expect to be more successful?
In all probability they were not.

Basically,

all they

could do was hope that violations of moral statutes did
not get out of hand.
adult population

Although most of New Haven's young

appears to have never compromised the

moral order, there was a small group of delinquents who
did.

Members of this group did things like drink exces

sively, pilfer watermelons,
intercourse.

and enjoy pre-marital sexual

These were individuals who for some reason

temporarily rejected the moral values and obligations
taught to them by their parents and masters.

Their be

havior took them beyond the bounds of the basic unit of
social control— the family— and placed them in a setting
where they had to answer to God's vice-regents, who were
required by their covenant with Him and by law to punish
offenders.

In realistic terms, what could magistrates

really do?

Whip all thieves and fornicE;ors?

Stock all
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drunks?

Should they punish young people excessively for

what amounted in actual practice to a single moral lapse?
Given the rhetoric of the puritans we half expect that
they would.

And indeed on occasion they did.

Yet while

all delinquent conduct was frowned upon by authorities,
most offenders received mild penalties.

Eighty-three per

cent of the alcohol abusers were punished by fines.
fornication and theft,
spectively.

For

the figures were 61% and 29% re

These varying percentages reflect the differ

ent types of penalties required by law, as well as their
interpretation and application by magistrates who used dis
cretion constantly.

Magisterial discretion was a central

feature of the social control apparatus because it permit
ted rulers to assess each case on an individual basis,

to

punish the "youth of honest conversation" differently from
an "old notorious lyar."

It is this kind of flexibility

which allowed magistrates to punish delinquents one way and
perceived deviants in an entirely different fashion,
society of individuals like John Knight,

to rid

but continue to

embrace younsters like John Frost, Esborn Wakeman,

and

Samuel Miles.
Although over time magistrates did little to stem the
flow of delinquent behavior,

they nevertheless vigorously

screened out people whose conduct and character went be
yond the limits of simple delinquency.

Exclusion for de

viance was an effective means of controlling serious
breaches of the moral order,

even though it was used
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sparingly.

The town's most notorious criminals underwent

well-attended trials which became showcases within which
the basic values of the community were periodically put on
display.

Some of the known deviants were,

or George Spencer,

like John Knight

excluded for unnatural sexual misconduct.

But there were others,

like Humphrey Norton, whose reli

gious and political views were so damaging that he war
ranted branding and banishment.
about their misdeeds,

Although we know little

still others,

like the Hunts or

Edward Woodcliff, must have behaved so poorly that they
too merited special sanctions.

When it occurred,

exclusion

was useful because it punished deviants for their crimes
and protected more God-fearing members of the community
from their "baneful influence."
But most of those who violated colony laws were by no
means considered deviant.

Evidence of overt exclusion is

so slight that it would not be inaccurate to estimate New
Haven's deviant population at less than 50.

Although

there must have been deviants who stole and fornicated
contrary to law, most offenders who seemed to compromise
the moral order were young people reared in New Haven who
at one point in their lives temporarily "fell from grace."
Using alcohol abusers,

thieves,

and fornicators— in all

50% of those who violated colony statutes— as a base,

it

is clear that they were predominantly unmarried white
males in their early-to-mid twenties.

These delinquents

differed from those who contravened local bylaws,

for the
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petty offenders of Chapter 3 were more numerous,
ten years older,

and married;

typically

they had already passed

through the stage of life that produced most delinquent
behavior.

However,

shared in common:

there is something that both groups
they all tended to be "insiders" who

retained membership in the community.

This was also a

trait common to individuals who contentiously dragged
their neighbors into court to settle civil disputes— someting that forced authorities to address an altogether dif
ferent threat to order.
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CHAPTER IV
NOTES
1.

For Knight's military disobedience see New Haven R e c o r d s ,
I, 487 and 477; for the drinking, Town Re c o r d s , I, 56.
The records of his trial for abusing the Hall children
are no longer extant (complete colony records begin in
1653), but his previous exploits were highlighted in the
May session of the court which is found in New Haven
Records, II, 137-138.

2.

The proceedings of this case were omitted from Town
R ec ords, I, because they contained material "undesirable
for publication" (n., 136), but can be consulted in the
original Town Records, I, 101-102.
In his study of homo
sexuality Robert F. Oaks suggested that sodomy was more
widespread than previously thought.
That some of these
cases were handled privately and therefore never reached
even manuscript records adds credence to O a k s ' hypothe
sis.
See "'Things Fearful to Name':
Sodomy and Buggery
in Seventeenth-Century New England," Journal of Social
History (Winter, 1978), 268-281, 268-272.

3.

For M i l e s ’ 1672 appearance see County Court Records, I,
55 and 58.
For Frost's subsequent trials, New Haven
Records, II., 169-171 and 466-467, plus omitted portions
in New Haven Records, II, 328-332.
As a post-script to
lawmaking in New Haven it is worth mentioning that the
first arson laws were written immediately following
Frost's trial in 1656.

4.

See, respectively, provisions in the Ludlow Code, Con
necticut R e c o r d s , I, 515 and then 77, in the Eaton Code,
New Haven L a w s , 19, and in the Connecticut Code of 1673,
Connecticut L a w s , 83.

5.

As noted earlier, Samuel was the son of Richard Miles, a
deacon, deputy to the General Court and town selectman.
Esborn was the nephew of John Wakeman, also a deputy and
at one time, the town treasurer.
Frost was the servant
of community stand-out William Gibbard, a deputy and
selectman who may have been entrusted with the care of
the youth by a George Frost who returned to England in
the 1640s.

6.

In the years 1639-1698 a total of 1438 appearances were
made.
The overwhelming majority (62%) was for petty
crime— the context and importance of which was discussed
in Chapter 3.
Although considered important, the moral
order, judging from colony infractions (38%) seems to
have been threatened less than previously thought..
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7.

New Haven Re c o r d s , I, 113, for the jurisdiction of the
Plantation Court; Connecticut R ec o r d s , II, 25 and 108
for the County and Commissioners' Courts respectively.

8.

Some proceedings of the colony between 1643 and 1653
appear in New Haven R e co rd s, I.
More than likely the
number of residents haled before the Magistrates'
Court during this period, and thus unknown, was small.
The reason is twofold.
First, in the 12 year period
beginning in 1653 only four individuals appeared before
the court for violating colony laws.
Second, if cases
were serious enough to reach the Magistrates' Court, it
was not uncommon for them to be mentioned in other sets
of records.

9.

Punishment for profaning the Sabbath was rather broad,
including fine, imprisonment, whipping, and death.
The
provision for death, however, was deleted from the Con
necticut Code of 1673.
See New Haven L a w s , 47; and Con
necticut L a w s , 132.

10.

Evidently they burned part of someone's fence; County
Court Records, I, 234.

11.

See New Haven Laws and Connecticut L a w s , 24-25 and 59
respect ively.

12.

County Court Records, I, 110.
Brooks' wife, the former
Mrs. Samuel Blakesley had her own troubles with the
court.
In 1673, two years prior to marrying Brooks and
at the time a widow, Hannah was convicted of "lacivious
carriages" with several people and of entertaining
youths at "unseasonable hours."
She received a £5, 10s
fine, but the court noted that she should have been
whipped but spared her because of her "frailty."
Ibi d.,
p. 72.
Brooks was also an indigent.
In 1686 after
being convicted for fighting, he was sentenced to pay a
40s fine and post a £10 bond.
Half of the fine was re
mitted because he could not pay it.
Brooks' persistent
misconduct led to fortfeiture of his bond; on this oc
casion he was whipped and the court ordered notices
prohibiting the sale of liquor to Brooks to be placed
on "public posts."
Ibi d., 162-164.

13.

Ibid. , 205.
It also appears that the court had quasi
admiralty jurisdiction because in 1671 William Collins
was convicted of drunkenness and disorderliness on
board the ship Recovery. Ibi d., 42.

14.

For the agreement see Ibid., 40-41; for the Halls, p.
58.
More can be found on the illusive subject of bonds
by consulting Paul Lermack, "Peace Bonds and Criminal
Justice in Colonial Philadelphia," Pennsylvania Magazine
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of History and B i o g r a p h y , C, (April, 1976), 173-191.
And for the acquittal, which was one of ten received
by those accused of violating colony statutes, see
County Court Records, I, 177.
15.

Town Records, II, 65-71.

16.

Connecticut L a w s , 126.

17.

Town Records,

18.

County Court Records,

19.

Ibid.,

20.

Parents themselves were sometimes "delinquent" because
they travelled away from home— sometimes for extended
periods— leaving children unsupervised.
Edmund Morgan
noted that occasionally this led to prosecution of
adults; Puritan Eamily 65-66.
The aftermath of similar
circumstances in New Haven illustrates why the practice
was frowned upon.
In 1666, Rebecca Potter, age 23 and
the daughter of a convicted bugger, was given permission
by her mother to house-sit for James Clark while he and
his wife were away.
She took care of the house, but 23
year old William Thorpe took care of her; nine months
later she gave birth of a "natural child."
Town Records
II, 184.

21.

For Hutchinson see Massachusetts R e co rd s , I, 207; for
the Browns, Ernest W. Baughman, "Excommunications and
Banishments from the First Church in Salem and the Town
of Salem, 1629-1680," Essex Institute Historical Collec
tions, 113 (April, 1979), 89-104, 91; for Partridge,
Bradford F. Swan, "Frontier Justice in Newport— 1652,"
Rhode Island H i s t o r y , 33 (February, 1974), 3-7; and for
Knight, New Haven R e c or ds , II, 137-138.

22.

Haskins, Law and Authority, p. 51.
Pre-emptive measures
like prohibitions on strangers can be seen in New Haven
and Dedham, to name just two communities.
See New Haven
R ecords, I, 40 and Lockridge, New England T o w n , 8-9.

23.

See Wayward Puritans,
170.

24.

"Puritan Criminals," 138.

25.

Wayward Pur it an s, 5-6.

26.

Guido Ruggiero, "Sexual Criminality in the Early Renais
sance:
Venice, 1338-1358," Journal of Social H i s t o r y ,
8 (Summer, 1975), 18-37, 18-19.
Even within Venice

II, 26-30.
II,

21.

I, 164.

165-166 and his rationale on 167-
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variations existed.
For instance, it was acceptable for
elites (who made the laws) to rape women of low social
standing, but unacceptable for a laborer to rape a
noblewoman.
27.

Erikson, Wayward P u r i ta ns , 7.

28.

See, for example, Arnold S. Linsky, "Who Shall be Ex
cluded:
The Influence of Personal Attributes in Com
munity Reaction to the Mentally 111," Social P s y c hi at ry ,
5 (1970), 166-171, and William A. Rushing, "Individual
Resources, Societal Reaction, and Hospital Commitment,"
American Journal of Sociology, 77 (1971), 511-526.
In
his study of Wiltshire, M.J. Ingram cited the "selective
bias" in favor of local residents.
Specifically consult
Table 3 (on indictments) in "Communities and Courts,"
132-133.

29.

James D. Or c u t t , "Societal Reaction and Response to Devi
ation in Small Groups," Social Forces, 52 (1964), 259266.

30.

Irving Piliavin and Scott Briar, "Police Encounters with
Juveniles," American Journal of Sociology, 70 (1964),
206-214.

31.

New Haven L a w s , 20.

32.

Jones, Congregational Commonwealth, 103.

33.

Randolph Trumbach, "London's Sodomites:
Homosexual
Behavior and Western Culture in the 18th Century,"
Journal of Social H i s t o r y , 11 (1977), 1-33, 11.
Also
see Caroline Bingham's analysis of "Seventeenth-Century
Attitudes Toward Deviant Sex," in Journal of Interdis
ciplinary H i s t o r y , I (1971), 447-472.

34.

Erikson, Wayward P u r i ta n s, 196-198; Foster, Their Soli
tary W a y , 31-35.

35.

Massachusetts Re c o r d s , I, 203.
During his bestiality
trial (in 1642) comments by Spencer place his arrival
in New England in either 1636 or 1637.
Spencer was
perhaps from Kempston, Bedfordshire, since he claimed
he knew a New Haven resident from that locale before
coming to the new world.

36.

One of those Spencer drew into the conspiracy was his
friend William Broomfield who was whipped and "ordered
to wear irons during the magistrate's pleasure."
A
month earlier, Broomfield, who apparently journeyed to
New Haven with Spencer, "was set in the stocks for pro
faning the L o r d ’s Day and stealing wine from his master
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which he drank and gave to others."
New Haven R e c o r d s ,
I, 28-29, and 31 for removal of the irons.
Broomfield
evidently left New Haven shortly thereafter and went to
Connecticut where he was convicted of "drunkenness and
striking a watchman" (in 1645) and was placed under a
£20 bond.
Connecticut R ec or ds , I, 130.
Some months
later a man was fined for "entertaining Broomfield."
That he should be referred to by his last name is signif
icant because this seems to have been reserved for unde
sirables.
Ibid., 135.
Indeed, prior to his trial for
sodomy, John Knight was identified by his surname.
See
New Haven R e c o r d s , I, 403.
37.

Unless otherwise noted, material from the Spencer case
is drawn from New Haven Records, I, 62-73.

38.

Similar "speeches" were made by other deviants prior to
their executions.
While Spencer's was only alluded to,
that of a Boston woman convicted of infanticide was more
complete; indeed it was published as a broadside.
See
The Declaration, Dying Warning and Advice of Rebekah
Chamblit (Boston, 1733).
Perhaps the most famous of
these was the confession of Esther Rogers, a 21 year old
executed for infanticide because of two illegitimate
births resulting from fornication with Negroes.
See
John Rogers, Death The Certain Wages of Sin (Boston, 1711).
A related account of such speeches is found in Ronald A.
Bosco, "Lectures at the Pillory:
The Early American Ex
ecution Sermon," American Q u ar t er ly , 30 (1978), 156-176.

39.

Repentance by all condemned criminals, but especially
felons was an important indication that the offender
acknowledged his transgressions of the moral standards
of the community and at the same time re-affirmed the
justice inherent in his punishment.
See Erikson, Way
ward P u r i t a n s , 195 and Lee, "Discretionary Justice,"
128-129.
New Haven authorities evidently consulted
Winthrop about possible sentences for Spencer.
See
Savage, e d . , Winthrop's J o u r n a l , II, 73.

40.

New Haven R e c o r d s ,II, 132-133.

41.

New Haven Records, II, 85-86.
The issue of both pene
tration and ejaculation was important in some criminal
cases.
In England a person could be convicted of sodomy
only if both could be proved with certainty— obviously a
difficult task, which is why authorities had to some
times settle on attempted sodomy which was easier to
prove, but which carried a less severe penalty.
Trumbach,
"London's Sodomites," 21.

42.

New Haven R e c o r d s , II, 440-443.
One aspect of exclusion
for deviance is that it makes others aware of collectively
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held values.
Erikson, Wayward P u r i t a n s , 4.
To author
ities, it might have appeared that Potter's continued
behavior in spite of previous executions for the same
offense reflected a repudiation of the "policies of
perfection."
43.

In 1656, on the advise of the New England Confederation,
New Haven passed a law prohibiting Quakfers from the
jurisdiction.
New Haven R e c o r d s , II, 217.

44.

George D. Langdon, J r . , Pilgrim C o l o n y : A History of
New Ply mo ut h, 1620-1691 (New Haven, 1966), 73.

45.

Quoted in Calder, New Haven C o l o n y , 96.
Norton's des
criptions are found in his New England's Ensign (London,
1656).
For more on Norton's views, consult Frederick B.
Tolies, "A Quaker's Case- Humphrey Norton to John
End ic ot t, 1658," Huntington Library Quarterly, 14 (1950),
415-421.

46.

Unless otherwise indicated, accounts of the trial pro
ceedings are found in Town R e c o r d s , I, 339-343.

47.

New Haven Colony,

48.

Erikson, Wayward P u r i t a n s , 127.

49.

New Haven R e c o r d s , I, 84.

50.

See Ibid. , 89 for the theft, and 233-239 for the subse
quent charges and trial proceedings.

51.

Ibid., 35.

52.

For more on the importance of boundaries see Erikson,
Wayward Puritans, 10-13.

53.

Connecticut Re c o r d s , II, 280-283.

54.

Ibid. , III, 148.

55.

See, respectively, Connecticut L a w s , 100, 81-82,
and New Haven L a w s , 32, 17-18, 37-39.

56.

Winthrop P a p e r s , IV, 474-475.

57.

New Haven Records,
II, 28-29.

58.

David Flaherty observed that relaxation in punishments
suggests growing acceptance by officials of certain
kinds of immoral conduct.
See "Law and Enforcement of
Morals in Early America," in Donald Fleming and Bernard

96.

108-110

I, 74-75 and County Court Records,

227
Bailyn eds., Perspectives in American History,
203-253, 229.
59.

V (1971),

The breakdown for Figure 4.2 is as follows:
Decade

no.

pet.

1648

29

27.4

1658

3

2.7

1668

25

23.7

1678

24

22.6

1688

16

15.2

1698

9

8.4

Totals

105

100

60.

New Haven Re cords, I, 306-307.

61.

Forty-nine individuals appeared for other non-alcohol
related offenses, leaving 31 whose single act of in
temperance accounted for their only court appearance.
One of the group of six who appeared three times before
1698 (Joseph Thomas) also appeared in 1700 and was
placed under a £20 bond.

62.

One of the females, Sarah Collins, was 20 and married
when she made her first appearance in 1670 and was
fined 10s.

63.

For the law see Connecticut R e co rd s, I, 534.
For the
convictions, Town R e c o r d s , II, 187.
Similar stepped
punishments existed in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts.
Consult Fitzroy, "Richard Crosby Goes to Court," 18,
and Lee, "Discretionary Justice," 122-123.

64

Thus 90% of the cases ended in convictions.
Nine cases
resulted in acquittals (1 ), postponements which were
never continued (2), were dropped (3), or were voluntary
appearances made to request the remission of previous
penalties (3).

65.

County Court Records,
I, 155 for the Indian, and New
Haven Re cords, I, 133 for the use of discretion.

66.

No stocking or whipping was used to punish delinquent
drinkers after 1668.

67.

The breakdown for Figure 4.3 is as follows:
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Decade

No.

Pet.

1648

16

21

1658

13

17

1668

16

21

1678

10

13. 5

1688

13

17

1698

8
Totals

10. 5

76

100

68 .

For the theft see New Haven R e c o r d s , I, 26, and for the
pilfering, County Court Records, I, 136.

69.

Seventy-three of the 76 appearances ended in convictions.
One case was postponed and never continued, there was
one acquittal, and one remission request.

70.

Forty percent of the punishments non-recidivists re
ceived (classified as "other") included stocking, pri
vate correction, and pure restitution.
Thirty percent
of the recidivists received similar sentences.
Only
one of the group, Andrew Low Jr., was a career thief
and it is possible that he was excluded for deviance.
His repeated acts of theft (4) caused him to be placed
in chains with a lock and to be severely whipped.
He
evidently left New Haven by 1650.
See New Haven Records,
I, 46, 56, 89-90.

71.

"Thomas Shepard to John Winthrop.,
IV 345-346.

72.

The breakdown for Figure 4.4 is as follows:

1642," Winthrop Papers,

Pet.

Decade

No.

1648

6

7.6

1658

7

9

1668

19

24

1678

4

5.1

1688

7

9

1698

36
Totals

79

45. 3
100

229
73.

For more on pre-marital pregnancy consult Smith and
Hindus, "Premarital Pregnancy in America."

74.

"Law and the Enforcement of Morals," 236.

75.

New Haven R e c o r d s , I, 61.

76.

There were seven postponements and two remission requests.

77.

Of the 43 "fines," 14 or 32% were fines to which was
linked the proviso that the offender could be whipped if
he could not come up with the necessary cash.

78.

Town Records,
81.

79.

County Court Records,

80.

New Haven Records,

81.

County Court Records,

I, 124-125, and County Court

I, 203.

I, 471.
I, 194.

Records,

I,

CHAPTER V
CHALLENGES TO SOCIAL
H A R M O N Y : CONTENTION
At a session of the Plantation Court held in December of
1645, "Hannah Marsh complained that Mr. Brewster called [her
a] Billingsgate slut,
to play the slut."

and that she was sent for on shipboard

Brewster's remarks referred to a voyage

from Massachusetts to New Haven during which Hannah had al
legedly been very "forward" and the "cause of much contention
and unrighteousness."

Although not specified in the records

as such, the issue raised in Marsh's complaint was slander—
the cause of 53 similar private disputes heard by local or
colony authorities during the seventeenth century.

Marsh

initiated her suit because she desired the "repair of her
reputation;" in the end, Brewster publically acknowledged
that he was "sorry he spoke rashly,

and that he intended no

such charge against her."”'"
Presumably Hannah Marsh was satisfied with Brewster's
apology.

There is no indication in extant records that

their conflict was continued in subsequent sessions of the
court.

Local officials had done their part in resolving

the contentious situation.

Yet differences between indi

viduals like Marsh and Brewster were a pervasive fact of
life in early New Haven.

Within months of the settling of

government, Humphrey Spinnage and Thomas Saulle had appeared
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in court and requested local officials to settle a dispute.
Their action was the first of 370 civil suits recorded be
tween 1639 and 1701.

Whether or not this is an indication

that "by nature the puritans were prone to litigiousness,"
or that dragging one's neighbor to court "was a favorite
2
form of indoor sport," remains to be seen.
At the very
least it suggests that civil disputes were plentiful and,
by implication,

that if left unchecked,

threatened to com

promise harmony in the well-ordered community.
There can be little doubt about the divisive aspects
of litigation.

The act of entering a complaint is prima

facie evidence of discord; plaintiffs sue defendants because
they feel that somehow they have been wronged.

Every civil

action, whether centering on replevin or defamation,

had the

potential for drawing in others and disrupting social har
mony.

Indeed,

it is quite possible that a bitter civil suit

promoted more disorder than any single

act

of deviance,

bestiality, which in effect was a victimless crime.

like

But

notwithstanding the contention associated with litigation,
it is possible that the process of resolving private dis
putes in court was a means of securing tranquility in the
long run.
Recent scholarship on litigation suggests that this was
one of its principal functions.
sachusetts,

for example,

In eighteenth-century Mas

civil actions were encouraged as a

way of settling private controversies before they led to
violent confrontations between disputants.

A similar position
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has been taken relative to litigation in early modern En
gland where an increase in the number of lawsuits is believed
to have "balanced a decline in the incidence and social ac
ceptability of violence,

and marked an important step to

wards a more peaceful and settled society."

Closer to home,

David Thomas Konig has emphasized that litigation in Essex
County Massachusetts was a "useful agent of orderly and de
sirable social change," and that it reaffirmed the values
and social norms of the well-ordered community.

Thus, while

it is accurate to say that civil suits were sources of ten
sion and disharmony,
promoted order.

it is conceivable that litigation also

3

Despite explicit recognition of this paradox by scholars,
our acquisition of specific knowledge about the quantity,
context,

and resolution of private disputes is minimal.

In

order to assess the role litigation played within the local
community we must ask questions about the distribution of
lawsuits over time and the kinds of controversies which
arose.

What,

if anything,

do these reveal about the role

litigation played in promoting order?

Because the process

of filing a suit was linked to law and legal procedure in
general we need to know more about the resources litigants
had at their disposal to pursue their interests in court.
Furthermore,

it may well be appropriate to try and discover

if there was a relationship between private controversy and
the evolution of law in the community.

Is there evidence

that litigation was in fact a "useful agent" of social
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change?

If so, this might have some bearing on the way

disputes were resolved.

Indeed,

it may well be that changes

in the process by which cases were concluded can shed light
on the attitudes of rising generations,

just as earlier a

softening in the punishment for fornication indicated a new
perspective on morality.

Finally, the context of certain

kinds of disputes should be examined.

Is there an indication,

for instance, that slander suits were a means of venting
pent up aggression,
locales?

4

as seems to have been the case in other

If so, how effectively were authorities able to

control these potentially divisive situations?

Only by

first identifying and assessing these fundamental details
about litigation can broad determinations be made about its
relationship to order in early New Haven.

If the rhetoric of New Haven's "pillars" and the archi
tects of the New England Way in general had been embraced
faithfully,

there would have been little need to resolve

private disputes through law; residents would have been so
righteous and "charitable" in their relations with one
another that contention would have been non-existent.

Al

though the founders of New Haven hoped that their Wilderness
Zion could escape the kinds of disorders they had witnessed
in England and Massachusetts, they were pragmatic enough to
empower magistrates to preside over criminal and civil
cases when they did arise.

Most of the cases which came to

their attention were criminal in nature.

But between 1640
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and 1699, officials did end up hearing 359 private disputes.
As proved to be the case with criminal offenses, the over
whelming majority (216 or 60%) were handled by local author
ities.

Nearly all were heard in the Plantation Court prior

to the absorption by Connecticut and the judicial reorgan
ization giving birth to the County Courts in 1666.

From

that point on, civil causes ordinarily were entered in ses
sions of the County Court,

although minor grievances were
5
adjudicated in the Commissioners' Courts.
It seems appropriate that lawsuits were resolved pri
marily on the local level since 95% of the cases involved
New Ilaven residents.

Only a handful of private disputes

(18 or 5%) were filed by outsiders exclusively.

Quite sim

ply, controversies like the issue of debt in 1644 between
Virginians Richard Catchman and Thomas Hart were heard in
New Haven on only the rarest of occasions.

For the most

part, contention arose between local residents like Marsh
and Brewster (239 or 66.5%).

An additional 102 suits

(28.5%) involved at least one New Havenite with one or more
non-residents, as exemplified in a controversy in 1652 when
James Rogers of Milford sued John Charles for "carrying" his
servant to "Long Island, by which means he was suffered
great damage."

Most of these cases of split residence (75%)

were similar insofar as they centered on economic issues
like debt, replevin,

and unspecified damages.

Once people filed their suits one of two things gener
ally happened.

Either their cases were resolved through a
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specific decision for the plaintiff or defendant,
one of a variety of reasons,
conclusion.

or,

for

their cases never reached a

For those that did, the favorable verdict

Christopher Todd received in 1665 when he sued Cornelius
g

Williamson for debt on two bushels of meal was typical;
plaintiffs won 195 (85%) of the 229 completed cases.

In

dividuals who initiated actions tended to be better pre
pared with evidence that would stand up in court,

had attor

ney-like representatives to plead their cases, or presented
more reliable witnesses.

Preparation like this,

did not always guarantee a victory.

Indeed,

the cases ended in favor of defendants.

however,

34 or 15% of

In 1650, for ex

ample, Jeremiah How sued a resident of Southampton,
Island for debt.

Long

How was unable to prove the £5 debt he was

seeking to recover and as a result local officials awarded
the Connecticut man 20s in damages (for the cost of his
journey to New Haven) and ordered How to pay court charges.

9

Although 229 of the 318 cases with known resolutions led
to a ruling, just over a quarter of the total remained un
finished in the sense that there was no known settlement.
The reasons for this varied.

In some instances,

such as the

dispute between Spinnage and Saulle in 1639, no explanations
are given.

On other occasions,

cases were non-suited be

cause plaintiffs failed to appear in court to prosecute
their cases.

That is what happened in 1686 after Nathan

Tuttle had warrants served on fence viewers Samuel Munson
and Jeremiah How Jr.

"for neglecting their work to his great
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damage."1^

Still others,

like a 1659 case of debt between

another member of the Tuttle family and one of the Atwater
brothers, w-,re officially "withdrawn" after the pleading of
the case by the plaintiff, who then ordinarily had to bear
the court costs associated with the case.1'1'

A handful of

other cases were dropped for unknown reasons, were postponed
and never continued,

or were thrown out of court because at

the time of the initial pleading authorities ordered the lit
igants to seek private resolutions by "advising them to get
some friends to help issue it between them so that they may
live in neighborly love together."

12

Although the details

concerning the ultimate resolution of these 89 "unfinished"
cases are lacking,

it is quite probable that they were set

tled to the satisfaction of both parties.
The 359 cases entered in the records between 1640 and
1699 were distributed unequally in time (Figure 5.1).

Over

the course of the century there was a downward trend in the
percentage of cases that appear in extant records.

The pe 

riod of greatest contention occurred in the early stages of
settlement when laws, economic relations,

and physical or

ganization in the community were still ill-defined.
first decade of the town's existence,
civil suits were filed;

In the

100 or 28% of all

for the second ten years the fig

ures were 74 and 21% respectively.
some of the earliest lawsuits,

As will be seen shortly,

like Meiggs v. Gregory (1647),

had a bearing on the evolution of law in New Haven and
hence the overall effort to create social stability.
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Following this initial flurry of private disputes,

the

number of cases dropped off steadily for the next decade
and a half, reaching a near low of but one case in 1661.
The overall decline in cases continued until the last years
of the century.
moral offenses,

Thereafter,

however, as was so with certain

like fornication,

the number of cases in

creased to 66 or 18% during the 1690s.
The distribution depicted in Figure 5.1 is probably ac
curate.

Indeed,

it bears similarities to the highs and lows

seen in the distributions of local and colony infractions.
But as was true with these earlier representations,
cautions must be noted.

certain

Three are particularly noteworthy

because they may have an affect on our conception of the
way lawsuits were distributed.
First,

it is clear that cases were being heard in offi

cial capacities that also went unrecorded.

Occasionally the

County Court records include references to cases that had
been tried originally in the discretionary Commissioners'
Courts,

for which no records remain.

In 1700, for example,

Thomas Wilmot appealed a previous judgement at a session of
the County Court so that "it might be tried by a jury."

A

few years earlier, Joseph Baldwin appealed the ruling in a
debt case heard at "an inferior court held at New Haven."
Perhaps each man did so with good reason, because in both
instances the initial judgements were overturned.

13

Ref

erences like these indicate that private disputes were
heard on the local level after 1666, but were not being
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Figure 5.1
Percent Distribution of Civil Suits in
New Haven,
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recorded.
A second reason for suspecting that some controversies
never found their way into official records relates to the
informal process of resolving disputes known as arbitration.
This out-of-court method of ironing out wrinkles in private
relations was encouraged greatly in the early years of set
tlement.

Normally disputants pleaded their causes in formal

court sessions and a ruling would be made by magistrates or
the case referred to arbitration.

This procedure insured

that the action was recorded, although the outcome of many
arbitrated cases in unknown.

However, there were also in

stances where this practice was not followed; cases were re
ferred to arbitration directly and never appeared in formal
court records.

For instance,.in March of 1667 John Hall

Jr., sued William Bradly "for unjust detaining of an award
given in arbitration."
respects.

First,

Their case is suggestive in two

the original arbitration had not been re

corded, hence had Bradly paid Hall as stipulated there would
have been no record of the case.

Secondly, the fact that

the case was mentioned only after the original attempt at
arbitration failed hints that this method of non-binding
conflict resolution was not especially effective.

14

Finally, the regime of Sir Edmund Andros may have had
an affect on the number of suits filed in the late 1680s.
Between 1687, when Connecticut was incorporated into the
Dominion,

and 1689, when it was overthrown, only three

civil actions were reported.

A comprehensive reorganization
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of the judiciary took place once the Dominion had been es
tablished and Andros traveled to Hartford in November of 1688
to order the County Courts dissolved.

They were replaced

by Quarter Sessions, which met sparingly before the Dominion
fell.

During that period no litigation was undertaken by

New Haven residents.

Based upon his analysis of Essex

County, David Konig has posited the theory that colonists
consciously "suppressed" their conflicts because the Domin
ion courts and the use of common law threatened their "accustomed system of determining title to land."

15

Whether

similar circumstances account for the absence of civil ac
tions in Connecticut courts is, lacking more explicit evi
dence, pure conjecture.

The reorganization nevertheless

may have had an affect on the general distribution and for
this reason is worth noting.
In the final analysis there is no way of knowing how
many lawsuits went unrecorded because they were heard in
Commissioners'

Courts or were arbitrated independently of

the formal court structure.

Yet it is reasonable to con

clude that many of these unrecoverable cases were similar
in content to the other 359 disputes filed between 1640 and
1699.

Indeed,

the appeals from inferior courts and the

case of arbitration just cited centered on the issue of
debt.

This is hardly surprising since most of New Haven's

lawsuits arose over economic considerations (Table 5.1).
Heading the list was d e b t , the source of 118 or 33% of
the cases.

Throughout the century references like "John
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Cooper entered an^ action of debt against Mr. Allerton"
abound in source materials.

16

But there were also a number

of tangential causes that were linked to the economic life
of the community.

Replevin, which accounted for 64 or 18%

of the cases, was one of these.

In 1652 Henry Morill sued

two keepers of the herds for temporarily losing
his cow.

track of

The damages he sought to recover were for "two

days time he spent to seek her, beside the loss of milk."
Morill felt the keepers "owed" him for his economic losses
and the court agreed; he was awarded 3s 4d for his two days
work, 12d for his milk he lost," and court charges amounting
to 4s.

17

Similarly,

cases of nonfeasance tended to be filed

because plaintiffs suffered monetary losses.

When Richard

Beach was sued in 1642 for "not performing covenant in the
work which he undertook to do at the mill" authorities
ruled that "he should make good the damage."

18

If all the

cases involving monetary losses are considered together,
they accounted for nearly three-quarters of the civil suits
filed in New Haven.

19

Although economic misfortune in one form or another may
have been the source of most of the civil disputes,
were others which tended to generate contention.
is an example.

Between 1640 and 1699,

amation or slander were filed.

there

Slander

54 actions of def

These represented 14% of

all lawsuits— by far the largest portion of non-economic
related cases.

Slander was a broad term which included in

stances of simple name calling in the heat of an argument
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but also embraced more serious and calculated remarks aimed
at damaging an individual's reputation.

It appears that

numerous slander suits grew out of neighborhood disputes,
as proved to be the case in 1666 when Peter Mallory sued
Elizabeth Hotchkiss because she claimed that the "work of
the Devil was done" at the plaintiff's house.

The court

ruled on behalf of Mallory and in an effort to stave off
related actions by residents of "the farms," advised all to
"live more quietly and peaceably for the future,
throuble the Court with anymore Vexatious suits."

and not

20

This

admonishment sheds light on the way slander suits in general
were regarded— that they were silly and often unnecessary.
For this reason both the New Haven and Connecticut colony
codes included provisions for punishing individuals who
capriciously dragged someone to court.

The laws, headed

"Damages Pretended" or "Vexatious Suits," warned that false
actions pretending "great damages or debts, to discredit,
trouble, or vex his,
a fine.

21

Ideally,

her, or [an] adversary," would lead to
the kind of contention generated in

Mallory v. Hotchkiss could be avoided if local residents
pursued the "policies of perfection" in their daily lives.
Failing that,

legal provisions incorporated into the codes

were aimed at discouraging suits of this nature.

Yet when

they did reach the formal setting of the court, officials
endeavored to resolve the controversies equitably so that
in the future,

disagreements between the same parties would

be less likely to occur.
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Table 5.1
Civil Actions in New Haven,
1640-1699

Act:- on

No.

Pet.

118

32.9

Replevin

64

17.8

Slander

54

14. 5

Nonfeasance

36

10

Unspecified Damages

22

6.1

Animal Damages

17

4.7

Unspecified Difference

15

4.2

Other

33

9.8

Debt

Totals

Sources:

359

100

New Haven R e co rd s, I 8s II; Town R e co rd s , I & II;

County Court Records,

I & II; Court of Assistants Records,
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In addition to debt, replevin, and slander,

there were

other lawsuits which arose in New Haven over the course of
the century.
however,

None of these occurred with great frequency,

and therefore they tend to reveal something about

the kinds of disorders that in the main members of the com
munity successfully sidestepped— especially in light of con
troversies known to have existed in other locales.
Haven, for example,

In New

land boundary disputes were rare; there

were but 10 or 3% of the total number of cases recorded be
tween 1640 and 1699.

In contrast, property litigation was

pervasive in Essex County, Massachusetts communities.

22

Trespass, which accounted for nearly 7% of the cases in
Newtown, on Long Island, was the object of litigation on but
six occasions.

23

As was true with other categories of lit

igation, trespass could take a variety of forms.

One of

the most bizarre cases of trespass occurred in 1668 when
William Edwards of Hartford sued New Havenite Joseph Baldwin
for fornicating with his daughter-in-law.
poned several times,
evidence.

24

Finally,

After being post

the case was dropped because of lack of
there were a handful (5 cases) of

what was called extortion but could be better described as
unrighteous business practices.

When a Mrs. Pembroke

brought suit against Joseph Dormer in 1693,

it was because

he had cheated her on a business transaction:

the pound of

beeswax he sold her was later found to contain a stone embedded in its center.

25

If the lack of cases citing shop

keepers and merchants with fruadulent dealings is any
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indication, then it would appear that transactions were
generally conducted in an above-board fashion.

Filing a civil action was basically very easy,

although

rules bearing upon pleading cases were increased over time.
Prior to the publication of the Eaton Code in 1656 there
were few procedures relating to litigation.

Initially all

an individual had to do was complain to authorities,

the

way Hannah Marsh did, and a case could be heard to decide
"differences that may arise."

Within a few years of settle

ment a system of set fees was established to pay the marshal
for every warrant or attachment he issued.

The first ex

plicit statement of jurisdiction was made in 1643 when the
New Haven Colony was formed.

At that juncture it was offi

cially noted that Plantation Courts could hear all civil
causes which did not exceed £20 in damages.

Suits for

damages higher than that amount were reserved for the Magistrate's Courts.

26

That is where the procedures stood until the Eaton Code
was compiled.

Then it was specified that litigants had to

be at least 21 years of age and that filing fees totaling
10s were to be assessed to each plaintiff.
these were the only procedures.

Essentially,

Any adult with 10s could

file to have a difference resolved.
poor would not be prejudiced against,

However,

so that the

the code provided

for plaintiffs to sue "In forma p a u p er is ."

When the Con

necticut Code was published in 1673 the section on "Actions"
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was broadened somewhat to require "at least five days no
tice" to defendants to prepare their cases.

Costs were

also increased slightly and a section on "Small Causes"
was added setting a 40s ceiling on cases heard in Commis
sioners' Courts which.,had a filing fee of just 2s.

In all

courts the plaintiff retained the right to non-suit himself before a verdict was reached.

27

Overall there were seven provisions in the Eaton Code
and twelve in the Connecticut Code directly bearing on lit
igation.

Both codes reflect a verbatim borrowing from the

Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts in matters pertaining
to private law, although the Connecticut compilation did
have some different headings.

This is hardly surprising

given the fact that it was written a quarter of century
later.

For the most part all three codes included sections

relating to major categories of litigation.

Those portions

on "Bills and Specialties," stipulated what was considered
to be a "good debt."

In the case cited earlier where John

Cooper sued Isaac Allerton,

his principal evidence was "a

bill dated November 5, 1653" which the court judged valid
thereby enabling Cooper to win his case.

28

Other sections

of the codes dealt with actions ranging from "Replevry,"
whereby plaintiffs could "satisfy damage," to Suits Vexa
tious" and "Barratry," which were aimed at slanderers who
were predisposed to drag neighbors to court on the least
provocation.

Though limited, these procedures and rules

were included in the codes to help authorities resolve
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private controversies in an equitable fashion.

29

And the

codes were useful to litigants like Mary Osborne who was so
upset by an unfavorable verdict that she requested members
of the court to "consider of the law page 37" which em
powered justices to alter awards granted by juries.

On

this occasion her knowledge of the law worked to her advantage and the award was reduced.

30

While these provisions were formulated to establish
guidelines for civil actions,

litigation in turn played a

role in shaping criminal statutes and regulations which were
designed to promote order in the community.

Recall,

for a

moment, Meiggs v. G r e g o r y , where officials were confronted
by a novel set of circumstances which posed a threat to
order.

From Meiggs'

nonfeasance.

perspective,

the issue in his suit was

Yet as the details of the suit emerged,

cials realized that more was at stake.

offi

The larger question

of quality control and unrighteous business dealings cap
tured the attention of civil officials who perhaps came to
view Meiggs'

cause of assumpsit as secondary.

Although

they had encountered blatant violations of bylaws governing
weights and measures prior to 1647, Meiggs'

suit emphasized

the need to "branch out" still further through legislation
and to create an agency of control charged with the responsibility of inspecting shoes and leather.

31

In essence,

the suit played an important role in promoting order
through consumer legislation which was begun within months
of the case.

It also generated official inquiries into
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coopers gauges and the measures of other artisans.

Indeed,

as suggested at the close of Chapter 3, the suit may have
been responsible for the enforcement of weights and measures bylaws that cost Mrs. Gregson and company 12d each.

32

Most cases of nonfeasance did not have such a pro
nounced impact on the apparatus of social control in early
New Haven.

There were, however, other kinds of disputes

that did have a direct bearing on defining social order.
Certain debt or damage cases contributed to new legislation
and as such bore a relation to criminal prosecutions.

More

over, cases relating to crop damage caused by livestock in
the long run served to promote order.
As illustrated earlier relative to law and petty crime,
livestock control was a problem in New H a v e n .

Most of the

town's bylaws concerned the control of livestock and the
maintenance of fences.

And with the exception of the pros

ecution of military offenses,
lated more than any others.

these ordinances were vio
The height of enforcement oc

curred in 1649 and 1650 when 70 or 68% of the 102 livestock
violations were

prosecuted.

This in turn was preceded

two year period

beginning in 1647 when nearly a quarter of

the livestock control laws were passed.

by a

And, to add a

final bit of perspective to the context of livestock man
agement, it was

in the years 1644 and 1645 that 41% of

the

civil suits for

damages caused by animals were filed.

This

sequence of events— litigation,

legislation,

and enforce

m e n t - o c c u r r e d in a concentrated period of time and suggests
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that more than one cause and effect relationship may have
existed.
The decade between 1640, when the first order restrict
ing hogs in the neck was issued,

and 1650, when most of New

Haven's livestock violations took place, holds the key to
appreciating how these three elements of social control were
related.

For reasons outlined in previous chapters,

it ap

pears that local officials were slow to recognize and re
spond to problems associated with controlling livestock.
Although several orders were made in the early years of
settlement,
passed.

it was not until 1644 that the first bylaw was

And it was not until the position of public

pounder was instituted in 1648 that truly effective enforce
ment began.

Gradually,

officials realized that meaningful

measures of control had to be introduced into the community.
The realization came in the form of private controver
sies between friends and neighbors who suffered damages
caused by roaming animals.

In fact, the first of the 17

suits relating to livestock damage was heard in 1640,
month after the first orders were issued.

a

In a case lacking

details, the court determined that "Mr. Wilks shall pay 5
bushels and a half of Indian corn to Thomas Buckingham for
corn" destroyed by the defendant's hogs.

33

It would be

nearly two full years before the next suit was recorded,
but the issue was still the same:

John Owen "had some

damage done in his corn by hogs" through the neglect of a
group of residents who had not "made up their fence in
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season."

34

During this period a few orders were issued,

but it was not until 1644--five years after settlement—
that authorities began to take purposeful steps towards
stemming what was becoming a contentious situation.
The cause which set the social control apparatus into
more complete motion was filed by the gunsmith, Thomas
Nash,

in 1644.

Nash's complaint was made because he "suf

fered damage done in his corn to the value of nine bushels
by hogs in their quarter," or neighborhood.

Authorities

responded by ordering a committee to "view fences of the
said quarter" and assess damages on respective owners.
Recovering damages was one thing, but getting owners to
repair their fences "speedily" was another.

A few months

after his hearing Nash returned to court and requested
satisfaction for an additional twelve bushels that had
been ruined because quarter fences were either defective
or completely down.

Figuring in the blame was none other

than the Town because its fence "was not set up in time."

35

It appears that Nash's second appearance had a hand in con
vincing authorities of the need for a more effective means
of dealing with the problem.

Finally, rulers recognized

that the "plantation has been much exercised with hogs
destroying of corn."

All agreed that it was time to take

into "serious consideration how they might prevent the
like damage" in the future.

The solution lay, or so it

seemed, with appointing fence viewers for each of the
36
quarters.
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Ultimately, however,
to be ineffective.

these informal committees proved

Indeed, more suits for animal damage

were filed in the year following implementation of the com
mittees than at any point in the town's history.

After John

Walker brought suit against Thomas Morris in 1645, the mar
shal warned members of the quarters to "get the defective
fences mended."

37

Unfortunately, Thomas Kimberly's warning

did not exactly cause planters to run out and repair their
fences.

After all, at this point in time there were few

laws on the books capable of leading to prosecution for
failing to maintain fences.

Perhaps this is why Theophilus

Eaton had to report in 1648, that "many are discouraged
from the labor of husbandry, because their corn, when they
had sown.it,

is spoiled."

frustration, contention,
the problem,

Finally, after several years of
and informal attempts to resolve

authorities created the position of public

pounder and backed it with meaningful legislation.

38

It was immediately following the appointment of John
Cooper as pounder and the establishment of bylaws with
fixed penalties that the problem appears to have been con
trolled.

But it took the prosecution of negligent property

owners to insure conformity.
Cooper's appointment,

Indeed, within two years of

70% of all known violations of the

livestock control bylaws were prosecuted.
progression of events,

In light of this

the role litigation played in bring

ing a semblance of order to the community appears to have
been significant.

If, in fact,

litigation served to promote
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order and stability,

then a sizeable portion of the civil

suits stemming from animal damages should have occurred
prior to the passage of bylaws and the prosecution of of
fenders.

That is precisely what Figure 5.2 suggests.

Be

fore 1648, when the pounder was appointed and a quarter of
the livestock control laws were passed, nearly 60% of the
civil actions had been filed.

Conversely,

just 1% of the

violations had been prosecuted— a reflection of the fact
that there was little enforcement prior to 1648.

The clus

tering of violations in the three year period from 1648 to
1650 reflects both the formulation and enforcement of live
stock control ordinances.

In that period,

70 or 74% of the

95 violations prior to 1663 were prosecuted.
prosecutions dropped dramatically,
civil actions.

Furthermore,

Thereafter,

as did the percentage of

it has already been demonstrated

that criminal cases prosecuted after 1650 tended to result
in postponements or acquittals— an indication that the problem was being brought under control.

39

Although it appears that livestock control was less
troublesome by the 1650s, civil suits continued to be filed.
Yet even these point to a change from the causes heard in
the 1640s.

For instance,

in 1657 Edward Perkins sued a

Dutchman named Steendam for damages done to two acres of
peas.

The culprits were hogs who had squirmed through a

hole in the defendant's fence.

Steendam was aware of the

defects and had previously "agreed with men to make it new."
He therefore tried to pass the damages on to the workers.
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Figure 5.2
Percent Distribution of Livestock Litigation
and Petty Offenses,

1639-1662
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The court said no, awarded Perkins six bushels of peas plus
court costs,

and then told the defendant that "he may seek

remedy from those who were to do his fence and did n o t ." ^
Unlike the earlier suits which were characterized by bla
tant neglect or the complete absence of fences,

Steendam

had taken steps to have his repaired— an indication that he
was attempting to conform to the regulations.

Similarly,

testimony in a case from 1651 provides another hint that the
problem was being brought under control.

In a suit between

Thomas Powell and William Gibbard centering on the former's
corn crop which had been "eaten and spoiled," local fence
viewers played a primary role in determining damages in the
case.

It was through active participation by viewers who

were requested to decide if the damage was caused by hogs
or by cattle that a judgement on behalf of Powell was
reached.

41

The presence of the viewers indicates that the

livestock problem was being faced head-on.

Over time,

their role increased and in 1654 viewers (unlike those of
the 1640s) were ordered to take a public oath "to discharge
the trust committed to them."

42

By 1654 the circumstances surrounding the control of
livestock were different than they had been a decade ear
lier.

The legal basis for control had since been expanded,

with litigation playing a fundamental role in promoting
change.

In the early years of settlement most of the legal

activity associated with livestock control was manifested
in lawsuits for damages caused by animals.

Bylaws and their
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enforcement were non-existent.

By the fifties,

however,

many orders and local ordinances had been passed, offenders
were being prosecuted,

the pounder was a viable position of

authority, and the office of fence viewer had become insti
tutionalized.
First,

This change is suggestive on two counts.

it appears that certain civil actions served a func

tion by helping to bring physical order to the community.
Surely litigants did not file suits with this express goal
in mind; their immediate concern was to recoup monetary
losses.

Their suits,

however,

called to attention the need

to limit contention through legislation which became the
basis for punishing transgressors.

It may well have been

that penalizing petty offenders individually fostered sta
b i l i t y by limiting conflict between two or more parties.
Second, the fact that laws were passed and violators were
prosecuted suggests that institutionalization,

not good will

or utopian rhetoric, was needed to order livestock offenders
in New Haven.

Simply put,

individuals failed to meet their

obligations voluntarily and in response to this negligence,
law became a more pervasive force in the community.

This tendency for the town to become increasingly "in
stitutionalized," for it to rely less on informal procedures,
relates directly to another facet of conflict resolution in
New Haven— arbitration and its decline over time.

It was

suggested earlier that this informal method of resolving
private controversies was encouraged in the initial years

256
of settlement.
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And it was utilized heavily at first even

though it never came near to being the foremost means of
ending disputes.

Yet,

in 1645 when Richard Malbon sued a

Mr. Caffinch "for damage done in his corn.at several times,"
arbitration was employed.

Caffinch, who evidently had com

mon business interests with the plaintiff,
damage "came by defect of their own fence."

argued that the
Because offi

cials believed the case was "something dark," both parties
consented to allow the matter to be resolved by three indi
viduals who were to "view and arbitrate and determine" the
outcome of the case.

44

But almost as frequently as it was

used to iron out problems in the 1640s, references to dis
pleasure with this technique of resolving disputes surface
in records of the 1650s.

When Thomas Powell sued William

Gibbard in 1651, both parties were urged to submit their
difference to arbitration.
Gibbard declined.

Originally Powell agreed, but

Then, when the latter finally accepted

the proposal, the plaintiff refused;
might by issued by the Court,
trouble about it."

45

"He now desired it

[so] that he may have no more

Powell's remarks suggest that arbi

tration lacked the speed and authority associated with
court ordered decisions.

Although reasons for rejecting

arbitration undoubtedly varied,

it is clear from Figure

5.3 that over time it lost its appeal as a means of con
flict resolution.
The basic function of arbitration was to stiffle pri
vate disputes before they reached the public spotlight
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and, perhaps more importantly,

to allow disputants to have

a role in determining the outcome of the case.

In so doing

the spirit of compromise generated by participation in de
termining awards became a possible avenue for limiting fu
ture contention.

If the trend in New Haven is at all indi

cative of other locales, then the procedure was used most
extensively during the first 25 years of settlement in com
munities founded prior to 1650.

It was utilized in Boston

as an alternative to local and colony courts.

It was used

in Dedham, where it was presumably "an ephemeral but effec
tive" means of resolving debt and slander cases.

And it

was employed extensively in Essex County communities in an
effort to defuse contentious conduct in a peaceful and
loving fashion.

46

Arbitration was also used in England

where it was considered to be "of great importance in lim
iting bitterness and conflict" without resorting to formal
litigation.

47

In areas where it was used,

it appears that

restricting the scope of contention was the foremost aim of
arbitration.
Unfortunately,

our understanding of the nuts and bolts

of the process is fragmentary and therefore makes it diffi
cult to assert with confidence why this means of resolving
disputes was slowly phased out.

For example, we do not

know how most of the arbitrated cases were resolved;

any

number of the actions brought before the bench could have
originally been the subject of arbitration.

48

We do not

know with certainty how long it took the typical case
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submitted to arbitration to be resolved.

Nor do we know

precisely how binding were the awards given in arbitration.
In the case cited earlier, where John Hall sued William
Bradly, the issue might have been prompted by Bradly's re
fusal to take the arbitrators judgement seriously.

This

lack of knowledge about the procedure is odd, given the
important role it was supposed to have played in the cove
nanted communities of New England.
Nevertheless, we do know enough about the way the pro
cess worked to gain some appreciation of why it was useful.
Once "judicious men," "three indifferent neighbors," or
"friends" had been selected as mediators,

they reviewed the

circumstances of the case.

they could call

witnesses,

If necessary,

although formal legal procedures like serving

warrants probably were not used.

Finally,

the arbitrators

would sit down with the contending parties and "hammer out
a practical agreement on a give-and-take basis."

49

This

can be seen at least partly in the details of a case arbi
trated in Massachusetts in 1640.
The issue in the action was nonfeasance.

A Mr. Norton

was sued by his servant Richard Arresby for failing to ful
fill the terms of a contract.

The points in contention were

the date when A r r e s b y 's service began and monies spent by
him after his arrival in New England.

In essence, Norton

claimed that he offered Arresby 20 nobles annually (which
pleased him), that his "time" was to begin on August 10,
1639, and that he had not agreed to pay for Arresby's
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Figure 5.3
Arbitrated Cases in New
Haven,

1639-1662
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transportation from England.

Also entering into the case

was the status of A r r e s b y 's wife who had been a "charge and
to no benefit,

having nothing to do but milk cows."

Chosen

to arbitrate the case were Governor Winthrop and William
Tynge, who then listened to Arresby's side of the story.
In response to Norton's position,

Arresby argued that

his time was to have begun when he landed at Dorchester on
June 23, 1639.

In addition, he pleaded that his wife "was

entertained by Mr. Norton's consent," and that she had been
useful because she provided "diet" for Norton's workers and
and had made butter and cheese which she sent to Mrs.
Norton.

Finally, Arresby maintained that it was Norton's

responsibility to reimburse him for living expenses follow
ing his arrival.
Ultimately the arbitrators reached a decision suitable
to both parties.

Their agreement stipulated that Arresby's

time was considered to have started on July 1— something of
a compromise.

His wages "for himself and wife" were deter

mined to be £20 annually.

Norton was held responsible for

Arresby's expenses, but the costs of his passage were "set
against the money he disbursed for his wife,"—
by the plaintiff.

a concession

in the course of determining an equitable

solution to the case, Winthrop and Tynge addressed each of
the major issues in the action and "hammered out" an agreement to the apparent satisfaction of both disputants.
Few examples of arbitrated cases anywhere,
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including New

Haven, spell out the contending positions and final compromise
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as early as Arresby v. N o r t o n .

For New Haven, the most

precise information about an arbitrated action is contained
in a reference to an award granted to Thomas Pell in 1649
after he sued John Budd of Southold.

William Wells of

Southold and New Havenite Thomas Munson were chosen as ar
bitrators.
bedstead,

They determined that Pell was to receive a
"two lockes, some bags of wool, and some hoop-roots

and hoopoles."

In this particular instance, Pell was seeking

verification of the award so that he could enter the house
containing these items without having to worry about being
sued for trespass by its current occupants.
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Beyond this one example, details of arbitrated cases
are virtually non-existent.

Thus,

in addition to the fact

that arbitration declined over time,

about all that is

known in a concrete way is that the actions which were medi
ated were not restricted to one particular kind of cause.
Actions of relpevry were arbitrated,

as seen in the 1645

dispute between Nathaniel Turner and his servant over the
death of a cow "by default of the said John Hill in working
him contrary to his master's express command."
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So too

were actions of nonfeasance such as the one "depending be
tween Robert Seely and Daniel Paul" who agreed to have two
residents "arbitrate and determine as they shall see cause.'
Even cases of slander were occasionally put to arbitration,
which is what happened in 1654 when John Tompson sued
Seely because the latter reported that during a business
transaction the plaintiff behaved "dishonestly and in an

53

262

unjust way."
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The arbitration process was used to decide

a variety of causes including debt, trespass,
between outsiders,

like Catchman and Holt,

arising from damages caused by animals.

55

differences
and in cases

Indeed, the last

known case of arbitration occurred in 1659 and centered on
the issue of satisfaction for damage done to John Down's
corn by Thomas Mulliner's horse.

Evidently they were the

last residents to agree to have their difference "referred
to arbitration," and because they did,
given m

"no sentence was

,,
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the case."

It is perhaps fitting that the last cause to be arbi
trated in New Haven would end officially on an inconclusive
note.

It serves as a reminder of the difficulties associa

ted with assessing the role arbitration played in limiting
contention in the community.

M.J.

Ingram has summarized as

well as anyone the import of arbitration when he noted that
it "could give the wronged party adequate redress, but the
relative informality of the procedure made it possible to
be flexibile... to persuade the parties at issue to compromise their rights in the interests of harmony."
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The

spirit of compromise was clearly the goal of arbitration
and frequently it worked, as evidenced in Arresby v. N o r t o n .
And, aside from the aim of compromise it is known that ar
bitration was also viewed as a means of obtaining "a loving
and peaceful end" to private disputes.
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It was employed

in New Haven and elsewhere to settle controversies ranging
from debt to slander, and for about 25 years authorities
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were able to persuade disputants to embrace the procedure
as an alternative to formal litigation.
like this,

Based on evidence

it would seem that arbitration had

recommend it.

much to

For this reason it is more difficult to

understand why it was phased out after 1660.
A number of different forces seem to have contributed
to its decline.

Comments made by Thomas Powell in 1651

suggest one of the most important of these:
resolve actions decisively.

the desire to

Slowly but surely the formal

environment of the courtroom was supplanting the informali
ties of arbitration.

Actions heard by the bench were re

solved quickly and backed by established law.

Because the

outcomes of arbitrated cases in New Haven are so difficult
to determine,

it is impossible to document accurately dis

pleasure with the system.
weary of it.

Nor is it known who was growing

Was it the dissatisfied litigant,

like Powell,

who sought a no-nonsense solution to a source of irritation?
Or were those on the opposite side of the bench no longer
encouraging arbitration because they realized that it was
often slow and non-binding?

Was this tacitly recognized by

the fact that nowhere in the codes of 1656 and 1673 is men
tion made of arbitration?
If there was a decreased tendency by officials to urge
disputants to arbitrate,

then it could have been a response

to an increase in the failure rate of arbitration.

If what

was happening in Essex County was simultaneously occurring
in New Haven,

then clearly the system was failing.

David
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Konig has argued that the failure of arbitration reflected
the "failure of the local community" to resolve private
controversies.
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This notion is appealling because it fits

well into other paradigms of social change— declension,
spatial fragmentation of New England towns,

and increased

mobility and independence by the rising generations.
ever,

it was not the community that was failing.

How

Rather,

it was the rhetorical and idealistic foundation upon which
it was built.

In point of fact, by the 1660s communities

were better equipped to resolve private disputes because
positive law had developed into a functional and pervasive
force within them.

By the sixties,

for example,

livestock

damage suits had disappeared because they had originally
promoted meaningful legal change.

Throughout the century

law on the local level reamined responsive to the needs of
society.

Furthermore,

local courts continued to hear and

determine private disputes.

Perhaps the decline of arbi

tration was less a falling off of the policies of perfection
or an indication of community weakness,

than it was a

strengthening of the legal milieu which simply provided a
more satisfying method of resolving private controversies.

Contrary to what one might expect, the phasing out of
arbitration was not linked to sharp increases in major
categories of litigation.
plevin,

By the 1660s cases of debt, re

and slander were being heard with less frequency

than had been so in the early years of settlement.

Pres

265
sures associated with an increased caseload do n o t , there
fore, appear to have been a factor in the decline of arbi
tration.
heard,

By 1660,

58 or 49% of the debt cases had been

as had 28 or 44% and 22 or 42% of the actions for

replevin and slander respectively.

Although the context

within which these disputes arose is less clear than the
circumstances of animal damage suits, they nevertheless
accounted for 65% of the lawsuits filed in New Haven and
as such merit examination.
Because they were related to routine economic activities
in the community,
common.

causes of debt and replevin shared much in

For instance, both were distributed similarly over

time (Figure 5.4).

As suggested above, the greatest per

centage of these suits occurred early when,
reasons,
defined.

for a variety of

the economic life of the community was most illIt was perhaps during the stage of acclimation to

the new world environment that individuals seeking economic
opportunity engaged in speculative ventures that fell
through and that there was a greater tendency to enter into
verbal contracts which led to lawsuits for indebtedness.
Following the high concentration of suits in the early
years,

a steady decline began and continued for two or

three decades.

It was during this period of decline that

arbitration was phased out.

Moreover,

it was not until

the 1680s and 1690s that suits of both kinds once again
i
,
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began to increase.
Unlike the intense periods of law enforcement that
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produced wide ranges in the number of offenses during a
given period, the range of debt and replevin cases was
narrow.

On three occasions— 1647,

1690, and 1698— there

were as many as four cases of the latter.

Typically,

in

the 37 years in which replevin suits were filed, one or two
cases was the rule.

Debt actions were slightly more prev

alent, averaging between two and three cases annually, but
there were never more than seven suits filed in a single
year and this occurred only twice over the course of the
century.
In addition

to

sharing common distributions and narrow

ranges, both kinds of actions had other similarities.
both, for example,

With

95% of the cases involved local residents

seeking satisfaction in business dealings with their friends
and neighbors.

About a third of the suits had at least one

participant who was a non-resident,

however.

In both cases,

males were the sole litigants in 88% and 92% of the cases
respectively.

Only twice did females exclusively enter

actions of debt (1) or replevin (1).

And in debt cases

which were completed, plaintiffs won 90%, while their
counterparts in replevin suits were successful in 77%— a
reflection of the fact that replevry frequently included
accusations of negligence which was sometimes a difficult
issue to prove.
The thorny question of negligence is best exemplified
by a replevin suit filed in 1647 by merchant John Evance
against a local mariner,

John Charles.

At issue was the
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Figure 5.4
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loss of a shallop and its cargoe to the value of £1 0 0 .
Evance, who was no stanger to the litigation process,
deavored to prove that "through gross,

if not wilfull,

negligence and default" of the defendant,
was cast away or broken,

en

"the said vessel

and a quantity of peas belonging

to himself, with certain pipes of Madera wine belonging to
others, were lost."
bitration,

61

The case was originally put to ar

but Charles refused to agree to the award

granted to Evance.

The arbitrators in the case were men

"that have long bred the sea" and who were "well exper
ienced in such cases."

When asked why he did not accept

the award, Charles claimed that he was not in charge of
the vessel and therefore not responsible for its well
being.

JBecause of this turn of events,

the merchant was

"constrained to crave help and justice" by the court.
Charles'

role in the voyage thus became a principal

point of contention.
tion of negligence,

In fact, before pursuing the ques
"the plaintiff was required to make

proof" that Charles was indeed master of the shallop and
that the loss then resulted through "his neglect or
default."

The issue was complicated because Charles was

a last minute replacement for Thomas Jeffries,
originally designated to serve as master.

the man

Charles claimed

that he went along "voluntarily" because he had "some oc
casions of his own" in Guilford.

However,

Jeffries and

several other witnesses testified that they understood
Charles'

role to be that of master.

The two seamen who
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accompanied the defendant stated that during the trip they
did "what he said John Charles commanded them."

Another

master was asked what he considered to be usual practice,
whereupon he answered "that if anyone were shipped’in the
room of a master of a ship and had his power,
conceived he was master."

that then he

In response to this testimony,

Charles held fast to his position,

adding that he had re

quested no wages and therefore could not have been the
master of the vessel.
jected Charles'

Ultimately,

defense,

however,

the court re

asserting that in "his own con

science" Charles thought of himself as master and "would
have required m a s t e r ’s wages if he returned safe."
Once a determination was reached relative to Charles'
role, the question of neglect was proved with little diffi
culty.

Evidently the shallop was docked at Guilford for

two days with a full cargoe when suddenly a storm developed.
Thomas Jeffries testified that "it was a dangerous place to
ride" out a storm and that as a precaution the vessel
should have been anchored in a nearby channel so that it
"could run up the river with little difficulty” and thereby
be saved.

Finally,

during the storm Charles and his crew

"did all foresake her," resulting in the loss of ship and
cargoe.
In the face of this testimony Charles was asked whether
or not the master of the vessel should be held responsible
for its loss?

His answer was a cautious yes:

were proved master,

there was a great neglect."

"that if he
Essentially
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all parties agreed that the boat was lost through negli
gence, but before this could be proved, officials had to
first determine who was in charge.
has spoken,

When all the witnesses

authorities concluded that Evance would not

have permitted Jeffries to miss the voyage if the defen
dant "had not been procurred in his room," and "that the
treaty with John Charles in this business,
took for consideration,

the time he

and his consent at last,

all tended

to that purpose."

In the end, Evance received the justice

he was "craving."

For his gross neglect and "unworthy car

riage in such a place of trust," Charles was ordered to pay
the plaintiff £67.
Evance was one of 28 other plaintiffs in replevry suits
who won.

In each instance recovery of lost or damaged

property was sought by individuals who filed suits.

Most

replevry causes were not as complex as Evance v. Charles
and the amount of awards requested was generally smaller.
More typical was Thomas Barnes'

suit against Ralph Dayton,

whose son was charged with neglect in the drowning death
of the plaintiff's cow while watching the herds.
instance the court ruled for the defendant;

In this

the loss was

considered "an afflicting providence of God which the said
Barnes must bear himself."
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Whether plaintiffs sought to

recover as much as Evance or as little a.s Barnes, authori
ties diligently weighed evidence in an effort to bring
equitable solutions to private controversies.

If the

absence of appeals is any indication of the attempt to

271
control bitterness,

then perhaps officials performed their

appointed task successfully.
Lawsuits for indebtedness were similar,
plentiful,

if not more

insofar as they related specifically to routine

economic activities of the community.
not as difficult to unravel,

Although they were

actions for debt were more

varied than those for replevin.

But because they tended to

be less complicated,

surviving records contain less detail

about cases of debt.

All too often, references appear as

follows:

"In the action wherein Joseph Smith is plaintiff

and John Downs contra defendant the court finds for the
plaintiff 20s ard costs of court which is 7s.”
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This does

not mean that details are unrecoverable and a sampling of
more complete cases reveals the variation that existed in
debt actions.
In 1652, for example, Philip Galpin sued Lancelot Baker
for a debt amounting to 20s in "trading wampom."
had given the wampom to Baker,
hoppes at Connecticut."

Galpin

instructing hirn to "buy some

However,

if he could not acquire

them, Baker was to turn the money over to John Webb of
Hartford as payment for ten bushels of apples.

Baker did

neither and when Galpin's wife requested the money back, he
refused.

Instead, he offered the Galpins some apples which

he had purchased from Webb even though he admitted to having
the wampom in his possession.

The court ruled for the

plaintiff and Baker was ordered to return the 20s and pay
4 - 6 4

court costs.
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Six years later,

in another of the varied debt cases, widow

Elizabeth Peakin sued John Tompshon "for a debt of roughly
£7 due to her for work done by her late husband."

As evi

dence she submitted his account book and a covenant between
Tompson and her husband.

The former freely acknowledged

the debt, but he contested portions of it for three reasons.
F irst, he claimed that it was improper for Peakin to charge
9d a day for the "victuals and drink" of his workers.

Sec

ond, that costs for tools should not be included in the
debt because Tompson had provided them.

Finally,

that

Peakin's wage of 3s a day for his own work was too high.
After pointing out to the widow that she was "very quick in
prosecuting,

seeing the money were due but yesterday," the

court ruled in her favor, but moderated the debt slightly—
workmen were allowed 6d instead of 9d and Tompson was re
leased from paying for the tools.

As to P e a k i n 1s wages,

they were allowed in full "seeing he was a master workman"
who labored "early and late" at his job.
was so eager to prosecute,

But because she

despite T o m p s o n ’s offer to set

tle out of court, Mrs. Peakin was ordered to pay for half
of the court fees associated with her case.
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Perhaps the most frequent action for debt concerned
"unpaid" bills for products purchased by local residents.
More typical,

therefore, then the preceding cases was the

lawsuit between Samuel Cooke and Thomas Mix heard by the
Plantation Court in 1669.

As plaintiff,

Cooke charged

that Mix owed him.£l 3s 7d "together with such damages as
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the Court shall adjudge."

The debt was for an unspecified

quantity of shoes purchased by the defendant who had of
fered to pay for them with corn.

Evidently,

however, Mix

extended this offer only after a warrant for prosecution
had been filed and the amount tendered was considered in
adequate by Cooke.
debt,

Mix made no attempt to repudiate the

and after all the evidence had been presented, he was

ordered to pay the plaintiff the full amount in addition to
bearing half of the court charges.

As proved to be the

case with widow Peakin, Cooke was told he had to pay the
other half.

In fact, he was admonished for "needlessly

troubling the court and his neighbor" and was left with the
warning that if "he should [here]after be found in such
needless and vexatious suits," he faced punishment by the
court "as the law directs in such eases."
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Although the dispute between Cooke and Mix is illus
trative of the circumstances which prompted most cases of
debt,

it was also atypical insofar as authorities believed

the cause to have been vexatious.

Clearly,

the majority

of actions for debt did not end with admonitions by the
court.

Because they did not, and because there is a

paucity of debt related material in extant records,

it is

difficult to assess the amount of true contention and dis
order which were generated by cases of an economic nature.
Nonetheless,

reference to the fact that Cooke had needlessly

troubled his neighbor suggests that ill-feeling very well
could have existed between the litigants.

Similarly, widow
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Peakin's refusal to settle out of court with John Tompson
leaves the impression that here too bitterness and strong
disagreement existed.

But because the major issue in each

of these actions was debt, its resolution,
of personal
of the bench.

antagonism,

not the extent

received the principal attention

Thus, most of our insights into how disrup

tive private controversies could in fact be, come from
cases like slander and defamation where attacks on indi
viduals reputations required the unswerving attention of
authorities.
When Hannah Marsh filed suit against Mr. Brewster be
cause he called her a Billingsgate s l u t , she was seeking
redress by the court.

This came in the form of a public

apology by the defendant who was told he had to "repair
her reputation."

Nearly all of the 54 slander suits filed

in New Haven between 1640 and 1699 were caused by similar
name-calling or accusations which were perceived by plain
tiffs as being unjust and damaging to their reputations.
Slander suits throughout the century were filed in a ran
dom fashion and do not appear to have been linked to any
thing unusual in the community,

like the problems of live

stock control which led to litigation in the 1640s.

As

proved to be the case with petty offenses and other kinds
of litigation, the majority of New Haven's slander cases
were heard in the first few decades of settlement (Figure
5.5).

The most prolonged period of litigation for slander

occ .rred between the mid-forties and early sixties when
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over 50% of the suits were filed.

The most pronounced

period of slander related controversies took place in the
early 1670s when 11 or 20% of the cases were heard.

From

that point on, the number of suits declined steadily until
the early 1690s when three or 5% of the cases were recorded
One, a suit filed in 1694, serves as a reminder that liti
gation was continuing on the local level even though there
are no extant records of the inferior courts.

In what ap

pears to have been part of a neighborhood conflict involving
quarreling and lying,
County Court of
justices.

a

John Downs entered an appeal in the

decision rendered against him by local

The original verdict was overturned, but Downs

was left with the warning "to be more cautious" with his
neighbors in the future.
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Thus, as was the case with all

our distributions, the one depicted in Figure 5.5 must be
viewed as tentative, especially after 1666.
Slander suits,

like most of the cases of civil litiga

tion filed in New Haven,
exclusively.

involved local residents almost

Fifty-one or 94% of the cases were filed by

local residents; only three suits were heard between non
residents.

And, as also proved to be the case with debt

and replevin,

in slander suits reaching completion, 87% were

won by the plaintiff;
of the defendant.

four or 13% were determined in favor

In addition, most of the individuals in

volved in slander suits were,

like John Downs, male members

of the community.

Seventy percent of the cases involved

males exclusively,

another 15% were cases like the one
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between Marsh and Brewster which embraced members of both
sexes, and 15% were filed just by women.

Moreover, the

eight slander suits entered by females represents 68% of
all those cases wherein women were the only litigants.
It is not surprising to find that most of the slander
cases occurred between local residents and that women were
embroiled in these with greater frequency than in the major
ity of actions,

like debt or replevin, which were related

to business transactions and the economy in general.

The

likelihood of defaming a stranger was much less than
speaking disparagingly about a neighbor or relative who
was disliked.

Whether male or female, however, the testi

mony taken in slander cases reveals certain common character
iztics.

First, the general aim of the litigation was to

"restore" the plaintiff's reputation.

Second, the cases

were generally marked by true contention.

And, third,

mediate neighbors were frequently distracted,

im

if only

tangentially, by the so-called private conflict of the
litigants.

It is in this respect that the disorders as

sociated with slander actions worried public officials.
Among other things,

it was feared that if these suits were

not resolved efficiently and equitably, violence (and a
spill-over into the realm of criminal law) might follow.
The conflict that raged for several years within one
New Haven family is an example of a particularly disrup
tive case which was difficult to resolve.

Central to the

dispute was Ebenezer Brown, one of the town's most prolific
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recidivists who, in the span of 27 years, violated local
or colony statutes on ten different occasions.

His inabil

ity to fulfill his duties as a husband led to conflict be
tween his mother-in-law, widow Rebecca Vincent,
mother, widow Mary Brown,

in 1668.

and his

The exact nature of

the slander is unknown, but it may well have been related
to Ebenezer's treatment of his wife Hannah and remarkds
made by her concerned mother.

In the initial confrontation

the court ruled on behalf of Vincent; Brown threatened to
appeal the decision to the Court of Assistants, but let her
petition drop without an explanation.

Immediately following

this hearing, Rebecca turned around and sued Mary for slan
der; she won her case, was awarded £4 by the jury, but the
award was moderated by the court to 40s and costs.
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As it turns out, the issue was far from settled.

At the

same session of the court, widow Vincent accused Ebenezer
of "sinful miscarriages" which somehow affected her daughter.
Brown was ordered to be whipped, but his wife intervened and
the corporal punishment was remitted.
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Perhaps Hannah

should have let her husband be "corrected," because his ap
parent neglect or mistreatment of her continued and in 1669
the court ordered him to find a suitable home for his now
pregnant wife.
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Five years later, at another session of

the court, Samuel Todd entered an action against Rebecca
Vincent and her daughter because they spread the rumor that
his wife "hugged and kissed Ebenezer" Brown.

Unlike the

earlier cases, this was withdrawn when the plaintiff and

Figure 5.5
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his wife reportedly came "to an agreement" with the defendants.
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Four years after the resolution of that conflict,

Ebenezer was taken to court and sued for slander by Benjamin
Bunell after this particularly wayward member of the Brown
clan reported that one day he saw the plaintiff's wife
"drunk as a bitch."

The court ruled that Bunell was un-

justly wronged and ordered Brown to pay £5 in damages.
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The series of civil and criminal actions involving mem
bers of the Brown family illustrates divisiveness which was
connected to many slander suits.

To be sure, the Browns were

fighting out in court a domestic dispute which was caused
by Ebenezer.

Yet on at least one occasion their conflict

led to the involvement of non-family members like Samuel
Todd.

As such, the Brown's conduct was the kind which

leaders most hoped to avoid.
other married couples;

It set a poor example for

it set in-laws like Rebecca and Mary

against one another in public view; and it was allowed to
spill over and draw outsiders into the fray.

Perhaps to

the relief of rulers, the Brown family quarrel was one of the
very few which dragged on over a long period of time.

After

all, one of the foremost aims of litigation was to resolve
conflict before it escalated.

The Brown dispute was, how

ever, also unique because the restoration of a damaged repu
tation does not appear to have been the principal issue as
it was in most cases of slander.
Lawsuits where the "repair" of one's reputation was the
point at issue could be equally contentious.

In 1659, for
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instance, Richard Beckley sued the recently widowed Frances
Hitchcock who, for some unknown reasons, claimed that the
Beckley's neglected their parental obligations.

in addi

tion, Hitchcock reportedly stated that Mrs. Beckley was a
"liar and a backbiter,"

who "went about with the work of

the Devil," and as such "made difference amongst neighbors."
The case was originally put to arbitration, but that in
creasingly unsatisfying process failed to resolve the con
flict.

The arbitrators determined that the widow "should

give satisfaction in the presence of her neighbors," but
the defendant's apology "was very short compared with her
miscarriages."

Because the arbitrators could not force the

widow to offer a more sincere apology, the Beckley's were
left with little choice but to file suit in Plantation
Court.
Once formal suit was filed, the disagreement escalated
when Mrs. Hitchcock further slandered the plaintiff and his
wife by charging their children with breaking the Sabbath.
At this point the records indicate that Beckley v/as "angry
and grieved" by her behavior.

All attempts to gain satis

faction from the disorderly widow had failed.

Once the

testimony of the plaintiff and defendant had been heard,
along with that of the arbitrators and neighbors affected
by the conflict, the court reached the conclusion that
Frances had a "rotten and corrupt heart" and that the
"poison of asps" was "under her lips."

Accordingly,

"in a

way of reparation," Beckley was awarded £10 and Hitchcock
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was fined 40s "to the public for her corrupting discourses
to others."
Beckley v. Hitchcock was a particularly divisive case
and it summarizes well the basic characteristics of slander
suits and why they needed to be controlled.

First, the

Beckleys were seeking "reparation" for remarks or rumors
directed at them which the court deemed uncalled for.

Pres

sing on with the suit even after Hitchcock had made an
anemic apology indicates their resolve.

In their case,

financial recompense proved to be both a satisfying and an
effective means of quieting the defendant.

Frequently,

however, public apologies alone served that purpose.
is what satisfied Hannah Marsh in 1645.

This

And when three

youths slandered the daughter of John Thomas by circulating
the rumor that she refused "to lye with her husband." they
had to publically acknowledge their error so that Thomas'
"daughter might be cleared."
Secondly,
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the controversy between Beckley and Hitchcock

had had a deleterious affect on their relationships with
neighbors.

The arbitrators in the case evidently spent

several days with the litigants and their neighbors in an
attempt to iron-out the wrinkles in their relationship.
Other divisive slander suits,

like Mallory v. Hotchkiss,

also affected immediate neighbors.

Moreover, the court

records are dotted with cautions like the one given to
Nathan Thorpe and Joshua Hotchkiss in 1673 for "more
neighborly and peaceable behavior in the future."
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Most
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references to conflict among neighbors surface in conduc
tion with suits for slander, but others,

like a bitter re

plevin suit between John Winston and Timothy and Samuel
Ford, ended with warnings that the defendant's behavior
had been "injurious to his neighbors."
Finally,

76

remarks like these suggest that all suits had

the potential of being disruptive and contentious.

Beckley

was reported as being "angry" with Hitchcock, whose conduct
was obviously a source of concern for more people than just
the plaintiff ant his wife.

The unusually handsome settle

ment awarded Beckley underscores how contentious the case
had been.

The lengthy and bitter dispute among members of

the Brown family suggest that public endeavors to control
private disagreements would indeed sometimes be very diffi
cult.

From the start of settlement authorities realized

that private controversies were bound to arise.

If these

could be kept to a minimum, so much the better.

But when

suits were filed in court or even referred to arbitration,
leaders assuredly sought better results than indicated in
the Brown controversy.

Occasionally,

some of the disputes

escalated following the litigants initial court appearance.
In 1657, a case of extortion eventually blossomed into a
full blown suit for slander.

Six years later, an unusually

vociferous replevin action led to a battery suit after a
servant of the plaintiff Isaac Beecher was beaten by one of
the defendants.

And,

in 1665, after being accused of at

tempting "to violate the chastity" of two sisters, Patrick
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Moran sued their mother,

"old goody P in ion,: for slander

and won his case even though he was urged to "carry it
more prudently in the future."
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Instances like these and

the Brown case occurred infrequently at best;

in the main,

authorities appear to have resolved civil disputes effec
tively once they reached the formal setting of the court.
Not only was this true for cases of an economic nature,
but also with actions for slander which,

without question,

tended to be more disruptive than any others.

Residents

of New Haven may have been contentious on occasion, but
because the courts were consistent and effective agencies
of social control over the course of the century, the
planters also remained a well-ordered people.

"Contention" is a word that conjures up images of pro
tracted controversies and disagreements between disputants.
It suggests a depth of enmity that we know must have existed
but which at the same time is next to impossible to document
with regularity.

To a certain extent, therefore, the act of

filing a suit, especially where slander, trespass, or bat
tery were issues, must remain our principal indication that
contention existed in early New Haven.

Very often individ

uals became vexed in their relations with one another and
undoubtedly suppressed their feelings without seeking legal
remedies to their problems.

Piling suit in essence repre

sents their inability to resolve conflicts in a "peaceful
and loving" fashion.
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Judging from extant records,

slander suits threatened

social harmony more than any others.

They frequently in

cluded strident exchanges between litigants and had a ten
dency to draw neighbors into the dispute.
this indicates,

as John Demos has speculated for similar

cases in Plymouth,

„hat a "man cursed his neighbor in order

to keep smiling at his parent,
batable.
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Whether or not

spouse, or child," is de-

What is relatively certain, however,

is that

cases of slander and defamation upset the tempo of life in
the community to the point where conflicts had to be re
solved in the formal setting of the court.

The courts were

there for that reason, as were provisions for filing suits
in the New Haven and Connecticut Colony codes.
But victims of slander were just a small percentage of
those who utilized legal avenues to right wrongs which were
perceived to have occurred.

The majority of suits touched

on a variety of routine economic transactions in New Haven.
Although the context within which the suits for debt and
replevin were filed is not too difficult to understand, the
amount of contention or disorder associated with them is.
Was, for example, John Evance deeply angered by the ne
glect of John Charles, and if so did it continue to under
mine their relationship?

Perhaps so, but the fact that

Charles did not appeal the decision or file a countersuit
suggests that authorities had done their part in ending
the controversy equitably.
That, after all, was one of the principal functions of
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litigation.

But it is also true that in certain instances

civil actions helped to promote order by calling to atten
tion the need to pass laws as a means of staving off future
disputes.

This is what happened in the 1640s and 1650s

relative to livestock control.

Even though rulers were

aware of the need to legislate in the area of fencing from
the outset of settlement,

it was not until after a series of

lawsuits filed in the forties by men like John Owen and
Thomas Nash that bylaws were actually written.

In this in

stance litigation clearly fostered meaningful change and
greater institutionalization in the form of both local or
dinances and positions like the public pounder.
The tendency for the community to become inc:reasingly
institutionalized is a constant theme of legal development
throughout the seventeenth century.

Whether in the form of

increased numbers of bylaws, positions of authority,
codes, or new courts,

legal

formal legal remedies were chosen

means of promoting order.

The decline of arbitration as a

method of conflict resolution is yet another example.
Rather than indicating a failure of the community to di
minish contention, .kh&. phasing out of arbitration reflects
the breakdown of the policies of perfection as articulated
in 1639.

In theory, the spirit of compromise exemplified

in cases like Arresby v. Norton was appealing.

However,

the comments of Thomas Powell who in 1651 refused to have
his suit arbitrated so that "he may have no more trouble
about it" are revealing.

They suggest,

as does most of the
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evidence presented here, that over time order came to be
defined through legal provisions and courts designed to
meet the challenges of settlement in the new world.
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CONCLUSION
Richard Bushman opened his study of Connecticut with
the statement that puritan rulers in the last quarter of
the seventeenth century "valued order above all other
social virtues.

Disorder and sin were equivalents in their

minds" (From Puritan to Yan ke e, 3).

Few researchers would

call into question the applicability of the first portion
of his remarks; throughout the century order remained a
persistent theme of puritan rhetoric.

But so too did the

notion that disorder was equated with sin, a point rein
forced by even a casual excursion into the writings of
Gurdon Saltonstall or Cotton Mather.

In many respects,

however, both ministers were throwbacks to an earlier age
when the exhortations of men like John Cotton and John
Davenport literally determined the character of society.
Moreover,

if one were to assess New England society on the

basis of ministerial tracts alone,

it is possible to con

clude, as did Perry Miller, that the behavior of puritans
reflected a commitment to an "unbroken body of thought"
that lasted for nearly a century.
Yet other forms of evidence suggest that behavior
changed significantly.

The vital records of New England

communities indicate that birth rates dropped.

Ecclesi

astical records have been used to document the decline of
church membership experienced in many locales.
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And town
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records have yielded material about changes in the personnel
of government that occurred late in the century.
once re-examined by social historians,

Indeed,

evidence like this

has explained the behavior of puritans in a different light
than that depicted in the writings of the articulate few.
Court records are yet another source for determining the
behavior of puritans who wrote laws, broke them, and used
them to resolve private controversies.

Information con

tained in New Haven court documents suggests that far from
being inflexibly grounded upon the "judicial laws of Moses,"
the town's legal apparatus was responsive to the needs of
society.

Law was both a reflection of changes in behavior

and used as a means of controlling it.
Law and legal institutions probably were utilized to a
greater extent than envisioned by the founders of New
Haven.

Leaders like John Davenport were convinced that a

broad-based commitment to a God-ordained social order would
prevent serious disorders from surfacing.

Theirs was an

ideal vision of society that was inextricably tied to the
prospects of erecting a Wilderness Zion unmolested by the
corruptions prevalent in England.

Theirs was to be a well-

ordered and covenanted society constructed around institu
tions that promoted correct moral conduct.

The family,

with its network of hierarchical relationships,
prominently in the formula for success.

figured

Indeed, these

"little commonwealths" constituted the first line of de
fense against social disorder.

The church, which was open
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to all who offered convincing professions of faith, served
as another agency of control and periodically used its
power to maintain purity by disciplining delinquent saints.
And for those who were technically beyond the pale of
church authority, God's vice-regents were empowered to pun
ish unrighteous members of the community.

Magistrates re

ceived their powers through a unanimous and voluntary man
date by New Haven's free planters and as a "moral hedge"
invoked the laws of Moses to determine ungodly behavior.

It

is little wonder that at the outset of settlement, when the
policies of perfection were strongest, the architects of
the New England Way believed that disorder was synonymous
with sin.
Within a few years of "transplantation," however, dis
orders arose which necessitated legal remedies that were
traditional and secular.

The most important period of

legal development in New Haven was the 1640s when 53% of
the 114 bylaws were written.

These town ordinances ad

dressed a variety of practical problems ranging from fire
prevention to the control of livestock, which alone, ac
counted for 35% of the legislation.

While men like Matthew

Gilbert may have been God-fearing enough to be chosen as
magistrates,

it was their inability to have fences "made

up in due season" that necessitated bylaws.

The threats

to order that surfaced when fences lay down or chimneys
remained unswept were not instrinsically related to sin.
Rather, they were disorders with which even the most
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enthusiastic member of the errand into the wilderness had
to contend.

Lawmaking on the local level was in effect a

secular response to the particular needs of the community.
Even on the colony level where laws were periodically
codified, flexibility was evident.

Indeed, 69% of the

statutes in the Eaton Code of 1656 and 80% of those in the
Connecticut Code of 1673 were secular in nature.

The rul

ers who compiled the codes were realistic enough to include
laws that were most applicable to the needs of society and
alter or drop those that were not.

They came to recognize

that even the highly regarded laws of Moses were sometimes
anachronistic.

Whereas Biblical law constituted 31% of the

Eaton Code, 17 years later that figure had dropped to 20%.
Moreover, the order that was promoted through lawmaking in
the new world differed markedly from that given priority in
1639.
So too did most of the disorders as reflected through
law enforcement which took place on both the local and
colony levels.

Violations of bylaws governing aspects of

life relating to timber cutting, military preparedness,

or

livestock control were clear challenges to the physical
order of the community.

As in the case of lawmaking,

it

was during the first decade that many (43%) of the 897 ap
pearances were made.

An additional 39% of the cases were

prosecuted before 1659, thus suggesting that the formative
years were crucial in terms of defining physical order.
The sharp decline in petty crime after 1660 may well be an
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indication that disorders had been overcome, that through
a combination of selective legislation and enforcment prob
lems were brought under control.

This proved to be the

case with infractions of military and livestock bylaws
which accounted for 62% of the violations.

When the com

munity was threatened by Indians or unruly livestock,
thorities moved swiftly to correct the disorders.
were brought to court, sometimes repeatedly,

au

Offenders

and convictions

were handed down in between 98% and 100% of the cases.

It

was only after enforcement forced the majority of residents
to attend training exercises or repair their fences, that
previous fines were remitted or that offenders with excuses
were acquitted.

These disorders were not caused by sinful

behavior, nor were petty offenders sinners.

As a group

they were, like magistrates Gilbert and Goodyear,
early thirties, married,

in their

and typically well established

members of the community.
If we accept puritan rhetoric at face value the real
sinners violated colony level statutes and as such chal
lenged moral order.

It was in the colony codes that "sins"

such as drunkenness, theft, fornication,
capital crimes were defined.

and a variety of

And, judging by the punish

ments that a minority of the criminals received, some were
considered sinners in the complete sense of the word.
These were New Haven's deviants and included among them
were people like Humphrey Norton who was "excluded" from
the plantation, John Knight who was deemed "unfit to live
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among men," and Mrs.
thief and lyar."

Fancy who was labelled as a "notorious

Their crimes were considered so threaten

ing that authoritiesbelifeyed they were incapable of recla
mation.

But this was not the case with most of the 541

violations of colony laws.

An overwhelming majority (61%)

were for alcohol abuse, theft,

and fornication.

But rather

than being excluded for deviance, most moral offenders re
ceived surprisingly mild sentences.
linquents tended to be unmarried,

As a group these de

in their early twenties,

and descendants of the founders of New Haven.

And although

corporal punishment was inflicted upon a number of these
offenders in the early yers of settlement, there was a pro
nounced tendency to treat them with greater leniency over
time.
point.

Punishment for the "sin of fornication" is a case in
Overall,

33% of the cases resulted in whippings,

but 91% of these occurred before 1669.

Thereafter magis

trates used the discretion at their disposal to fine "sin
ners" for their misbehavior— the punishment meted out in
61% of these cases during the seventeenth century.

If

rulers in 1639 believed that morality could be legislated,
that was no longer the case a generation later.
Another threat to social harmony came in the form of
civil litigation.

The aim of litigation was to resolve

private controversies.

And although New Haven had its

share of contentious disputes which set local residents
at odds with one another, authorities appear to have re
solved these in an equitable fashion.

Indeed, rather than

299
just disrupting social stability, civil suits sometimes
furthered the cause of order.

This is seen most explicitly

in the case of actions stemming from animal damage to crops.
These suits proved to be instrumental in the formulation of
bylaws which could be used to hold negligent planters ac
countable.

Once the laws were passed and subsequently en

forced, livestock disorders,

including cases realted to

animal damage, declined significantly.

Finally, one of the

clearest examples of how formal legal remedies helped to
promote order concerns arbitration.

If there was one aspect

of litigation that was bound up directly in the rhetoric of
the well-ordered society,
conflict resolution.

it was this informal process of

But as other features of the ideal

faded, so too did the reliance upon arbitration.

And just

as authorities came to rely on law to counteract physical
and moral disorders,

local residents in turn adopted es

tablished law and procedure to end their private contro
versies .
If it could be argued that a God-ordained commitment to
order determined the character of law in 1639, it is equal
ly plausible to assert that in 1701 law defined the char
acter of order.

With all due respect to the founders of

New Haven it is accurate to state that they realized there
would be a need to "branch out" beyond the foundations of
Biblical law.

Perhaps what they did not anticipate was

how far, just as they failed to perceive that other insti
tutions like the family, church,

and government would
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change dramatically in the face of new world conditions.
However, as these alterations occurred, as members of the
rising generations struck out on their own, as church mem
bership declined, and as the personnel of government changed,
law followed suit.

By the end of the seventeenth century

the commitment to order remained, but it was law, not utopian
rhetoric, that assumed the pre-eminent role in defining and
maintaining social order.
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A number of sources on New Haven and Connecticut, again
mostly published, have been invaluable even if they do not
deal specifically with social control.

Especially crucial

for prosoprographical research was Donald Lines Jacobus,
Families of Ancient New Haven (9 v ol s. , in 3, Baltimore,
1974), supplemented by James Savage, A Genealogical Dictio
nary of the First Settlers of New England (4 v o l s . , Boston,
1860-1862).

These were used in conjuction with the spotty

Vital Records of New Haven,

1649-1850 (2 vo ls., Hartford,

1917-1924), Franklin B. Dexter comp., Historical Catalogue
of the Members of the First Church of Christ in New H a v e n ,
Connecticut (New Haven,

1914), the MS "First Church of

Christ and Ecclesiastical Society Records, 1639-1937,"
Volume I, located in the Connecticut State Library, and
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Jay Mack Holbrook, Connecticut 1670 Census (Oxford, M a ss .,
1977), which is not a true census (unfortunately), but a
collection of names drawn from a variety of sources.
Ever useful is the work of Isabel M. Calder, including
The New Haven Colony (New Haven, 1934), her edition of the
Letters of John Davenport Puritan Divine (New Haven, 1937),
and her "John Cotton and the New Haven Colony," New England
Quarterly,

III (1930) and "John Cotton's

'Moses His Judi

cials,'" Colonial Society of Massachusetts Publications,
XXVIII (1935), both of which should be read in conjunction
with Bruce E. Steiner,

"Dissension at Quinnipiac:

The

Authorship and Setting of A Discourse About Civil Government
in New Plantation Whose Design is Religion," New England
Quarterly; LIV (1981).

Other works of significance on New

Haven and Connecticut include John Archer,

"Puritan Town

Planning in New Haven," Society of Architectural Historians
Journal, XXXIV (1975); Leonard Bacon, Thirteen Historical
Discourses...

(New Haven,

Puritan to Yankee:

1839); Richard L. Bushman, From

Character and the Social Order in Con

necticut , 1690-1765 (Cambridge, Mass., 1967); Bruce C.
Daniels, The Connecticut Town:

Growth and Development,

1635-1790 (Middletown, Conn., 1979); Mary J. A. Jones, Con
gregational Commonwealth:
Conn.,

Connecticut, 1636-1662 (Middletown,

1968); and Paul Lucas, Valley of D is cord:

Church

and Society along the Connecticut River, 1636-1725 (Hanover,
N.H., 1976).
The list of important sources that in one form or another
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touch upon the components of the well-ordered society is
endless, but in addition to those cited in the introduction
of this analysis, there are several recent studies which
have helped clarify my thoughts about the shape of early
New Haven society.

Especially useful were T.H. Breen, The

Character of the Good R u l e r :

A Study of Puritan Political

Ideas in New England, 1630-1730 (New Haven, 1970), and
Stephen Foster, Their Solitary Way:

The Puritan Social

Ethic in the First Century of Settlement in New England
(New Haven, 1971), as well as their collaboration,
Puritan's Greatest Achievement:

"The

A Study of Social Cohesion

in Seventeenth-Century Massachusetts," Journal ox American
History, LX (1973),

5-22.

Their interests clearly reflect

those of their mentor Edmund Morgan who, early in his career,
authored The Puritan Fa mi ly :

Religion and Domestic Rela

tions in Seventeenth-Century New England (Boston, 1944) and
later Visible Sa in t s:
York, 1963).
society,

The History of a Puritan Idea (New

Collectively these works examine puritan

ideas, domestic relations, religion, and politics,

all of which were important features of the well-ordered
society.
Morgan was influenced by his teacher, Perry Miller,
whose The New England Mind:

The Seventeenth Century (New

York, 1939), Orthodoxy in Massachusetts, 1630-1650 (Cam
bridge, M ass., 1933), and Errand into the Wilderness
(Cambridge, Mass., 1956) are standard fare for appreci
ating the complex issues associated with puritan thought
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and behavior.

Yet some of Miller's interpretations,

like

his inflexible view of Calvin forwarded in his "The Marrow
of Puritan Divinity," in Ibid., should be tempered by
Micheal McGiffert,

"American Puritan Studies in the 1960's,"

William and Mary Quarterly, XXVII (1970), 36-67; David Hall,
The Faithful Shepard:

A History of the New England Minis

try in the Seventeenth Century (Chapel Hill,

1972) and works

by other members of what Hall calls the "Yale School," in
cluding Norman Pettit, The Heart P repared:

Grace and Con

version in Puritan Spiritual Life (New Haven,
Robert Middlekauf, The M at hers:

1966) and

Three Generations of Puri

tan Intellectuals, 1596-1728 (New York, 1S71).

Finally,

two original sources which have shed light on the puritan
ideal are John Winthrop,

"A Model of Christian Charity," in

Allen B. Forbes e d . , Winthrop Pa p e r s , (5 vols., Boston,
1929-1947) and John Cotton, A Discourse About Civil Govern
ment ...

(Cambridge, Mass.,

1663).

And,

illuminating many

of the details of the Congregational Way, are the documents
contained in Williston Walker e d . , The Creeds and Platforms
of Congregationalism (New York,

1893).

Secondary works focusing on law, its enforcement,

and

litigation also played an important role in understanding
the disorders encountered by New Englanders.

Providing an

overall conceptual framework were a number of general intro
ductions such as Donald Black, The Behavior of Law (New
York,

1976) which examines law and social

control from a

sociological perspective; Roscoe Pound, Social Control
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Through Law (New Haven, 1942); the first chapter of Richard
B. Morris, Studies in the History of American Law (New
York, 1958) and Part I of Lawrence M. Friedman, A History
of American Law (New York, 1973).

William J. Bouwsma's

"Lawyers and Early Modern Culture," American Historical Re
v i e w , LXXVIII (1973) correlates the rise of the legal pro
fession with the need to regulate disorders in the late
middle ages, while Warren 0. Ault's "Some Early Village
By-Laws,” English Historical Review, XLI (1930), 208-231,
demonstrates how important local ordinances were for regu
lating life in English rural communities at roughly the
same time.

Dealing largely with the same period is Alan

Harding, A Social History of English Law (Gloucester, Mass.,
1973 [1966]) which is nonetheless informative because of
the way it explains the context of certain crimes as well
as the derivation of complicated legal terms.
Bridging the gap between Europe and America are help
ful works like Thomas G. Barnes and Joseph H. Smith, The
English Legal System:
Angeles,

Carryover to the Colonies (Los

1975), which features a pair of long essays,

"The

English Criminal Law in Early America," by Smith, and
Barnes'

"Law and Liberty (and Order) in Early Massachu

setts;" Mark DeWolf Howe,

"The Sources and Nature of Law

in Colonial Massachusetts," in George A. Billias e d . , Law
and Authority in Colonial America (Barre, M a s s . , 1965),
1-16; G. B. Warden,

"Law Reform in England and New England,”

William and Mary Quarterly,

3rd Ser., XXXV (1979); and to
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a certain degree David Allen's stimulating Ln English W a y s :
The Movement of Societies and the Transferal of English
Local Law and Custom to Massachusetts Bay in the Seven
teenth Century (Chapel Hill, 1981).
Related more specifically to America and the New England
region are David F. Flaherty,

"An Introduction to Early

American Legal History," in Flaherty e d . , Essays in the
History of Early American Law (Chapel Hill, 1969), 3-38, and,
of course, George Lee Haskins, Law and Authority in Early
Massachusetts:
1960).

A Study in Tradition and Design (New York,

Also informative was William K. Holdsworth,

and Society in Colonial Connecticut,

"Law

1636-1672," (unpub

lished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School,

1974),

and a number of less ambitious studies including Julius
Goebel's "King's Law and Local Custom in Seventeenth Cen
tury New England," Columbia Law Review XXXI (1931), which
gives early acknowledgement to the role played by customary
law; George Lee Haskins,

"The Legal Heritage of Plymouth

Colony," University of Pennsylvania Law Review CX (1962);
appropriate chapters of Harry M. Ward, Statism in Plymouth
Colony (Port Washington, N.Y.,
"Possible Kingdoms:

1973); and Kinvin Wroth,

The New England Town from the Perspec

tive of Legal History," American Journal of Legal History
XIV (1971).

Two articles focusing specifically on New

Haven are Henry N. Townsend's worthy "Judicial Administra
tion in the New Haven Colony before the Charter of 1662,"
Connecticut Bar Journal XXIV (1950), 210-234, and the less
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useful Dean B. Lyman J r . , "Notes on the New Haven Colonial
Courts," in Ibid. , XX (1946), 178-189.

Finally, the

Eaton Code and Connecticut Code of 1673 can be found in
John D. Cushing e d . , The Earliest Laws of the New and
Connecticut Colonies, 1639-1673 (Wilmington, Del.,

1977).

In addition to the works of Edwin Powers, Kai Erikson,
and Eli Faber, studies on crime and punishment have pro
liferated in recent years.

Though not focusing on New

England, Douglas Greenberg's Crime and Law Enforcement in
the Colony of New Y o r k , 1691-1776 (Ithaca, N . Y . , 1976) is
one of the few full-length quantitative assessments of
criminal behavior in early America.

However, some of the

finest surveys of crime have been devoted to England.

Two

collections of essays that are noteworthy include Douglas
Hay et a l . , Albion's Fatal T r e e :

Crime and Society in

Eighteenth-Century England (New York,

1975) and J.S. Cockburn

ec*-> Crime in England, 1550-1800 (Princeton, 1977).

The

latter consists of many fine selections, but worth special
mention because of the way crime is examined on the local
level are J.A. Sharpe,
Parish,
Courts:

"Crime and Delinquency in an Essex

1600-1640," and M.J.

Ingram,

"Communities and

Law and Disorder in Early Seventeenth-Century

Wiltshire."

Other helpful works of English social history

that have aided to further illuminate criminal conduct are
Barbara Hanawalt's "Fur Collar Crime:

The Pattern of

Crime among the Fourteenth-Century English Nobility,"
Journal of Social History VIII (1975), 1-17 which describes
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the difficulties of controlling criminal behavior of nobles;
Carol Z. Wiener,

"Sex Roles and Crime in Late Elizabethan

Hertsforshire," in Ibid., which devotes special attention
to female lawbreakers; and Caroline Bingham,

"Seventeenth-

Century Attitudes Toward Deviant Sex," Journal of Inter
disciplinary Histo ry , I (1971)— an examination of attitudes
towards homosexuality.

This should be read in conjunction

with Randolph Trumbach,

"London's Sodomites:

Homosexual

Behavior and Western Culture in the 18th Century," Journal
of Social H is tory, XI (1977)^
Along the same line but focusing on New England is
Robert F. Oaks' whose "'Things Fearful to Name':

Sodomy

and Buggery in Seventeenth-Century New England," Ibid., XII
(1978) suggests that homosexuality was more widespread than
previously thought.

Other works pertaining to moral order,

but more general in scope include Charles Francis Adams'
disappointing examination of Braintree, Massachusetts
church records,

"Some Phases of Sexual Morality

and Church

Discipline in Colonial New England," Massachusetts Histori
cal Society Proceedings, 2nd Ser., VI (1890-1891), 477-516.
Much better is David H. Flaherty's "Law and the Enforcement
of Morals in Early America," Perspectives in American His
tory , V (1971) because of the way it illustrates changing
morality,

especially in light of the puritan rhetoric

found in studies like Ronald A. Bosco,
Pillory:

"Lectures at the

The Early American Execution Sermon," American

Quarterly, XXX (1978), 156-176.

Despite the rhetoric of
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execution sermons, at least two studies have stressed the
flexibility and charity inherent in puritan justice.
Carol F. Lee,

See

"Discretionary Justice in Early Massachu

setts," Essex Institute Historical Collections, CXII
(1976) and Jules Zanger, "Crime and Punishment in Early
Massachusetts," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd S e r . , XXII
(1965).

For the activities of "delinquents" prone to im

morality see Ross W. Beales Jr., "In Search of the His
torical Child:

Miniature Adulthood and Youth in Colonial

New England," American Quarterly, XXVII (1975) and Ray H.
H i n e r , "Adolescence in Eighteenth-Century America," His
tory of Childhood Quarterly, III (1975).
consult Richard Slotkin,
England,

"Narratives of Negro Crime in New

1675-1800," ikmerican Quarterly, XXV (1973),

and for Indians, James P. Ronda,
Bench:

For Negroes

3-21,

"Red and White at the

Indians and the Law in Plymouth Colony,

1620-1691,"

Essex Institute Historical Collections, CX (1974), 200-215.
Finally, there is a small body of literature devoted
primarily to exploring civil litigation.

As one might

expect these studies have been utilized to the fullest in
an effort to illuminate the context of private controver
sies in New Haven.

The most important is certainly David

Thomas Konig, Law and Society in Puritan Massachusetts:
Essex County, 1629-1692 (Chapel Hill,

1979) which empha

sizes the rise of law in defining the social order as the
policies of perfection or what L' called the "communal
ideal" crumbled.

Also useful for comparative purposes was
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Jessica

Kross Ehrlich,

Betwixt Man and M a n ' :

"'To Hear and Try all Causes
The Town Court of Newtown,

1659-

1692," New York Hi s t o r y , LIX (1978) especially because it
focuses on a single community during the seventeenth cen
tury.

Both of these studies should be supplemented by

Herbert W. K. Fitzroy,
1697:

"Richard Crosby Goes to Court, 1683-

Some Realities of Colonial Litigation," Pennsylvania

Magazine of History and Biography, LXII (1938) even though
it examines more than just civil disputes.

Also worthy of

mention is the one good example of arbitration that I have
found, "Arbitration Between Mr. Norton and Richard Arresby,"
Winthrop Papers,

IV.

And, perhaps deserving of attention

is Robert Silverman's recent Law and Urban G r o w t h :

Civil

Litigation in the Boston Trial Courts, 1880-1900 (Princeton,
1981).

